RUSTSEC-2026-0585: ML-KEM does not perform the FIPS 203 input checks

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

pqcrypto-mlkem wraps PQClean's ML-KEM implementation, which does not perform the input checks required by FIPS 203:

- encapsulation does not perform the encapsulation key modulus check (section 7.2), so encapsulation keys with coefficients that are not reduced modulo q are accepted; - decapsulation does not perform the decapsulation key hash check (section 7.3), so a decapsulation key whose stored hash or embedded encapsulation key has been altered is accepted.

With the Wycheproof ML-KEM vectors, 108 / 112 / 116 invalid encapsulation keys (ML-KEM-512 / -768 / -1024) and 2 invalid decapsulation keys per parameter set are accepted.

This does not disclose key material. It is a FIPS 203 non-conformance, and an affected implementation can disagree with a conforming one about which keys are valid.

The crate is unmaintained (see RUSTSEC-2026-0161) and no patched version is expected. Migrating to a maintained implementation, such as the ml-kem crate, is recommended.

Affected Software

1 affected component
rust/pqcrypto-mlkem>=0.0.0-0

Event History

Nov 20, 2026
Advisory Published
via OSV·12:00 PM
Data Sourced
via OSV·12:00 PM
DescriptionAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is exposed to this issue?

Users of the rust/pqcrypto-mlkem crate are affected where interoperability or compliance with FIPS 203 key-validation requirements matters. An affected implementation may accept malformed encapsulation or decapsulation keys that a conforming implementation rejects.

2

What malformed inputs are accepted?

Encapsulation accepts keys whose coefficients are not reduced modulo q because it does not perform the FIPS 203 section 7.2 modulus check. Decapsulation accepts keys with an altered stored hash or embedded encapsulation key because it does not perform the section 7.3 hash check.

3

Does exploitation disclose key material?

No. The available information states that this issue does not disclose key material.

4

What should teams do if they use this crate?

No patched version is expected because the crate is unmaintained. Migrate to a maintained implementation, such as the ml-kem crate.

5

How can teams determine whether their implementation has this behavior?

Testing with the Wycheproof ML-KEM invalid-key vectors can identify the behavior. The affected implementation accepts 108, 112, and 116 invalid encapsulation keys for ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024 respectively, plus two invalid decapsulation keys for each parameter set.

Contact

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