Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.8
EPSS
0.05%
SQL Injection
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Impact

It is possible for a user with SCRIPT right to escape from the HQL execution context and perform a blind SQL injection to execute arbitrary SQL statements on the database backend.

Depending on the used database backend, the attacker may be able to not only obtain confidential information such as password hashes from the database, but also execute UPDATE/INSERT/DELETE queries.

The vulnerability may be tested in a default installation of XWIki Standard Flavor, including using the official Docker containers.

For example, with a MySQL or MariaDB database, you can use the following script (which a user having SCRIPT right but not PROGRAMMING right) to get the content of the xwikistrings table (which contain all the short string fields stored in objects, including passwords):

{{velocity}} $services.query.hql("where 1<>'1\'' union select concat(XWSNAME, XWSVALUE) from xwikistrings #'").execute() {{/velocity}}

Patches

This has been patched in 16.10.1, 16.4.6 and 15.10.16.

Workarounds

There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki.

The protection added to this REST API is the same as the one used to validate complete select queries, making it more consistent. However, while the script API always had this protection for complete queries, it's important to note that it's a very strict protection and some valid, but complex, queries might suddenly require the author to have programming right.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22718

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
4.7
EPSS
0.06%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Impact

This vulnerability impacts users of a subwiki of XWiki where Message Stream is enabled and use, if they configured their wiki to be closed by selecting "Prevent unregistered users to view pages" in the Administrations Rights.

The vulnerability is that any message sent in a subwiki to "everyone" is actually sent to the farm: any visitor of the main wiki will be able to see that message through the Dashboard, even if the subwiki is configured to be private.

Patches

This problem has not been patched and is not going to be patched in the future: Message Stream has been deprecated in XWiki 16.8.0RC1 and is not maintained anymore.

Workarounds

Message Stream is disabled by default, it's advised to keep it disabled from Administration > Social > Message Stream.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-17154

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

NOTE: The Realtime WYSIWYG Editor extension was experimental, and thus not recommended, in the versions affected by this vulnerability. It has become enabled by default, and thus recommended, starting with XWiki 16.9.0.

A user with only edit right can join a realtime editing session where others, that where already there or that may join later, have script or programming access rights. This user can then insert script rendering macros that are executed for those users in the realtime session that have script or programming rights. The inserted scripts can be used to gain more access rights.

Here's an example that works with XWiki 15.10.9+ and 16.2.0+:

the attacker starts editing a wiki page in realtime (for which they have edit right) another user, with script or programming access right joins the editing session (e.g. by clicking on a link / URL provided by the attacker) the attacker inserts a script rendering macro, say {{velocity}}I can run scripts{{/velocity}}, in the edited content, using the WYSIWYG editor UI the edited content is reloaded for both the attacker and the other user, in order to render the inserted macro the attacker gets a rendering error message the other user sees "I can run scripts"

The attacker can obviously use more advanced scripts to gain access rights.

Before XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.2.0 the edited content was not re-rendered for all the users in the editing sesesion, but only for the user that inserted the macro. This means that in order to reproduce the problem the other user had to insert or update a macro or save and view the content.

Patches

This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.10.12, 16.4.1 and 16.6.0-rc-1.

Workarounds

To avoid this vulnerability you can:

either disable the realtime WYSIWYG editing by disabling the xwiki-realtime CKEditor plugin from the WYSIWYG editor administration section or uninstall the Realtime WYSIWYG Editor extension (org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-realtime-wysiwyg-ui)

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21949

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of XWiki.org XWiki. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The ZDI has assigned a CVSS rating of 9.8.

