GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  .  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  .  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (githubpat) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs, ghu; for example, ghs<APPID><JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUBTOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho and ghp have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, some HTTP request URLs interpolate variable path components without percent encoding, allowing URL path metacharacters in attacker-controlled repository or resource values to make gh address a different API endpoint or resource than the user intended. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, multiple GitHub CLI commands printed externally controlled gist, API, pull request, release, codespace, skill, or agent-task content without neutralizing terminal escape sequences. An attacker who can influence that content can embed escape sequences that are interpreted by the terminal of a user who runs an affected command, with impact ranging from cosmetic manipulation of the title or on-screen content to, on some terminal emulators, command execution. This extends the same class of issue as CVE-2026-45803—which addressed only gh run view --log—to the other affected command paths. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 2.10.0 through 2.95.0, connecting to a malicious Codespace with gh codespace jupyter can allow command execution because the command opens a JupyterLab URL supplied by a process inside the Codespace without validating that it is a loopback HTTP or HTTPS address, allowing a crafted vscode:// or vscode-insiders:// URL to be handed to VS Code. This issue is fixed in version 2.96.0.