First published: Sun Mar 13 2011(Updated: )
While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit f83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR. Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since "ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to Brad Spengler for pointing this out. <a href="https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/3/11/380">https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/3/11/380</a> Acknowledgements: Red Hat would like to thank Kees Cook for reporting this issue.
Affected Software | Affected Version | How to fix |
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Red Hat Linux |
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The severity of REDHAT-BUG-684569 is considered to be critical due to the potential for ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) bypass.
To fix REDHAT-BUG-684569, apply the latest security patches provided by Red Hat Linux that address this vulnerability.
REDHAT-BUG-684569 affects versions of Red Hat Linux that utilize the affected mm->start_stack functionalities.
Yes, REDHAT-BUG-684569 could potentially allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access and compromise the system by leaking memory addresses.
Currently, there are no known effective workarounds for REDHAT-BUG-684569 other than applying the appropriate patches.