A deserialization flaw was found in Apache log4j 1.2.x. While reading serialized log events, they are improperly deserialized.
Note this is the same as CVE-2020-9493 which identified a deserialization issue in Apache Chainsaw. Prior to Chainsaw V2.0, Chainsaw was a component of Apache Log4j 1.2.x.
References:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/18/5
A flaw was found in the Java logging library Apache Log4j in version 1.x. JDBCAppender in Log4j 1.x is vulnerable to SQL injection in untrusted data. This allows a remote attacker to run SQL statements in the database if the deployed application is configured to use JDBCAppender with certain interpolation tokens.
A flaw was found in the Java logging library Apache Log4j in version 1.x. JMSSink in Log4j 1.x is vulnerable to deserialization of untrusted data. This allows a remote attacker to execute code on the server if JMSSink is deployed and has been configured to perform JNDI requests.
Apache Log4j <=2.14.1 JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled (CVE-2021-44228).
A flaw was found in the Java logging library Apache Log4j in version 1.x . This allows a remote attacker to execute code on the server if the deployed application is configured to use JMSAppender.
In 1.x you will find that there are two places where lookups are done - that is JMSAppender.java:207 and JMSAppender.java:222 - if you set TopicBindingName or TopicConnectionFactoryBindingName to something that JNDI can handle - for example "ldap://host:port/a" JNDI will do exactly the same thing it does for 2.x - so 1.x is vulnerable, just attack vector is "safer" as it depends on configuration rather than user input
This flaw in Log4j 2.x is tracked via CVE-2021-44228
In Apache Commons IO before 2.7, When invoking the method FileNameUtils.normalize with an improper input string, like "//../foo", or "\\..\foo", the result would be the same value, thus possibly providing access to files in the parent directory, but not further above (thus "limited" path traversal), if the calling code would use the result to construct a path value.
References:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/04/12/1 https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/IO-556
ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 8.5 has a double free that may be relevant in a few less-common scenarios, such as unconstrained agent-socket access on a legacy operating system, or the forwarding of an agent to an attacker-controlled host.
Apache Batik 1.13 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery, caused by improper input validation by the NodePickerPanel. By using a specially-crafted argument, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the underlying server to make arbitrary GET requests.
Python CPython could allow a remote attacker to bypass security restrictions, caused by a web cache poisoning flaw via urllib.parse.parseqsl and urllib.parse.parseqs. By sending a specially-crafted request parameter cloaking, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a difference in the interpretation of the request between the proxy and the server.
A flaw was found in python. A stack-based buffer overflow was discovered in the ctypes module provided within Python. Applications that use ctypes without carefully validating the input passed to it may be vulnerable to this flaw, which would allow an attacker to overflow a buffer on the stack and crash the application. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind. FasterXML mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
Impact If GZIP request body inflation is enabled and requests from different clients are multiplexed onto a single connection and if an attacker can send a request with a body that is received entirely by not consumed by the application, then a subsequent request on the same connection will see that body prepended to it's body.
The attacker will not see any data, but may inject data into the body of the subsequent request
CVE score is 4.8 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Workarounds The problem can be worked around by either: - Disabling compressed request body inflation by GzipHandler. - By always fully consuming the request content before sending a response. - By adding a Connection: close to any response where the servlet does not fully consume request content.
A flaw was found in krb5. MIT Kerberos 5 allows unbounded recursion via an ASN.1-encoded Kerberos message because the lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1encode.c support for BER indefinite lengths lacks a recursion limit.
Impact On Unix like systems, the system's temporary directory is shared between all users on that system. A collocated user can observe the process of creating a temporary sub directory in the shared temporary directory and race to complete the creation of the temporary subdirectory. If the attacker wins the race then they will have read and write permission to the subdirectory used to unpack web applications, including their WEB-INF/lib jar files and JSP files. If any code is ever executed out of this temporary directory, this can lead to a local privilege escalation vulnerability.
Additionally, any user code uses of WebAppContext::getTempDirectory) would similarly be vulnerable.
Additionally, any user application code using the ServletContext attribute for the tempdir will also be impacted. See: https://javaee.github.io/javaee-spec/javadocs/javax/servlet/ServletContext.html#TEMPDIR
For example: java import java.io.File; import java.io.IOException; import javax.servlet.ServletContext; import javax.servlet.ServletException; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
public class ExampleServlet extends HttpServlet { @Override protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) throws ServletException, IOException { File tempDir = (File)getServletContext().getAttribute(ServletContext.TEMPDIR); // Potentially compromised // do something with that temp dir } }
Example: The JSP library itself will use the container temp directory for compiling the JSP source into Java classes before executing them.
CVSSv3.1 Evaluation
This vulnerability has been calculated to have a CVSSv3.1 score of 7.8/10 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Patches Fixes were applied to the 9.4.x branch with: - https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/commit/53e0e0e9b25a6309bf24ee3b10984f4145701edb - https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/commit/9ad6beb80543b392c91653f6bfce233fc75b9d5f
These will be included in releases: 9.4.33, 10.0.0.beta3, 11.0.0.beta3
Workarounds
A work around is to set a temporary directory, either for the server or the context, to a directory outside of the shared temporary file system. For recent releases, a temporary directory can be created simple by creating a directory called work in the ${jetty.base} directory (the parent directory of the webapps directory). Alternately the java temporary directory can be set with the System Property java.io.tmpdir. A more detailed description of how jetty selects a temporary directory is below.