First published (updated )
Advisory
ZDI-24-1697

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of XWiki.org XWiki. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The ZDI has assigned a CVSS rating of 9.8.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Any user with script rights can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of XWiki.ConfigurableClass to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce on a instance, as a user with script rights, edit your user profile and add an object of type XWiki.ConfigurableClass ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in category" to other, "Scope" to Wiki and all spaces and "Heading" to: #set($codeToExecute = 'Test') #set($codeToExecuteResult = '{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}') Save the page and view it, then add ?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content&section=other to the URL. If the logs contain "attacker - Attack from Heading succeeded!", then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21207 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/8493435ff9606905a2d913607d6c79862d0c168d

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
5.4
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Impact Any user with an account on the main wiki could run scheduling operations on subwikis. To reproduce, as a user on the main wiki without any special right, view the document Scheduler.WebHome in a subwiki. Then, click on any operation (e.g., Trigger) on any job. If the operation is successful, then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.

Workarounds If you have subwikis where the Job Scheduler is enabled, you can edit the objects on Scheduler.WebPreferences to match https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331#diff-8e274bd0065e319a34090339de6dfe56193144d15fd71c52c1be7272254728b4.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21663 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Impact

In getdocument.vm ; the ordering of the returned documents is defined from an unsanitized request parameter (request.sort) and can allow any user to inject HQL.

Depending on the used database backend, the attacker may be able to not only obtain confidential information such as password hashes from the database, but also execute UPDATE/INSERT/DELETE queries.

It's possible to employ database backend dependent techniques of breaking out of HQL query context, described, for example, here: https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/exploiting-hibernate-injections.

Patches

This has been patched in 13.10.5 and 14.3-rc-1.

Workarounds

There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-17568

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact On instances where Extension Repository Application is installed, any user can execute any code requiring programming rights on the server. In order to reproduce on an instance, as a normal user without script nor programming rights, go to your profile and add an object of type ExtensionCode.ExtensionClass. Set the description to {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Description"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} and press Save and View. If the description displays as Hello from Description without any error, then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.

Workarounds Since Extension Repository Application is not mandatory, it can be safely disabled on instances that do not use it. It is also possible to manually apply this patch to the page ExtensionCode.ExtensionSheet, as well as this patch to the page ExtensionCode.ExtensionAuthorsDisplayer.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21890 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/8659f17d500522bf33595e402391592a35a162e8

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Impact

It's possible to get access to notification filters of any user by using a URL such as <hostname>xwiki/bin/get/XWiki/Notifications/Code/NotificationFilterPreferenceLivetableResults?outputSyntax=plain&type=custom&user=<username>. This vulnerability impacts all versions of XWiki since 13.2-rc-1. The filters do not provide much information (they mainly contain references which are public data in XWiki), though some info could be used in combination with other vulnerabilities.

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.21, 15.5.5, 15.10.1, 16.0RC1. The patch consists in checking the rights of the user when sending the data.

Workarounds

It's possible to workaround the vulnerability by applying manually the patch: it's possible for an administrator to edit directly the document XWiki.Notifications.Code.NotificationFilterPreferenceLivetableResults to apply the same changes as in the patch. See c8c6545f9bde6f5aade994aa5b5903a67b5c2582.

References

Jira ticket: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20336 Commit: c8c6545f9bde6f5aade994aa5b5903a67b5c2582

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported on Intigriti by Mete.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Impact

It's possible for any user knowing the ID of a notification filter preference of another user, to enable/disable it or even delete it. The impact is that the target user might start loosing notifications on some pages because of this. This vulnerability is present in XWiki since 13.2-rc-1.

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.21, 15.5.5, 15.10.1, 16.0-rc-1. The patch consists in checking properly the rights of the user before performing any action on the filters.

Workarounds

It's possible to fix manually the vulnerability by editing the document XWiki.Notifications.Code.NotificationPreferenceService to apply the changes performed in this commit e8acc9d8e6af7dfbfe70716ded431642ae4a6dd4.

References

JIRA ticket: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20337 Commit: e8acc9d8e6af7dfbfe70716ded431642ae4a6dd4

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported on Intigriti by @floerer

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

A user without script/programming right can trick a user with elevated rights to edit a content with a malicious payload using a WYSIWYG editor. The user with elevated rights is not warned beforehand that they are going to edit possibly dangerous content. The payload is executed at edit time.

