REDHAT-BUG-2577154: Medium severity Red Hat Keycloak vulnerability
A client can enforce a minimum authentication level (the "Minimum ACR
Value" client setting, documented as the server-side way to enforce step-up authentication). The normal authorization endpoint applies that minimum, so the second factor is demanded. The credential reset endpoint (/realms/{realm}/login-actions/reset-credentials?clientid=...&redirecturi=...) also creates a login session for a client. That session never receives the client's required level. A user who starts the login there and follows the "Back to login" link gets the same login form. Because no level is required, the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped and the login completes with the first factor only. Keycloak then issues an authorization code, and the client can redeem it for an access token and a refresh token. The token carries the level the first factor reached (acr=1).
The same defect was fixed for the Device Authorization Grant and CIBA in 26.8.2 (CVE-2026-105305). This is a further entry point with the same missing step. The same omission exists when a login is continued from an action token link (password reset, verify email or execute-actions email), but that path needs a valid action token and is narrower.
Against the built-in administration console, whose minimum ACR is set to a second-factor level, an attacker who knows only an administrator's password obtains a token that works against the Admin API. This also relies on the missing PKCE enforcement at the token endpoint on the same entry point, which is tracked separately in keycloak/keycloak#55064.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
keycloak/keycloakto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 26.8.2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this bypass?
Deployments are exposed when a client uses the Minimum ACR Value setting to require step-up authentication and the authentication flow conditionally requires a second factor. The affected paths are credential reset flows and, with a valid action token, logins continued from password-reset, email-verification, or execute-actions email links.
What does an attacker need to exploit the issue?
The attacker must be able to start the affected login path for the target client and complete the first authentication factor. For the action-token entry points, a valid action token is also required.
How can administrators identify a potentially affected authentication result?
A successful login through an affected path can result in an authorization code that is redeemable for access and refresh tokens even though the client requires a higher authentication level. The resulting token carries the level reached by the first factor, shown as acr=1.