By default, the password for the Access Manager's web interface, is set to 'admin'. In the tested version changing the password was not enforced.
The binary serving the web server and executing basically all actions launched from the Web UI is running with root privileges. This is against the least privilege principle. If an attacker is able to execute code on the system via other vulnerabilities it is possible to directly execute commands with highest privileges.
The web server of the Access Manager offers a functionality to download a backup of the local database stored on the device. This database contains the whole configuration. This includes encrypted MIFARE keys, card data, user PINs and much more. The PINs are even stored unencrypted. Combined with the fact that an attacker can easily get access to the backup functionality by abusing the session management issue (CVE-2025-59101), or by exploiting the weak default password (CVE-2025-59108), or by simply setting a new password without prior authentication via the SOAP API (CVE-2025-59097), it is easily possible to access the sensitive data on the device.
Instead of typical session tokens or cookies, it is verified on a per-request basis if the originating IP address has once successfully logged in. As soon as an authentication request from a certain source IP is successful, the IP address is handled as authenticated. No other session information is stored. Therefore, it is possible to spoof the IP address of a logged-in user to gain access to the Access Manager web interface.
The web interface offers a functionality to export the internal SQLite database. After executing the database export, an automatic download is started and the device reboots. After rebooting, the exported database is deleted and cannot be accessed anymore. However, it was noticed that sometimes the device does not reboot and therefore the exported database is not deleted, or the device reboots and the export is not deleted for unknown reasons. The path where the database export is located can be accessed without prior authentication. This leads to the fact that an attacker might be able to get access to the exported database without prior authentication. The database includes sensitive data like passwords, card pins, encrypted Mifare sitekeys and much more.
The Access Manager is offering a trace functionality to debug errors and issues with the device. The trace functionality is implemented as a simple TCP socket. A tool called TraceClient.exe, provided by dormakaba via the Access Manager web interface, is used to connect to the socket and receive debug information. The data is permanently broadcasted on the TCP socket. The socket can be accessed without any authentication or encryption.
The transmitted data is based on the set verbosity level. The verbosity level can be set using the http(s) endpoint with the service interface password or with the guessable identifier of the device via the SOAP interface.
The transmitted data contains sensitive data like the Card ID as well as all button presses on Registration units. This allows an attacker with network level access to retrieve all entered PINs on a registration unit.