Patches

This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.10RC1.

Workarounds

No workaround. It is advised to upgrade to XWiki 15.10+.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20331 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21311 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21481 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21482 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21483 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21484 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21485 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21486 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21487 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21488 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21489 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21490

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported on Intigriti by @floerer

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Pro Macros provides XWiki rendering macros. Missing escaping in the Viewpdf macro allows any user with view right on the CKEditor.HTMLConverter page or edit or comment right on any page to perform remote code execution. Other macros like Viewppt are vulnerable to the same kind of attack. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.1.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

By creating a conflict when another user with more rights is currently editing a page, it is possible to execute JavaScript snippets on the side of the other user, which compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce on a XWiki instance, a user with admin rights needs to edit a document without saving right away. Then, as another user without any other right than edit on the specific document, change the whole content to <script>alert('XSS')</script>. When the admin user then saves the document, a conflict popup appears. If they select "Fix each conflict individually" and see an alert displaying "XSS", then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.8 and 16.3.0RC1.

Workarounds

We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21626 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/821d43ec45e67d45a6735a0717b9b77fffc1cd9f

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

The content of a document included using {{include reference="targetdocument"/}} is executed with the right of the includer and not with the right of its author.

This means that any user able to modify the target document can impersonate the author of the content which used the include macro.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 15.0 RC1 by making the default behavior safe.

Workarounds

Make sure to protect any included document to make sure only allowed users can modify it.

A workaround have been provided in 14.10.2 to allow forcing to execute the included content with the target content author instead of the default behavior. See https://extensions.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Extension/Include%20Macro#HAuthor for more details.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-5027 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20471

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact When an admin disables a user account, the user's profile is executed with the admin's rights. This allows a user to place malicious code in the user profile before getting an admin to disable the user account.

To reproduce, as a user without script nor programming rights, edit the about section of your user profile and add {{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}. As an admin, go to the user profile and click the "Disable this account" button. Then, reload the page. If the logs show attacker - Hello from Groovy! then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.21, 15.5.5, 15.10.6 and 16.0.0.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21611 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f89c8f47fad6e5cc7e68c69a7e0acde07f5eed5a

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Parameters of UI extensions are always interpreted as Velocity code and executed with programming rights. Any user with edit right on any document like the user's own profile can create UI extensions. This allows remote code execution and thereby impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce, edit your user profile with the object editor and add a UIExtension object with the following values: Extension Point ID: org.xwiki.platform.panels.Applications Extension ID: platform.panels.myFakeApplication Extension parameters:  label=I got programming right: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming') target=Main.WebHome targetQueryString= icon=icon:bomb Extension Scope: "Current User".

Save the document and open any document. If an application entry with the text "I got programming right: true" is displayed, the attack succeeded, if the code in "label" is displayed literally, the XWiki installation isn't vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.9-RC1.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workarounds apart from upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21335 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/171e7c7d0e56deaa7b3678657ae26ef95379b1ea

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact The HTML escaping of escaping tool that is used in XWiki doesn't escape {, which, when used in certain places, allows XWiki syntax injection and thereby remote code execution.

To reproduce in an XWiki installation, open <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Panels/PanelLayoutUpdate?place=%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20async%3Dfalse%7D%7D%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%23evaluate(%24request.eval)%7B%7B%2Fvelocity%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fasync%7D%7D&eval=Hello%20from%20URL%20Parameter!%20I%20got%20programming%3A%20%24services.security.authorization.hasAccess(%27programming%27) where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation. If this displays You are not admin on this place Hello from URL Parameter! I got programming: true, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches The vulnerability has been fixed on XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.5, and 15.9 RC1.

