An authentication bypass and audience confusion vulnerability exists in the Google OAuth provider component of Google mcp-toolbox version 1.4.0. When a Google authService is initialized with mcpEnabled: true but lacks an explicitly defined audience or clientId, the ValidateMCPAuth pipeline for opaque tokens skips audience validation entirely. As a result, the toolbox will accept any valid Google OAuth access token—even those minted for unrelated ecosystem applications—granting unauthorized clients access to protected tools and data backends.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the generic HTTP source and tool components of Google mcp-toolbox versions 0.3.0 through 1.4.0. While the toolbox implements baseline input sanitization for user-controlled parameters, the underlying HTTP client (internal/sources/http/http.go) fails to safely regulate request redirection boundaries. Specifically, the client is initialized without a restrictive CheckRedirect policy hook and lacks target IP validation. An attacker or a malicious data-driven prompt can supply a crafted path parameter that triggers an open redirect or a direct destination swap on the target backend, coercing the mcp-toolbox into blindly following the redirection and making unauthorized requests to internal or arbitrary external endpoints.

Incorrect Authorization in the direct HTTP API tool invocation endpoint in Google mcp-toolbox versions v1.3.0 and v1.4.0 allows an unauthenticated attacker to invoke tools protected by the scopeRequired feature via sending tool invocation requests through legacy HTTP endpoints when the --enable-api flag is active.