Capgo (capgo.app) backend through 12.242.4 does not validate parent-child delegation when processing the x-limited-key-id header. checkKeyByIdPg() in supabase/functions/backend/utils/honomiddleware.ts resolves the attacker-supplied numeric API key ID using only the key ID, its expiration state, and the authenticating key's userid, while hasLimitedRbacSubkeyScope() accepts any key with a non-organization (e.g., app-scoped) RBAC binding and validateSubkeyUser() only compares owning user IDs. Because Capgo treats API keys as independent RBAC principals with separate role bindings, an authenticated apikeymanager API key with no application access can supply the numeric ID of a more privileged same-owner key and have the middleware replace the authenticated principal and effective API-key secret with that key (setSubkeyAuthContext), exercising an appadmin sibling's permissions without knowing or submitting its secret. The issue was reproduced on release 12.242.4 (commit b3d02cdbc23ac59990785acacd1f113c07458568) after the fix for GHSA-8h52-44r7-w343; at the time of the advisory no patched version was available.