Workarounds Apart from upgrading, there is no generic workaround. However, replacing $escapetool.html by $escapetool.xml in XWiki documents fixes the vulnerability. In a standard XWiki installation, we're only aware of the document Panels.PanelLayoutUpdate that exposes this vulnerability, patching this document is thus a workaround. Any extension could expose this vulnerability and might thus require patching, too.

References - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-commons/commit/b94142e2a66ec32e89eacab67c3da8d91f5ef93a - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XCOMMONS-2828 - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21438

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.7
EPSS
0.04%
CSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact When the realtime editor is installed in XWiki, it allows arbitrary remote code execution with the interaction of an admin user with programming right. More precisely, by getting an admin user to either visit a crafted URL or to view an image with this URL that could be in a comment, the attacker can get the admin to execute arbitrary XWiki syntax including scripting macros with Groovy or Python code. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce on an XWiki installation, as an admin, click on <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/get/RTFrontend/ConvertHTML?wiki=xwiki&space=Main&page=WebHome&text=%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%24logtool.error%28%22Hello%20from%20Velocity%20%21%22%29%7B%7B%2Fvelocity%7D%7D. If the error "Hello from Velocity!" gets logged then the installation is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.9.

Workarounds Update RTFrontend.ConvertHTML following this patch. This will, however, break some synchronization processes in the realtime editor, so upgrading should be the preferred way on installations where this editor is used.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21424 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/4896712ee6483da623f131be2e618f1f2b79cb8d

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Any user who can edit any page like their profile can create a custom skin with a template override that is executed with programming right, thus allowing remote code execution.

To reproduce, as a user without edit, script or admin right, add an object of class XWiki.XWikiSkins to your profile. Name it whatever you want and set the Base Skin to flamingo. Add an object of class XWikiSkinFileOverrideClass and set the path to macros.vm and the content to: #macro(mediumUserAvatar $username) #resizedUserAvatar($username 50) $services.logging.getLogger('Skin').error("I got programming: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming')") #end Back to your profile, click Test this skin. Force a refresh, just in case. If the error "Skin - I got programming: true" gets logged, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.10RC1.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21478 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/3d4dbb41f52d1a6e39835cfb1695ca6668605a39 (>= 15.8 RC1) https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/da177c3c972e797d92c1a31e278f946012c41b56 (< 15.8 RC1)

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
EPSS
0.04%
CSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact By creating a document with a special crafted documented reference and an XWiki.SchedulerJobClass XObject, it is possible to execute arbitrary code on the server whenever an admin visits the scheduler page or the scheduler page is referenced, e.g., via an image in a comment on a page in the wiki.

To reproduce on an XWiki installation, click on this link to create a new document : <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/%22%3E%5D%5D%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20context%3D%22request/parameters%22%7D%7D%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%23evaluate%28%24request/eval%29/. Then, add to this document an object of type XWiki.SchedulerJobClass. Finally, as an admin, go to <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Scheduler/?eval=$services.logging.getLogger(%22attacker%22).error(%22Hello%20from%20URL%20Parameter!%20I%20got%20programming:%20$services.security.authorization.hasAccess(%27programming%27)%22). If the logs contain ERROR attacker - Hello from URL Parameter! I got programming: true, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches The vulnerability has been fixed on XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.5, and 15.9.

Workarounds Modify the Scheduler.WebHome page following this patch.

References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21416 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f16ca4ef1513f84ce2e685d4a05d689bd3a2ab4c

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
5.4
EPSS
0.04%
CSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Impact It is possible to schedule/trigger/unschedule existing jobs by having an admin visit the Job Scheduler page through a predictable URL, for example by embedding such an URL in any content as an image.

To reproduce in an XWiki installation, open <xwiki-host>:/xwiki/bin/view/Scheduler/?do=trigger&which=Scheduler.NotificationEmailDailySender as a user with admin rights. If there is no error message that indicates the CSRF token is invalid, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches The vulnerability has been fixed on XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.5, and 15.9.

Workarounds Modify the Scheduler.WebHome page following this patch.

