Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
5.5
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

A flaw was found in Ansible-Core. This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass unsafe content protections using the hostvars object to reference and execute templated content. This issue can lead to arbitrary code execution if remote data or module outputs are improperly templated within playbooks.

First published (updated )
Severity
5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

An information disclosure flaw was found in ansible-core due to a failure to respect the ANSIBLENOLOG configuration in some scenarios. Information is still included in the output in certain tasks, such as loop items. Depending on the task, this issue may include sensitive information, such as decrypted secret values.

First published (updated )
Severity
4

Verbatim report from Maksym Mazura via secalert. Impacted project ansible-core, verified on 2.21.5; exception listed in PRESERVE in lib/ansible/internal/task.py on v2.21.6rc1, v2.22.0rc2 and devel; not reproducible on 2.16.3. Three leak vectors: (1) module arg-validation value echoed, (2) templating Origin snippet of the vars file (failing line + two preceding lines), (3) full fail/assert msg; also under -vvv. INLINE reproducer provided: sec.yml (secreta !unsafe "FAKEUNSAFE111", secretb "FAKEPLAIN222 {{ nosuchvar }}"); pb.yml (command echo {{secretb}}, waitfor port {{secreta}}, fail msg {{secreta}} - all nolog:true ignoreerrors:true); run: ansible-playbook -i localhost, -c local -e @sec.yml pb.yml. Output on 2.21.5 shows FAKEUNSAFE111 and the secretb line (plus preceding secreta line) next to the "censored" notice. Suggested fix: do not preserve exception (or replace its message) when the result is censored, as 2.16 did; or have CallbackBase.handleexception print fixed text for censored results. NOTE: no reproducer file/attachment was attached to the ticket - only the inline steps above; Red Hat has not yet independently reproduced. Disclosure: not public, no bounty requested.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in ansible-core. The extractcollectionfromgit() function in ansible-core's concreteartifactmanager.py constructs git clone commands without a '--' (end-of-options) separator before user-supplied URLs when installing collections from git sources. An attacker who provides a crafted collection source URI containing git argument injection payloads can achieve arbitrary command execution when a user runs 'ansible-galaxy collection install' with the malicious source. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332, which hardened the role install path but missed the equivalent collection install code path.

1 / 3
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with ansible-galaxy collection install, the archive extractor validates member paths using lexical path normalisation (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symbolic links (os.path.realpath), and it performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them. A crafted collection tarball can chain symlink directory entries so that a subsequent file member is written outside the intended destination directory. This allows an attacker who can get a victim to install a malicious collection to overwrite arbitrary files with the privileges of the user running ansible-galaxy, leading to code execution on the control node. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691.

1 / 3
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )

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