REDHAT-BUG-2577526: Medium severity Red Hat Cluster Network Operator vulnerability

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in cluster-network-operator. The network.openshift.io/signer controller validates that a certificate signing request originates from an existing OVN node username but does not bind the requested certificate Subject and DNS SANs to that node. An attacker possessing an accepted OVN node credential and CSR submission permission can request a CA-signed certificate identifying another node chassis. In the reported OVN IPsec scenario, impersonation additionally requires separate control of the victim underlay address to satisfy the configured peer address check; the signer defect does not itself provide this capability. Successful impersonation could compromise the confidentiality and integrity of protected traffic. Cross identity issuance is supported by source review; complete IKE impersonation and traffic interception have not been independently reproduced. The supplied patch and fake client tests were reviewed statically, not applied or executed. Preliminary CVSS v3.1: 5.9 (Medium), CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N. This score assumes successful impersonation allows reading and modifying victim traffic and remains subject to confirmation. Reported by Avinash Duduskar; preferred acknowledgment name is pending confirmation.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Red Hat Cluster Network Operator

Event History

Nov 20, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·01:40 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What access would an attacker need to exploit this issue?

The attacker needs an accepted OVN node credential and permission to submit certificate signing requests. The flaw allows that requester to obtain a CA-signed certificate with the identity of another node chassis.

2

Are all environments using the affected signer exposed to IPsec traffic interception?

No. In the reported OVN IPsec scenario, the attacker must also separately control the victim's underlay address to pass the configured peer-address check. The signer defect alone does not provide control of that address.

3

How certain is the reported impact on protected traffic?

Cross-identity certificate issuance is supported by source review. Complete IKE impersonation and traffic interception have not been independently reproduced, and the supplied patch and fake-client tests were reviewed statically rather than applied or executed.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203