References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20851 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f16ca4ef1513f84ce2e685d4a05d689bd3a2ab4c

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact By creating a document with a specially crafted title, it is possible to trigger remote code execution in the (Solr-based) search in XWiki. This allows any user who can edit the title of a space (all users by default) to execute any Groovy code in the XWiki installation which compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce, as a user without script nor programming rights, create a document with title {{/html}}{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy Title!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} and content Test Document. Using the search UI, search for "Test Document", then deploy the Location facet on the right of the screen, next to the search results. The installation is vulnerable if you see an item such as: Hello from Groovy Title! </a> <div class="itemCount">1</div> </li> </ul> {{/html}}

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10 RC1.

Workarounds Modify the Main.SolrSpaceFacet page following this patch.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21471 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/acba74c149a041345b24dcca52c586f872ba97fb https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/74e301c481e69eeea674dac7fed6af3614cf08c5

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

In multilingual wikis, translations can be edited by any user who has edit right, circumventing the rights that are normally required for authoring translations (script right for user-scope translations, wiki admin for translations on the wiki). This can be exploited for remote code execution if the translation value is not properly escaped where it is used. To reproduce, in a multilingual wiki, as a user without script or admin right, edit a translation of AppWithinMinutes.Translations and in the line platform.appwithinminutes.description= add {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Translation"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} at the end. Then open the app with in minutes home page (AppWithinMinutes.WebHome) in the same locale. If translations are still working and "Hello from Translation" is displayed at the end of the introduction, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10RC1.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except restricting edit right on documents that contain translations.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21411 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/c4c8d61c30de72298d805ccc82df2a307f131c54

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Remote code execution is possible via PDF export templates. To reproduce on an installation, register a new user account with username PDFClass if XWiki.PDFClass does not exist. On XWiki.PDFClass, use the class editor to add a "style" property of type "TextArea" and content type "Plain Text". Then, add an object of class PDFClass and set the "style" attribute to $services.logging.getLogger('PDFClass').error("I got programming: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming')"). Finally, go to <host>/xwiki/bin/export/Main/WebHome?format=pdf&pdftemplate=XWiki.PDFClass. If the logs contain "ERROR PDFClass - I got programming: true", the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10-rc-1.

Workarounds If PDF templates are not typically used on the instance, an administrator can create the document XWiki.PDFClass and block its edition, after making sure that it does not contain a style attribute. Otherwise, the instance needs to be updated.

References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21337 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/d28e21a670c69880b951e415dd2ddd69d273eae9

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Any user with edit right on any page can execute any code on the server by adding an object of type XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceClass to their user profile or any other page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce on an instance, as a user without script nor programming rights, add an object of type XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceClass to your profile page. On this object, set every possible property to }}}{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} (i.e., name, engine, service, query, limit and icon). Save and display the page, then append ?sheet=XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceSheet to the URL. If any property displays as Hello from Groovy!}}}, then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10 RC1.

Workarounds This patch can be manually applied to the document XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceSheet.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21474 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/6a7f19f6424036fce3d703413137adde950ae809

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
6.8
EPSS
0.04%
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impact

It is possible to access the hash of a password by using the diff feature of the history whenever the object storing the password is deleted. Using that vulnerability it's possible for an attacker to have access to the hash password of a user if they have rights to edit the users' page.

Now with the default right scheme in XWiki this vulnerability is normally prevented on user profiles, except by users with Admin rights. Note that this vulnerability also impacts any extensions that might use passwords stored in xobjects: for those usecases it depends on the right of those pages.

There is currently no way to be 100% sure that this vulnerability has been exploited, as an attacker with enough privilege could have deleted the revision where the xobject was deleted after rolling-back the deletion. But again, this operation requires high privileges on the target page (Admin right). A page with a user password xobject which have in its history a revision where the object has been deleted should be considered at risk and the password should be changed there.

