REDHAT-BUG-2577141: Medium severity Keycloak Keycloak vulnerability
After an administrator disables a client that has Authorization
Services enabled (a resource server), Keycloak still issues new Requesting Party Tokens (RPTs) that target that disabled client. The UMA grant resolves the target resource server by checking only that the client and its authorization settings exist, and never checks whether the client is enabled. Keycloak then adds the disabled client to the RPT audience and includes the user's granted permissions. This bypasses the administrator's action of disabling the client, because ordinary token issuance excludes disabled clients from the audience of new tokens. The resulting RPT remains usable by any resource server or policy enforcement point that validates the signature, audience and embedded authorization data locally. The affected endpoint is the token endpoint (POST /realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token) using the UMA grant (urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:uma-ticket).
Affected Software
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to practical impact?
Deployments are exposed when a disabled client has Authorization Services enabled and a resource server or policy enforcement point accepts RPTs through local validation of their signature, audience, and embedded authorization data.
What request path is involved in obtaining an affected token?
The issue is triggered through the realm token endpoint using the UMA ticket grant. The request is sent to POST /realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token with grant type urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:uma-ticket.
Does disabling the client prevent newly issued RPTs from naming it as an audience?
No. UMA grant processing can still resolve the disabled client, add it to the RPT audience, and include the user's granted permissions.