UBUNTU-CVE-2026-80872: Low severity ubuntu/linux-hwe-edge vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda/tas2781: Cancel async firmware request at unbind TAS2781 HDA I2C and SPI queue RCA firmware loading from component bind with requestfirmwarenowait(). The firmware loader keeps the callback module pinned and holds a device reference, but the callback still uses driver-private HDA state. Component unbind removes controls and DSP state immediately. Later device removal tears down the TAS2781 private data, including codeclock. If the async firmware callback runs after unbind has started, it can operate on state that is being torn down. Cancel or synchronize the async firmware request before removing controls and DSP state. A queued callback is cancelled, and an already-running callback is allowed to finish before unbind continues.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-aws-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1014.14~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-azure-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1017.17~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-azure-fde-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1016.16~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-gcp-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1014.14~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-hwe-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-38.38~24.04.4 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-nvidia-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1024.25~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-oracle-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1013.13~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-riscv-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-38.38.1~24.04.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-38.38 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-awsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1014.14 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-azureto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1017.17 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-azure-fdeto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1016.16 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-gcpto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1014.14 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-gketo a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1008.9 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-ibmto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1015.15 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-nvidia-bosto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-2022.23 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-oem-7.0to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1015.15 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-oracleto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-1013.13 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-realtimeto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-38.38.1 - Upgrade
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ubuntu/linux-riscvto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.0.0-38.38.1 - Compensating control
Before removing TAS2781 controls, DSP state, or private data during component unbind, cancel the queued asynchronous firmware request and wait for any already-running callback to finish.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which systems are exposed to this issue?
Systems using the affected Ubuntu kernel packages are exposed when they use TAS2781 HDA audio devices connected over I2C or SPI and the driver performs asynchronous RCA firmware loading during component binding.
What condition triggers the race?
The race requires component unbind or device removal to begin while an asynchronous firmware request callback is still queued or running. The callback can then access TAS2781 driver-private HDA state after controls and DSP state have been removed or while private data such as codec_lock is being torn down.
Is an external attacker required to exploit this issue?
The available information describes a local driver lifecycle race involving firmware loading and device unbind or removal. It does not provide evidence of a remote attack path or specify attacker privileges.
What mitigates the issue if an updated kernel cannot be deployed immediately?
The data does not provide a supported workaround. Reducing exposure would require avoiding the affected TAS2781 component unbind or device-removal sequence while asynchronous firmware loading may still be pending.