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.9-rc-1 by performing a better check before dislaying data of a diff, to ensure it's not coming from a password field.

Workarounds

Admins should ensure that the user pages are properly protected: the edit right shouldn't be allowed for other users than Admin and owner of the profile (which is the default right). Now there's not much workaround possible for a privileged user other than upgrading XWiki.

References

JIRA ticket: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19948 Commit: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f1eaec1e512220fabd970d053c627e435a1652cf

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.3
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

Impact

It's possible to execute a Velocity script without script right through the document tree.

To reproduce:

As a user without script right, create a document, e.g., named Nasty Title Set the document's title to $request.requestURI Click "Save & View" Reload the page in the browser

The navigation panel displays a document named with the current URL, showing that the Velocity code has been executed even though the user doesn't have script right.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.7 and 15.2RC1.

Workarounds

A possible workaround is to: modify the page XWiki.DocumentTreeMacros search for the code #set ($discard = $translatedDocument.setTitle($translatedDocument.title)) modify it into #set ($discard = $translatedDocument.setcomment(''))

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20625 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/41d7dca2d30084966ca6a7ee537f39ee8354a7e3

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

Anyone who can edit an arbitrary wiki page in an XWiki installation can gain programming right through several cases of missing escaping in the code for displaying sections in the administration interface. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. Normally, all users are allowed to edit their own user profile so this should be exploitable by all users of the XWiki instance.

The easiest way to reproduce this is to edit any document with the object editor and add an object of type XWiki.ConfigurableClass ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in Category" to "other", set scope to "Wiki and all spaces" and "Heading" to {{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"); println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}. Click "Save". Open <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Main/?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content&editor=globaladmin&section=other where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation. If this displays just "Hello from Groovy!" in a heading and generates an error message with content "Attack from Heading succeeded!" in XWiki's log, the attack succeeded. Similar attacks are also possible by creating this kind of object on a document with a specially crafted name, see the referenced Jira issues for more reproduction steps.

Patches This has been fixed in XWiki 14.10.15, 15.5.2 and 15.7RC1

Workarounds

It is possible to manually apply the fixes for the vulnerability by editing two pages in the wiki. This patch needs to be applied to the page XWiki.ConfigurableClassMacros. Further, the following patches need to be applied to the page XWiki.ConfigurableClass:

https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e#diff-bf419a99140f3c12fd78ea30f855b63cfb74c1c976ff4436898266d9b37ad3ce https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7#diff-bf419a99140f3c12fd78ea30f855b63cfb74c1c976ff4436898266d9b37ad3ce https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6

Note that also the page XWiki.ConfigurableClass needs to be changed to xwiki/2.1 syntax for the escaping to work properly but the security vulnerability is fixed also without changing the syntax.

References

https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/bd82be936c21b65dee367d558e3050b9b6995713 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21122 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21121 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21194

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
CSRF, XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact There is a reflected XSS or also direct remote code execution vulnerability in the code for displaying configurable admin sections. The code that can be passed through a URL parameter is only executed when the user who is visiting the crafted URL has edit right on at least one configuration section. While any user of the wiki could easily create such a section, in this case it is much more convenient to exploit GHSA-qj86-p74r-7wp5 which is why this attack scenario won't be further considered in the following. In contrast to GHSA-qj86-p74r-7wp5, this vulnerability doesn't require the attacker to have an account or any access on the wiki. It is sufficient to trick any admin user of the XWiki installation to visit the crafted URL. Alternatively, the URL can also be embedded as image source of an image in any content of the wiki like a comment that could be left by an anonymous user. This vulnerability allows full remote code execution with programming rights and thus impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

Patches

This has been fixed in XWiki 14.10.15, 15.5.2 and 15.7RC1

Workarounds

The patch can be manually applied to the document XWiki.ConfigurableClass.

References

https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/5e14c8d08fd0c5b619833d35090b470aa4cb52b0 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21167

1 / 2
First published (updated )

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