boneIO blackdebianimages stores the Mosquitto MQTT broker password file at /etc/mosquitto/passwd with world-readable permissions. Any local user can read the password hashes for all MQTT accounts and perform offline dictionary attacks.

This issue was fixed in version 1.6.0.

boneIO blackdebianimages ships with a Mosquitto MQTT broker that uses the same default credentials on all devices. These credentials are publicly documented on github, and there is no indication in the instructions to change them. A remote attacker can use them to gain full read and write access to the broker, allowing control of connected relays, blinds, and gates, and injection of fake entities into a linked Home Assistant installation.

This issue was fixed in version 1.6.0 of the image: MQTT passwords are generated per device at first boot. Devices upgraded from earlier versions keep their existing broker credentials; from boneio 1.6.0 the web panel reports credentials that are still the published defaults, and the owner has to change them.

boneIO blackdebianimages gives the boneio service account excessive privileges, including full passwordless sudo access and membership in the docker group. A local attacker who compromises the boneio user can use these privileges to escalate to root.

This issue was fixed in version 1.6.0: the image removes the sudoers rule and the docker group membership when it is sealed, and devices already in the field have both removed by migrations shipped with boneio 1.6.0 and applied on first start after the upgrade. Privileged operations now go through helpers that accept only a fixed set of commands, with migrations verified against Ed25519 signatures.