Malcolm's front nginx reverse proxy defines a "Dashboards → Arkime shortcut" location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location's proxypass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity.

A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.

A deployment mode intended to expose only read access to stored data proxies a set of application programming interface routes without restricting which request methods are allowed. One such route accepts a request that creates or overwrites a stored record, including an attacker-chosen identifier, using the application's own elevated backend credentials. This allows an authenticated user on a deployment intended to be read-only to forge or overwrite stored records that should not be modifiable in that deployment mode.

A web interface reflects a portion of the request URL into a script context and a hyperlink attribute without adequate encoding, and does not require authentication to reach. This allows an unauthenticated network attacker to craft a link that, when visited by a user, executes arbitrary script in the context of the affected application and can redirect the user's browser to an arbitrary external site. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to act with the compromised user's session privileges within the application.

Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.