Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.3
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

The MPD package included in TwinCAT/BSD allows an authenticated, low-privileged local attacker to induce a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition on the daemon and execute code in the context of user “root” via a crafted HTTP request.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

The IPC-Diagnostics package included in TwinCAT/BSD is vulnerable to a local denial-of-service attack by a low privileged attacker.

First published (updated )
Severity
9
XSS
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The IPC-Diagnostics package in TwinCAT/BSD is susceptible to improper input neutralization by a low-privileged local attacker.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The IPC-Diagnostics package included in TwinCAT/BSD is vulnerable to a local authentication bypass by a low privileged attacker.

First published (updated )
Severity
4.7
EPSS
0.05%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

The package authelia-bhf included in Beckhoffs TwinCAT/BSD is prone to an open redirect that allows a remote unprivileged attacker to redirect a user to another site. This may have limited impact to integrity and does solely affect anthelia-bhf the Beckhoff fork of authelia.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The default installation path of the TwinCAT XAR 3.1 software in all versions is underneath C:\TwinCAT. If the directory does not exist it and further subdirectories are created with permissions which allow every local user to modify the content. The default installation registers TcSysUI.exe for automatic execution upon log in of a user. If a less privileged user has a local account he or she can replace TcSysUI.exe. It will be executed automatically by another user during login. This is also true for users with administrative access. Consequently, a less privileged user can trick a higher privileged user into executing code he or she modified this way. By default Beckhoff’s IPCs are shipped with TwinCAT software installed this way and with just a single local user configured. Thus the vulnerability exists if further less privileged users have been added.

Remedy

Please consider to choose “C:\Program Files\TwinCAT” during installation of TwinCAT 3.1. If you have installed it already then please uninstall and re-install it with the changed path. Please use the custom installation for this. That will automatically protect the binaries such that they can only be modified by an administrator. Please mind that already installed projects underneath C:\TwinCAT need to be moved. It is recommended to perform a backup of the complete device before such action. For security reasons, please remove the former content of C:\TwinCAT at the end of this sequence. This will also prevent confusion.
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

When a Beckhoff TwinCAT Runtime receives a malformed UDP packet, the ADS Discovery Service shuts down. Note that the TwinCAT devices are still performing as normal. This issue affects TwinCAT 2 version 2304 (and prior) and TwinCAT 3.1 version 4204.0 (and prior).

First published (updated )
Severity
5.9
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 supports communication over ADS. ADS is a protocol for industrial automation in protected environments. This protocol uses user configured routes, that can be edited remotely via ADS. This special command supports encrypted authentication with username/password. The encryption uses a fixed key, that could be extracted by an attacker. Precondition of the exploitation of this weakness is network access at the moment a route is added.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
Input Validation
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Kernel drivers in Beckhoff TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4022.4, TwinCAT 2.11 R3 2259, and TwinCAT 3.1 lack proper validation of user-supplied pointer values. An attacker who is able to execute code on the target may be able to exploit this vulnerability to obtain SYSTEM privileges.

First published (updated )

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