RUSTSEC-2026-0586: ML-DSA verification accepts non-conforming signatures with the `avx2` feature
With the default avx2 feature on x8664 (non-Windows) and a CPU that supports AVX2, pqcrypto-mldsa verifies signatures with PQClean's AVX2 implementation of ML-DSA. That implementation predates two upstream fixes (pq-crystals/dilithium#113, 3 June 2026):
- the verifier does not check that the infinity norm of z is below γ1 − β (FIPS 204, Algorithm 8, line 13), so it accepts signatures that conforming verifiers reject; - usehintavx() mishandles a boundary case, so one class of valid signatures is rejected.
Creating an accepted out-of-bound signature requires the private key. The practical effect is that verification results differ between this crate with AVX2 and conforming implementations, including this crate without AVX2.
The Wycheproof ML-DSA verification vectors reproduce both defects: with AVX2, 37 / 41 / 49 invalid vectors (ML-DSA-44 / -65 / -87) are accepted and one valid vector per parameter set is rejected.
The crate is unmaintained (see RUSTSEC-2026-0166) and no patched version is expected. Disabling the avx2 feature avoids the affected code. Migrating to a maintained implementation, such as the ml-dsa crate, is recommended.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Configuration
Disable the `avx2` feature to avoid the affected verification code.
pqcrypto-mldsa avx2 = disabled
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments use the affected verification path?
The affected path is used on non-Windows x86_64 systems when the crate's default avx2 feature is enabled and the CPU supports AVX2. Builds without AVX2 do not use the affected implementation.
Can an attacker create a signature that is accepted only by the affected verifier without access to the signing key?
Creating an out-of-bound signature accepted by the affected verifier requires the private key. The issue can still cause interoperability problems because AVX2-enabled verification can disagree with conforming implementations.
What should we do if upgrading is not an option?
Disable the avx2 feature to avoid the affected code path. The crate is unmaintained and no patched version is expected, so migration to a maintained implementation is the longer-term option.
How can we confirm that verification behavior is affected?
The Wycheproof ML-DSA verification vectors reproduce both defects: AVX2 verification accepts 37, 41, and 49 invalid vectors for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 respectively, and rejects one valid vector for each parameter set.