An issue was discovered in BusyBox before 1.30.0. An out of bounds read in udhcp components (consumed by the DHCP server, client, and relay) allows a remote attacker to leak sensitive information from the stack by sending a crafted DHCP message. This is related to verification in udhcpgetoption() in networking/udhcp/common.c that 4-byte options are indeed 4 bytes.

huftbuild in archival/libarchive/decompressgunzip.c in BusyBox before 1.27.2 misuses a pointer, causing segfaults and an application crash during an unzip operation on a specially crafted ZIP file.

A memory leak flaw was found in the way OpenSSL handled TLS status request extension data during session renegotiation. A remote attacker could cause a TLS server using OpenSSL to consume an excessive amount of memory and, possibly, exit unexpectedly after exhausting all available memory, if it enabled OCSP stapling support.

The busybox NTP implementation doesn't check the NTP mode of packets received on the server port and responds to any packet with the right size. This includes responses from another NTP server. An attacker can send a packet with a spoofed source address in order to create an infinite loop of responses between two busybox NTP servers. Adding more packets to the loop increases the traffic between the servers until one of them has a fully loaded CPU and/or network.

It seems this bug was actually inherited from openntpd, on which the busybox implementation was based on. In openntpd it was fixed in:

https://github.com/openntpd-portable/openntpd-openbsd/commit/28a2f904aafbf4c209fe6fa04ffb9308740fd78a

Busybox upstream patch:

https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=150dc7a2b483b8338a3e185c478b4b23ee884e71