Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.8
3 Months
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vhost: reset the vring metadata cache on vring reconfiguration

vq->metaiotlb[] caches the vhostiotlbmap that backs each vring metadata region, and iotlbaccessok() returns early on a cache hit, taking the hit as proof that the region has already been validated:

if (vhostvqmetafetch(vq, addr, len, type)) return true;

The cache is reset on VHOSTIOTLBUPDATE and VHOSTIOTLBINVALIDATE, on device IOTLB (re)initialisation and on vq reset, but not when VHOSTSETVRINGADDR replaces vq->desc, vq->avail and vq->used, nor when VHOSTSETVRINGNUM changes the region sizes.

With a device IOTLB attached both ioctls are accepted while the vq is live, and neither validates the addresses at ioctl time: vqaccessok() and vqlogusedaccessok() return true early because the addresses are GIOVAs, deferring validation to prefetch time. Once the cache has been populated that deferred validation no longer runs -- vqmetaprefetch() hits the stale entry and returns true -- and vhostvqmetafetch() keeps translating through the old mapping as

map->addr + addr - map->start

for an address the mapping no longer covers. vhostcopytouser() and vhostcopyfromuser() consume the result with copytouser() and copyfromuser(), which do not check it either, so a subsequent used ring update or descriptor fetch accesses memory outside the region the IOTLB actually maps.

Reset the metadata cache whenever the vring is reconfigured, so the new addresses are pushed back through iotlbaccessok()'s slow path.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
3 Months
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A use-after-free vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's IPv6 FIB rule lookup path. In fib6rulesuppress(), when a route is suppressed and released via ip6rtputflags(), the res->rt6 pointer is not cleared. If no later rule supplies a replacement route, fib6rulelookup() returns the stale (freed) rt6info to its caller. The subsequent dstrelease() then operates on freed memory, hitting rcurefputslowpath(). A local attacker who can configure IPv6 routing/FIB rules could trigger this to cause a denial of service (kernel crash) or potentially escalate privileges.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
3 Months
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: bridge: stop fast-leave after deleting a port group

brmulticastleavegroup() iterates mp->ports with pp = &p->next in its fast-leave path. After brmulticastdelpg() removes p, continuing the loop advances pp through the deleted entry.

If multicast-to-unicast was enabled, the bridge can hold multiple port groups for the same port and group with different source MAC addresses. Once multicast-to-unicast is disabled, brportgroupequal() matches those entries by port only. A fast leave can then delete one entry and continue from its stale next pointer, leaving mp->ports pointing at a deleted port group.

Fast leave only needs to remove one matching port group. Break after brmulticastdelpg() so the loop stops before dereferencing the removed entry.

1 / 3
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
3 Months
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow

sctpassocaddpeer() increments the association's 16-bit transportcount for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to zero.

SCTP sockdiag uses transportcount to reserve the INETDIAGPEERS payload, then copies one sockaddrstorage for every entry in transportaddrlist. After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes 8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail.

Reject a new unique peer when transportcount has reached U16MAX. Perform the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues to return its existing transport at the limit.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )

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