Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure-Storage Datalake component

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0.

The camel-azure-storage-datalake component can download an Azure Data Lake Storage Gen2 file to the local filesystem through its downloadToFile operation, writing into the directory named by the fileDir endpoint option. DataLakeFileOperations.downloadToFile built the local target by joining fileDir with the remote path name exactly as the Azure SDK reported it (new File(fileDir, fileClientWrapper.getFileName())) and passed the result straight to the SDK download call, with no lexical normalization and no check that the resolved location stayed inside fileDir. The remote name is not route-controlled data: the consumer enumerates the filesystem in DataLakeConsumer.createBatchExchangesFromPath, which lists paths and creates one exchange per entry from PathItem.getName() verbatim, applying no name filtering by default. A path name containing parent-directory segments therefore resolved to a location outside the configured fileDir, letting anyone able to influence the names present in the consumed Data Lake filesystem cause Camel to create or overwrite a file at a location of their choosing, with the privileges of the Camel process. Depending on what the process can write to, overwriting a file outside the download directory can escalate beyond the loss of integrity of that file. The fileDir option is an ordinary common-group configuration parameter and carries no security marker, so nothing signalled to users that its value was not being enforced as a containment boundary. Camel's other file-download consumers - camel-file, camel-ftp, camel-smb, camel-mina-sftp and camel-azure-files - already constrained their local downloads to the configured directory using a path-segment boundary check; the camel-azure-storage-datalake download path was not covered by that work.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, constrain the names the consumer will act on using the regex endpoint option, which is applied to each listed path name as a full-string match, so that only simple single-segment names are accepted and any name carrying a path separator or a parent-directory segment is filtered out before an exchange is created. Alternatively, avoid the downloadToFile operation on untrusted filesystems and write the payload from the route under a file name the route itself controls, rather than one taken from the remote listing. As defence in depth, treat the object names in any externally writable Data Lake filesystem as untrusted input and do not derive local filesystem paths from them.

Improper input validation vulnerability in Apache Camel.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.17.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0.

The camel-mail component ships a MimeMultipart data format that can unmarshal a MIME multipart message. When it is configured with headersInline set to true, the unmarshal path copies the MIME headers of the incoming message onto the Camel message: it enumerates every header that is not one of the three standard ones it generates itself - Message-ID, MIME-Version and Content-Type - and calls setHeader for each, applying no HeaderFilterStrategy. The names of those MIME headers come from the message being unmarshalled, so a sender able to influence the message could place a header whose name falls in the Camel-internal namespace and have it set on the Exchange. Camel components read control headers from that namespace to override their configured behaviour - the camel-sql producer, for instance, takes the statement to execute from a Camel header when one is present - so an injected header could redirect what a downstream step in the route does with data the route author never intended it to take from the message. Which sinks are reachable, and what the consequences are, depends entirely on what the route does after the unmarshal step. The camel-mail consumer already applied a header filter strategy on its own inbound path, so this was the parallel inbound path into the same component that the earlier hardening did not cover. The affected copy is reached only when headersInline is enabled, which is not the default: with the default setting the MIME headers are surfaced as attachments rather than as message headers, and are not affected. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the data format in 2.17.0 and was present on every release line until this fix.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, leave headersInline at its default of false where the inline headers are not needed, since the copy is only reached when it is enabled. Where it must stay enabled, strip Camel-internal headers immediately after the unmarshal step, for example with removeHeaders(“Camel”) placed before any processor or producer that reads control headers, and do not unmarshal MIME content from an untrusted sender into a route that dispatches on header values. As defence in depth, treat the header names of any MIME message arriving from outside the trust boundary as untrusted input.

Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel Mail Component.

The camel-mail producer (MailProducer.getSender) scanned the outgoing Exchange for message headers in the mail.smtp. / mail.smtps. namespace and, when any were present, built a per-message JavaMail sender with those values applied as JavaMail session properties, overriding the endpoint configuration. This namespace is Camel-internal - only MailProducer interprets it - and was not blocked by any HeaderFilterStrategy, so the values could originate from any inbound protocol (for example platform-http query parameters or request headers, or JMS / Kafka messages from untrusted producers) that feeds a route ending in an smtp / smtps producer without an intervening removeHeaders. The maximal impact is version-dependent: on releases before 4.19.0, setting mail.smtp.host redirects the SMTP connection to a server under the attacker's control, and because the producer then authenticates with the endpoint's configured username and password those credentials are transmitted to the attacker; on 4.19.0 and later the producer connects to the endpoint's configured host explicitly, so the reachable impact is limited to weakening transport security (for example mail.smtp.ssl.trust, mail.smtp.starttls.enable or mail.smtp.socks.host) and interception of the outgoing message rather than host redirect. Exploitation requires a route that channels untrusted input into the mail producer without stripping the namespace. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, the per-message override is disabled by default; enable it only on trusted endpoints with useJavaMailSessionPropertiesFromHeaders=true. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the namespace before the mail producer with removeHeaders('mail.smtp.') and removeHeaders('mail.smtps.') between any untrusted ingress and the smtp / smtps producer. Even with the opt-in enabled, route authors should still strip the namespace on any path that carries untrusted input.

Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel ElasticSearch Rest Client.

The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour - SEARCHQUERY (an advanced query body), OPERATION (which Elasticsearch operation to run), INDEXNAME, INDEXSETTINGS and ID. The string values of these header constants, defined in ElasticSearchRestClientConstant, are plain unprefixed names ('SEARCHQUERY', 'OPERATION', 'INDEXNAME', 'INDEXSETTINGS', 'ID') rather than the 'Camel'-prefixed names used by every other Camel component (for example CamelSqlQuery, CamelMongoDbCriteria, CamelCqlQuery). Camel's inbound HTTP header filter, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, blocks only header names that begin with 'Camel' or 'camel'. Because the Elasticsearch header names do not carry that prefix, they pass through the inbound filter unchanged. When a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point (for example platform-http) in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer, an untrusted HTTP client can set these headers directly on its request and override the query and operation that the route author configured: reading every document in the index (SEARCHQUERY with a matchall query), deleting documents (OPERATION set to Delete together with ID), or exfiltrating selected fields. No credentials are required and the producer reads the headers unconditionally. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.3.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix renames the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client Exchange header constant string values (ID, SEARCHQUERY, INDEXSETTINGS, INDEXNAME, OPERATION) to carry the Camel prefix (CamelElasticsearchId, CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, CamelElasticsearchIndexSettings, CamelElasticsearchIndexName, CamelElasticsearchOperation) so that they are blocked by the inbound HttpHeaderFilterStrategy; the Java field names are unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the affected headers from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the producer (for example removeHeader('SEARCHQUERY'), removeHeader('OPERATION'), removeHeader('INDEXNAME'), removeHeader('INDEXSETTINGS') and removeHeader('ID') in front of the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint), or apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy that blocks these names.

Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in Apache Camel Netty HTTP component.

The camel-netty-http HTTP server consumer exposes a muteException option that controls what is returned to the client when a route processing error occurs. This option defaulted to false because the backing field was an uninitialised primitive boolean (Java's default of false), whereas the other Camel HTTP server components (camel-http / camel-jetty / camel-servlet and camel-platform-http) default it to true. With muteException=false, when a request triggers an exception during route processing the consumer writes the full Throwable stack trace into the HTTP response body as text/plain (via DefaultNettyHttpBinding) instead of returning an empty body. Any unauthenticated client that can reach the endpoint and cause a processing error - for example by sending a malformed request body, an invalid parameter, or otherwise triggering a route-internal failure - therefore receives a complete Java stack trace. Such a stack trace can disclose sensitive internal information, including credentials embedded in exception messages, internal host names and IP addresses, filesystem paths, dependency and version details, database and class names, and the application's internal structure, which an attacker can use to plan further attacks. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set muteException=true explicitly on the camel-netty-http consumer (for example netty-http: http://0.0.0.0:8080/api?muteException=true , or globally via the camel.component.netty-http.configuration.mute-exception=true property), so that processing errors no longer return the stack trace to the client.

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component.

The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECTQUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECTSEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECTNAME = sObjectName, SOBJECTID = sObjectId, APEXURL = apexUrl, APEXMETHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id for CRUD operations, or redirecting an Apex REST call to a different endpoint and HTTP method (including destructive methods) with injected query parameters. All such operations run with the full permissions of the Salesforce connected (integration) user, which is typically broad. No credentials are required from the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via the raw header names must use the CamelSalesforce names (for example CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery and CamelSalesforceApexUrl) instead of the old sObject / apex values; the endpoint-option spelling is unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Salesforce control headers from any untrusted ingress before the salesforce: producer (for example removeHeaders('sObject') and removeHeaders('apex') at the start of the route), and set the query, SObject and Apex parameters from a trusted source.