In Eclipse Theia versions 1.73.0 up to but not including 1.75.0, the AI "Agent Mode" file-change tools (writeFileContent, suggestFileContent, and the replacement and state helpers) resolved a model-supplied file path without a workspace-containment check. A crafted relative path such as ../.bashrc, an absolute path, or a ~-expanded path could therefore write or delete files outside the workspace with the privileges of the Theia backend OS user. Because the path argument is influenced by model output, it can be steered through indirect prompt injection, and in Agent Mode writes are applied without a confirmation dialog. Writing to a host-executed file such as a shell startup file or ~/.ssh/authorizedkeys can escalate to code execution on the backend.

In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.69.0, opening a folder starts source control integration without requiring the user to trust the folder first. This affects applications built on Theia that include the git integration, such as the Theia IDE. Both Theia's own @theia/git extension and the builtin VS Code git extension run git commands such as git status as soon as a repository is detected. Since git honors repository-local configuration, a folder containing an attacker-controlled .git/config with core.fsmonitor (or a comparable hook-like setting) causes the configured command to be executed. The configuration can be delivered by burying a bare repository inside a regular repository (OVE-20210718-0001), so cloning an attacker-supplied repository and opening it in a Theia-based application is sufficient to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user, without any confirmation prompt.

As of 1.70.0, plugins that declare capabilities.untrustedWorkspaces.supported: false, which includes the builtin git extension, are no longer loaded or activated in an untrusted workspace, and the deprecated @theia/git extension has been removed, so no git command is executed against an untrusted folder.

In Eclipse Theia versions 1.66.0 and up until including 1.73.1, the @theia/plugin-ext backend exposes the /hostedPlugin/:pluginId/:path() HTTP endpoint, which resolves the requested file path with path.resolve(localPath, filePath) without verifying that the resolved path stays within the plugin's directory. An unauthenticated network attacker can send percent-encoded ../ sequences (%2e%2e%2f) that decode into the path parameter and escape the plugin directory, allowing arbitrary files readable by the Theia backend process to be retrieved. Plugin IDs are derived deterministically from a plugin's publisher and name, so built-in plugins serve as reliable anchors that require no prior knowledge of the target system.

In Eclipse Theia versions 0.7.0 and up until including 1.73.1, the PreferenceUtils.merge function in @theia/core recursively merges preference values without rejecting prototype-related keys (proto, constructor, prototype). Because this function is invoked by PreferenceServiceImpl.doResolve for every preference resolution across scopes (default, user, workspace, folder), a crafted preference value in a workspace settings file (.theia/settings.json or .vscode/settings.json) can pollute Object.prototype when the user opens the workspace, potentially altering application logic across the Theia process.

In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the @theia/filesystem backend binds POST /file-upload in every filesystem-enabled deployment. The handler takes an attacker-supplied absolute path from the multipart uri field and calls fs.move(tmp, target, { overwrite: true }) with no workspace confinement and no authentication. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in @theia/core re-issues the cookie and calls next() without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests. Because multipart/form-data is a CORS-safelisted request type, a cross-origin web page can trigger the write with no preflight and no credentials, resulting in an unauthenticated arbitrary file write outside the workspace to any absolute path the backend process can write. This can escalate to remote code execution, for example by overwriting a startup-executed file such as ~/.bashrc. Electron mode uses a separate ElectronSecurityToken and is not affected via this path.

In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the @theia/filesystem backend exposes HTTP file-download endpoints (GET /file, GET /files/, PUT /files/) that convert a client-supplied URI directly to a filesystem path and stream the file, without confining it to the workspace or any allow-listed root. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in @theia/core re-issues the cookie and calls next() without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests, so these endpoints are reachable without a valid token. As a result an unauthenticated client can read any file readable by the backend process, including files outside the opened workspace (for example /etc/hosts, SSH keys, or tokens). Electron mode uses a separate ElectronSecurityToken and is not affected via this path.

In Eclipse Theia versions prior to 1.71.0, the AI chat rendered Markdown image tags from AI responses, triggering HTTP requests to arbitrary external URLs without restriction. Combined with prompt injection in a malicious workspace, an attacker could induce the AI agent to construct image URLs encoding sensitive information from the workspace or conversation context, exfiltrating it to attacker-controlled servers. The workspace trust enforcement introduced in v1.71.0 mitigates the documented attack chain by disabling AI features in untrusted workspaces.

In Eclipse Theia versions prior to 1.71.0, the AI chat agent processed workspace file and directory names as part of its prompt context without distinguishing them from system instructions. An attacker could craft a malicious repository with adversarial directory or file names that, when analyzed by the AI agent, would cause the agent to follow attacker-controlled instructions (indirect prompt injection). Combined with other AI chat features available in untrusted workspaces, this enabled attack chains leading to data exfiltration via Markdown image rendering or arbitrary command execution via task definitions.

In Eclipse Theia versions prior to 1.69.0, custom task definitions in workspace files (e.g. .theia/tasks.json, .vscode/tasks.json) could be executed without requiring workspace trust. An attacker could craft a malicious repository that, when cloned and opened in Theia, leads to execution of arbitrary commands with the user's privileges. In combination with AI chat features and a workspace .theia/settings.json that disabled tool confirmation, this could be triggered automatically by sending a message in the AI chat.

In Eclipse Theia versions prior to 1.71.0, files matching the pattern .prompts/.prompttemplate in a workspace were automatically loaded and could override or extend the AI agent's system prompts. An attacker could craft a malicious repository containing prompt template files that, when the workspace was opened in Theia, replaced the AI's system instructions with attacker-controlled content (indirect prompt injection). Combined with other AI chat features available in untrusted workspaces, this enabled attack chains leading to data exfiltration via Markdown image rendering or arbitrary command execution via task definitions.

In the Eclipse Theia Website repository, the GitHub Actions workflow .github/workflows/preview.yml used pullrequesttarget trigger while checking out and executing untrusted pull request code. This allowed any GitHub user to execute arbitrary code in the repository's CI environment with access to repository secrets and a GITHUBTOKEN with extensive write permissions (contents:write, packages:write, pages:write, actions:write). An attacker could exfiltrate secrets, publish malicious packages to the eclipse-theia organization, modify the official Theia website, and push malicious code to the repository.

In Eclipse Theia versions 0.3.9 through 0.15.0, one of the default pre-packaged Theia extensions is "Mini-Browser", published as "@theia/mini-browser" on npmjs.com. This extension, for its own needs, exposes a HTTP endpoint that allows to read the content of files on the host's filesystem, given their path, without restrictions on the requester's origin. This design is vulnerable to being exploited remotely through a DNS rebinding attack or a drive-by download of a carefully crafted exploit.

In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.2.0, the Markdown Preview (@theia/preview), can be exploited to execute arbitrary code.

In versions of the @theia/plugin-ext component of Eclipse Theia prior to 1.18.0, Webview contents can be hijacked via postMessage().

In Eclipse Theia 0.3.9 to 1.8.1, the "mini-browser" extension allows a user to preview HTML files in an iframe inside the IDE. But with the way it is made it is possible for a previewed HTML file to trigger an RCE. This exploit only happens if a user previews a malicious file..

In Eclipse Theia 0.1.1 to 0.2.0, it is possible to exploit the default build to obtain remote code execution (and XXE) via the theia-xml-extension. This extension uses lsp4xml (recently renamed to LemMinX) in order to provide language support for XML. This is installed by default.

In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 0.16.0, in the notification messages there is no HTML escaping, so Javascript code can run.

In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.8.0, in the debug console there is no HTML escaping, so arbitrary Javascript code can be injected.