The Jetty search order for finding a temporary directory is as follows:
1. If the WebAppContext has a temp directory specified), use it. 2. If the ServletContext has the javax.servlet.context.tempdir attribute set, and if directory exists, use it. 3. If a ${jetty.base}/work directory exists, use it (since Jetty 9.1) 4. If a ServletContext has the org.eclipse.jetty.webapp.basetempdir attribute set, and if the directory exists, use it. 5. Use System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir") and use it.
Jetty will end traversal at the first successful step. To mitigate this vulnerability the directory must be set to one that is not writable by an attacker. To avoid information leakage, the directory should also not be readable by an attacker.
Setting a Jetty server temporary directory.
Choices 3 and 5 apply to the server level, and will impact all deployed webapps on the server.
For choice 3 just create that work directory underneath your ${jetty.base} and restart Jetty.
For choice 5, just specify your own java.io.tmpdir when you start the JVM for Jetty.
shell [jetty-distribution]$ java -Djava.io.tmpdir=/var/web/work -jar start.jar
Setting a Context specific temporary directory.
The rest of the choices require you to configure the context for that deployed webapp (seen as ${jetty.base}/webapps/<context>.xml)
Example (excluding the DTD which is version specific):
xml <Configure class="org.eclipse.jetty.webapp.WebAppContext"> <Set name="contextPath"><Property name="foo"/></Set> <Set name="war">/var/web/webapps/foo.war</Set> <Set name="tempDirectory">/var/web/work/foo</Set> </Configure>
References - https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/issues/5451 - CWE-378: Creation of Temporary File With Insecure Permissions - CWE-379: Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Insecure Permissions - CodeQL Query PR To Detect Similar Vulnerabilities
Similar Vulnerabilities
Similar, but not the same.
- JUnit 4 - https://github.com/junit-team/junit4/security/advisories/GHSA-269g-pwp5-87pp - Google Guava - https://github.com/google/guava/issues/4011 - Apache Ant - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1945 - JetBrains Kotlin Compiler - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15824
For more information
The original report of this vulnerability is below:
On Thu, 15 Oct 2020 at 21:14, Jonathan Leitschuh <jonathan.leitschuh@gmail.com> wrote: Hi WebTide Security Team, I'm a security researcher writing some custom CodeQL queries to find Local Temporary Directory Hijacking Vulnerabilities. One of my queries flagged an issue in Jetty. https://lgtm.com/query/5615014766184643449/ I've recently been looking into security vulnerabilities involving the temporary directory because on unix-like systems, the system temporary directory is shared between all users. There exists a race condition between the deletion of the temporary file and the creation of the directory. java // ensure file will always be unique by appending random digits tmpDir = File.createTempFile(temp, ".dir", parent); // Attacker knows the full path of the file that will be generated // delete the file that was created tmpDir.delete(); // Attacker sees file is deleted and begins a race to create their own directory before Jetty. // and make a directory of the same name // SECURITY VULNERABILITY: Race Condition! - Attacker beats Jetty and now owns this directory tmpDir.mkdirs(); https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/blob/1b59672b7f668b8a421690154b98b4b2b03f254b/jetty-webapp/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/webapp/WebInfConfiguration.java#L511-L518 In several cases the parent parameter will not be the system temporary directory. However, there is one case where it will be, as the last fallback. https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/blob/1b59672b7f668b8a421690154b98b4b2b03f254b/jetty-webapp/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/webapp/WebInfConfiguration.java#L467-L468 If any code is ever executed out of this temporary directory, this can lead to a local privilege escalation vulnerability. Would your team be willing to open a GitHub security advisory to continue the discussion and disclosure there? https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/security/advisories This vulnerability disclosure follows Google's 90-day vulnerability disclosure policy (I'm not an employee of Google, I just like their policy). Full disclosure will occur either at the end of the 90-day deadline or whenever a patch is made widely available, whichever occurs first. Cheers, Jonathan Leitschuh
A Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in the python-lxml's clean module. The module's parser did not properly imitate browsers, causing different behaviors between the sanitizer and the user's page. This flaw allows a remote attacker to run arbitrary HTML/JS code. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality and integrity.
A flaw was found in the way NSS handled CCS (ChangeCipherSpec) messages in TLS 1.3. This flaw allows a remote attacker to send multiple CCS messages, causing a denial of service for servers compiled with the NSS library. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability. This flaw affects NSS versions before 3.58.
A flaw was found in jackson-databind 2.x in versions prior to 2.9.10.6. The interaction between serialization gadgets and typing is mishandled. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and system availability.
FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.6 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to br.com.anteros.dbcp.AnterosDBCPDataSource (aka Anteros-DBCP).