Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
Use After Free
AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Redis contains a use-after-free vulnerability in the 'tlsProcessPendingData()' function, which handles the TLS pending-data list if Redis is configured with TLS support. A remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Redis server.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.1
AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H

Rejected reason: Red Hat CNA-LR concluded that this CVE is not valid.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Double Free
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Redis before 8.8.0, in the unusual case where an authenticated attacker can execute RESTORE, allows remote code execution via a RESTORE payload where the same NACK (pending entry) is referenced by more than one consumer, because deleting both consumers via XGROUP DELCONSUMER leads to a double free. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-25243.

First published (updated )

CVE-2026-23479 has been sitting in Redis since 7.2.0, introduced in mid-2023 across two separate commits that were not dangerous individually but created a use-after-free condition together. It survived multiple rounds of security review and remained in every stable branch until patches landed on May 5. The flaw was not found by a human security researcher going through the code. An autonomous AI tool called Xint Code, built by Theori specifically to hunt bugs in large codebases, found it at Wiz's ZeroDay.Cloud hacking competition in London last December. The full technical writeup and working exploit chain are now public. Here's why this matters beyond the patch urgency. Redis runs in roughly 75% of cloud environments according to Wiz. Most of those instances run without a password. The exploit technically requires an authenticated session, but in a default Redis deployment the default user already holds every permission the attack chain needs: u/admin, u/scripting, u/stream, and read/write access. So for a significant portion of exposed instances, the authentication requirement is not much of a barrier in practice. The exploit itself is a three-stage chain. First a one-line Lua script leaks a heap pointer. Then the attacker grooms client memory, parks a large client on a stream, drops the memory limits to trigger the free, and immediately reclaims the freed slot with a fake client structure via a pipelined SET. Finally Redis's own memory accounting routine gets turned against itself to overwrite a function pointer in the Global Offset Table, redirecting a standard string function to system(). The next command Redis parses runs as a shell command on the host. The official Redis Docker image makes the last step easier because it ships with only partial RELRO, leaving the GOT writable at runtime. ASLR and PIE do not help here since the write targets a global with a fixed offset at build time. Patches are out. Minor upgrades within a series are designed to be drop-in, so there is no good reason to delay. If you are on a managed Redis service, check your provider's status. Redis Cloud is already patched. Patched versions by branch: 7.2.x fixed in 7.2.14, 7.4.x fixed in 7.4.9, 8.2.x fixed in 8.2.6, 8.4.x fixed in 8.4.3, 8.6.x fixed in 8.6.3. If patching immediately is not possible, keep Redis off the public internet, put it behind TLS, tighten ACLs so no single role holds u/admin and u/scripting together, and disable Lua scripting entirely if you do not use it. That last step kills Stage 1 of the exploit chain. Worth noting this is one of five RCE-class Redis flaws disclosed in the same May 5 advisory. CVE-2026-23479 is the one that got the full public exploit writeup, but the others are worth reviewing too. Redis's official security advisory covers all five. This assumes some familiarity with your environment and Redis configuration. If any of this is unclear, drop a comment and the community or myself can help.

First published (updated )
Social
reddit

After FIOD seized 800+ servers and arrested two operators on May 18, the ELLIO research team reports that scanning from the network's ASN ranges has continued largely uninterrupted - and that while roughly a third of the recently-active ranges (including the legacy Stark blocks 94.131.105.0/24 and 92.118.232.0/24) have since been withdrawn from global routing, the surviving ranges under AS209847 (WorkTitans / THE.Hosting) are still announced and still scanning, at the network's normal daily rate.

The sibling ASNs (AS213999 and the Moscow-based AS33993) remain routed and idle.

The recent activity skews toward database and ICS/SCADA discovery = MongoDB, Redis, PostgreSQL, Oracle, LDAP, plus DNP3 and EtherNet/IP - alongside known-exploit probes like CVE-2017-17215 and WinRM.

First published (updated )
Social
reddit
Severity
7.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Redis is an in-memory data structure store. In versions of redis-server up to 8.6.3, the RESTORE command does not properly validate serialized values. An authenticated attacker with permission to execute RESTORE can supply a crafted serialized payload that triggers invalid memory access and may lead to remote code execution. A workaround is to restrict access to the RESTORE command with ACL rules. This is patched in version 8.6.3.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.1
Use After Free
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Redis is an in-memory data structure store. In all versions of redis-server with Lua scripting, an authenticated attacker can exploit the master-replica synchronization mechanism to trigger a use-after-free on replicas where replica-read-only is disabled or can be disabled, which may lead to remote code execution. A workaround is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts or avoid using replicas where replica-read-only is disabled. This is patched in version 8.6.3.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.7
Use After Free
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Redis is an in-memory data structure store. In redis-server from 7.2.0 until 8.6.3, the unblock client flow does not handle an error return from processCommandAndResetClient when re-executing a blocked command. If a blocked client is evicted during this flow, an authenticated attacker can trigger a use-after-free that may lead to remote code execution. This has been patched in version 8.6.3.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Input Validation, Buffer Overflow
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions 8.2.0 and above, a user can run the XACKDEL command with multiple ID's and trigger a stack buffer overflow, which may potentially lead to remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.3. To workaround this issue without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing XACKDEL operation. This can be done using ACL to restrict XACKDEL command.

