UBUNTU-CVE-2026-93241: Medium severity ubuntu/linux vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: bypass the reclaim and oom killer for dying tasks once oomreaper is done At Meta, we are seeing instances where an OOM killed job is stuck in the exit path for several hours. In one particular case, the job was stuck for more than 8 hours and I had to manually remove the memory.max limits to allow the process to exit. The job was a single process job and had ~55 GiB memory.max and zswap enabled. It had almost 0 anon in memory and ~111 GiB in zswap compressed to ~51 GiB zswap pool (i.e. almost all of memory.current was zswap). Nothing was left on the LRUs to reclaim. On further inspection, I observed ~20k threads of that process stuck with the following stack: [<0>] memcgroupoutofmemory+0x4e/0xa0 [<0>] chargememcg+0x8bf/0x990 [<0>] memcgroupswapinchargefolio+0x4e/0x80 [<0>] readswapcacheasync+0x10c/0x260 [<0>] swapinreadahead+0x116/0x3f0 [<0>] doswappage+0x13c/0x1ce0 [<0>] handlemmfault+0x61d/0x11f0 [<0>] douseraddrfault+0x3e7/0x6d0 [<0>] excpagefault+0x8f/0x110 [<0>] asmexcpagefault+0x22/0x30 [<0>] getuser8+0x14/0x20 [<0>] futexcleanup+0x27/0x1c0 [<0>] futexexitrelease+0x47/0x60 [<0>] doexit+0x107/0x940 [<0>] dogroupexit+0x81/0xa0 [<0>] getsignal+0x2b1/0x6e0 [<0>] archdosignalorrestart+0x1a/0x1c0 [<0>] exittousermodeloop+0xa8/0x1c0 [<0>] dosyscall64+0x152/0x250 [<0>] entrySYSCALL64afterhwframe+0x4b/0x53 In addition the dmesg was filled with "Out of memory and no killable processes..." messages. I have no idea why oom reaper was not able to reap/unmap the process. My guess is that since oom reaper tries to acquire mmaplock in read mode limited number of times and then gives up, there might be a thread of that process which had mmaplock in write mode at that time. My initial suspicion was the futexcleanup and kernel page fault causing infinite fault and charge retries but that was put to rest in previous discussions happened on similar problem [1]. My current theory is that it is just a simple slow serialization behind the oomlock. Unlike page allocator, memcg charge code takes the oomlock without the "try". Though memcg oom code uses mutexlockkillable(), note that in the call stack getsignal() consumes SIGKILL (or sigdelset(SIGKILL)) before calling dogroupexit(). So this mutexlockkillable() is just a mutexlock() here. Therefore 10s of thousands of threads are waiting on oomlock and one by one they get -EFAULT from getuser() in the futex cleanup code and bails out. Discussion from [1] led to commit a75ffa26122b ("memcg, oom: do not bypass oom killer for dying tasks") which routes dying tasks into the OOM path precisely so the oomreaper can reap their mm and free the memory asynchronously. But the reaper is best-effort and one-shot: if it cannot take mmaplock for read (e.g. a sibling thread holds it for write) it sets MMFOOMSKIP and never retries, leaving only the glacial oomlock-serialized synchronous drain. Once MMFOOMSKIP is set there is no more asynchronous reclaim coming for the mm, so a dying task charging against it has nothing left to wait for: it frees its memory only once it finishes exiting. Running reclaim and the (no-victim) OOM killer for it is then pointless, and doing it for 10s of thousands of exiting threads is what serializes them behind oomlock. So before reclaim, if current is an OOM victim whose reaper is done, fail the charge. Reproduced with 20k threads, each parking a robust futex head on its own zswapped page, OOM-group-killed while a sibling holds mmaplock for write so the reaper gives up and sets MMFOOMSKIP. Tested on next-20260728 and baseline show ~90 seconds exit time while with the patch the exit time reduced to ~3 seconds.