First published (updated )
Severity
7
Use After Free

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted Lua script to manipulate the garbage collector, trigger a use-after-free and potentially lead to remote code execution. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2. To workaround this issue without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts. This can be done using ACL to restrict EVAL and EVALSHA commands.

First published (updated )
Severity
4

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted LUA script to read out-of-bound data or crash the server and subsequent denial of service. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2. To workaround this issue without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts. This can be done using ACL to block a script by restricting both the EVAL and FUNCTION command families.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Use After Free
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted Lua script to manipulate the garbage collector, trigger a use-after-free and potentially lead to remote code execution. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2. To workaround this issue without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts. This can be done using ACL to restrict EVAL and EVALSHA commands.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
7.1
Integer Overflow
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted LUA script to read out-of-bound data or crash the server and subsequent denial of service. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2. To workaround this issue without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts. This can be done using ACL to block a script by restricting both the EVAL and FUNCTION command families.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
4

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted Lua script to manipulate different LUA objects and potentially run their own code in the context of another user. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with LUA scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2. A workaround to mitigate the problem without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing LUA scripts. This can be done using ACL to block a script by restricting both the EVAL and FUNCTION command families.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.3
Code Injection
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted Lua script to manipulate different LUA objects and potentially run their own code in the context of another user. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with LUA scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2. A workaround to mitigate the problem without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing LUA scripts. This can be done using ACL to block a script by restricting both the EVAL and FUNCTION command families.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
4
Integer Overflow

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user to use a specially crafted Lua script to cause an integer overflow and potentially lead to remote code execution The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.2.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Integer Overflow
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Lua library commands may lead to integer overflow and potential RCE

1 / 2
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
7

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. From 2.8 to before 8.0.3, 7.4.5, 7.2.10, and 6.2.19, an authenticated user may use a specially crafted string to trigger a stack/heap out of bounds write on hyperloglog operations, potentially leading to remote code execution. The bug likely affects all Redis versions with hyperloglog operations implemented. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.0.3, 7.4.5, 7.2.10, and 6.2.19. An additional workaround to mitigate the problem without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing hyperloglog operations. This can be done using ACL to restrict HLL commands.

First published (updated )
Severity
4

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. An unauthenticated connection can cause repeated IP protocol errors, leading to client starvation and, ultimately, a denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.0.3, 7.4.5, 7.2.10, and 6.2.19.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Redis DoS Vulnerability due to bad connection error handling

1 / 2
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Redis allows out of bounds writes in hyperloglog commands leading to RCE

1 / 2
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
4
Buffer Overflow

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions starting from 7.0.0 to before 8.0.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in redis-check-aof due to the use of memcpy with strlen(filepath) when copying a user-supplied file path into a fixed-size stack buffer. This allows an attacker to overflow the stack and potentially achieve code execution. This issue has been patched in version 8.0.2.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Input Validation, Buffer Overflow
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions starting from 7.0.0 to before 8.0.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in redis-check-aof due to the use of memcpy with strlen(filepath) when copying a user-supplied file path into a fixed-size stack buffer. This allows an attacker to overflow the stack and potentially achieve code execution. This issue has been patched in version 8.0.2.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Redis DoS Vulnerability due to unlimited growth of output buffers abused by unauthenticated client

1 / 2
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
7

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. An authenticated user may use a specially crafted Lua script to manipulate the garbage collector and potentially lead to remote code execution. The problem is fixed in 7.4.2, 7.2.7, and 6.2.17. An additional workaround to mitigate the problem without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts. This can be done using ACL to restrict EVAL and EVALSHA commands.

First published (updated )
Severity
4

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. An authenticated with sufficient privileges may create a malformed ACL selector which, when accessed, triggers a server panic and subsequent denial of service. The problem is fixed in Redis 7.2.7 and 7.4.2.

First published (updated )
Severity
4.4
Input Validation
AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Last updated 20 March 2025

1 / 4
Source: Ubuntu
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Use After Free
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Last updated 20 March 2025

1 / 4
Source: Ubuntu
First published (updated )
Severity
4
Buffer Overflow

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. An authenticated user may use a specially crafted Lua script to trigger a stack buffer overflow in the bit library, which may potentially lead to remote code execution. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This problem has been fixed in Redis versions 6.2.16, 7.2.6, and 7.4.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

First published (updated )

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