Summary ShadowCopyAction in the Shadow plugin does not validate or sanitize ZIP entry names before writing them to the output fat JAR. A malicious upstream dependency containing path traversal sequences (e.g. ../../../../tmp/pwned.txt) in entry names will have those entries reproduced verbatim in the output shadow JAR.

Details The vulnerability exists because Shadow relies entirely on Gradle's ZipFileTree for entry sanitization rather than implementing its own path validation. This means:

1. Users on Gradle < 7.6.2 / 8.x < 8.2.0 are directly exploitable 2. The produced shadow JAR becomes a Zip Slip weapon against any downstream consumer using unprotected extraction (raw ZipInputStream, older CI tooling, custom Java unpackers) 3. If Shadow ever uses a non-ZipFileTree code path, protection disappears silently

Affected file: src/main/kotlin/com/github/jengelman/gradle/plugins/shadow/internal/ShadowCopyAction.kt

PoC 1. Create a malicious JAR with path traversal entry: python import zipfile with zipfile.ZipFile('evil.jar', 'w') as zf: zf.writestr('../../../../tmp/zipslipproof.txt', 'pwned') 2. Add as dependency in a shadow project 3. Run gradle shadowJar 4. Run unzip -l build/libs/.jar | grep "\.\." 5. Traversal entry survives in output JAR

Impact Any tool extracting the shadow JAR with unprotected extraction is subject to arbitrary file overwrite. Users on older Gradle versions are directly vulnerable at build time.

Summary ShadowCopyAction in the Shadow plugin does not validate or sanitize ZIP entry names before writing them to the output fat JAR. A malicious upstream dependency containing path traversal sequences (e.g. ../../../../tmp/pwned.txt) in entry names will have those entries reproduced verbatim in the output shadow JAR.

Details The vulnerability exists because Shadow relies entirely on Gradle's ZipFileTree for entry sanitization rather than implementing its own path validation. This means:

1. Users on Gradle < 7.6.2 / 8.x < 8.2.0 are directly exploitable 2. The produced shadow JAR becomes a Zip Slip weapon against any downstream consumer using unprotected extraction (raw ZipInputStream, older CI tooling, custom Java unpackers) 3. If Shadow ever uses a non-ZipFileTree code path, protection disappears silently

Affected file: src/main/kotlin/com/github/jengelman/gradle/plugins/shadow/internal/ShadowCopyAction.kt

PoC 1. Create a malicious JAR with path traversal entry: python import zipfile with zipfile.ZipFile('evil.jar', 'w') as zf: zf.writestr('../../../../tmp/zipslipproof.txt', 'pwned') 2. Add as dependency in a shadow project 3. Run gradle shadowJar 4. Run unzip -l build/libs/.jar | grep "\.\." 5. Traversal entry survives in output JAR

Impact Any tool extracting the shadow JAR with unprotected extraction is subject to arbitrary file overwrite. Users on older Gradle versions are directly vulnerable at build time.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. In affected versions when unpacking Tar archives, Gradle did not check that files could be written outside of the unpack location. This could lead to important files being overwritten anywhere the Gradle process has write permissions. For a build reading Tar entries from a Tar archive, this issue could allow Gradle to disclose information from sensitive files through an arbitrary file read. To exploit this behavior, an attacker needs to either control the source of an archive already used by the build or modify the build to interact with a malicious archive. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed. A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Starting from these versions, Gradle will refuse to handle Tar archives which contain path traversal elements in a Tar entry name. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Impact

This is a path traversal vulnerability when Gradle deals with Tar archives, often referenced as TarSlip, a variant of ZipSlip.

When unpacking Tar archives, Gradle did not check that files could be written outside of the unpack location. This could lead to important files being overwritten anywhere the Gradle process has write permissions. For a build reading Tar entries from a Tar archive, this issue could allow Gradle to disclose information from sensitive files through an arbitrary file read.

To exploit this behavior, an attacker needs to either control the source of an archive already used by the build or modify the build to interact with a malicious archive. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed.

Gradle uses Tar archives for its Build Cache. These archives are safe when created by Gradle. But if an attacker had control of a remote build cache server, they could inject malicious build cache entries that leverage this vulnerability. This attack vector could also be exploited if a man-in-the-middle can be performed between the remote cache and the build.

Patches

A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Starting from these versions, Gradle will refuse to handle Tar archives which contain path traversal elements in a Tar entry name.

It is recommended that users upgrade to a patched version.

Workarounds

There is no workaround.

If your build deals with Tar archives that you do not fully trust, you need to inspect them to confirm they do not attempt to leverage this vulnerability. If you use the Gradle remote build cache, make sure only trusted parties have write access to it and that connections to the remote cache are properly secured.

References

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Gradle Build Cache ZipSlip

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. In affected versions when unpacking Tar archives, Gradle did not check that files could be written outside of the unpack location. This could lead to important files being overwritten anywhere the Gradle process has write permissions. For a build reading Tar entries from a Tar archive, this issue could allow Gradle to disclose information from sensitive files through an arbitrary file read. To exploit this behavior, an attacker needs to either control the source of an archive already used by the build or modify the build to interact with a malicious archive. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed. A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Starting from these versions, Gradle will refuse to handle Tar archives which contain path traversal elements in a Tar entry name. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Impact

This is a path traversal vulnerability when Gradle deals with Tar archives, often referenced as TarSlip, a variant of ZipSlip.

When unpacking Tar archives, Gradle did not check that files could be written outside of the unpack location. This could lead to important files being overwritten anywhere the Gradle process has write permissions. For a build reading Tar entries from a Tar archive, this issue could allow Gradle to disclose information from sensitive files through an arbitrary file read.

To exploit this behavior, an attacker needs to either control the source of an archive already used by the build or modify the build to interact with a malicious archive. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed.

Gradle uses Tar archives for its Build Cache. These archives are safe when created by Gradle. But if an attacker had control of a remote build cache server, they could inject malicious build cache entries that leverage this vulnerability. This attack vector could also be exploited if a man-in-the-middle can be performed between the remote cache and the build.

Patches

A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Starting from these versions, Gradle will refuse to handle Tar archives which contain path traversal elements in a Tar entry name.

It is recommended that users upgrade to a patched version.

Workarounds

There is no workaround.

If your build deals with Tar archives that you do not fully trust, you need to inspect them to confirm they do not attempt to leverage this vulnerability. If you use the Gradle remote build cache, make sure only trusted parties have write access to it and that connections to the remote cache are properly secured.

References

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Gradle Build Cache ZipSlip

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. In affected versions when unpacking Tar archives, Gradle did not check that files could be written outside of the unpack location. This could lead to important files being overwritten anywhere the Gradle process has write permissions. For a build reading Tar entries from a Tar archive, this issue could allow Gradle to disclose information from sensitive files through an arbitrary file read. To exploit this behavior, an attacker needs to either control the source of an archive already used by the build or modify the build to interact with a malicious archive. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed. A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Starting from these versions, Gradle will refuse to handle Tar archives which contain path traversal elements in a Tar entry name. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Impact

This is a path traversal vulnerability when Gradle deals with Tar archives, often referenced as TarSlip, a variant of ZipSlip.

When unpacking Tar archives, Gradle did not check that files could be written outside of the unpack location. This could lead to important files being overwritten anywhere the Gradle process has write permissions. For a build reading Tar entries from a Tar archive, this issue could allow Gradle to disclose information from sensitive files through an arbitrary file read.

To exploit this behavior, an attacker needs to either control the source of an archive already used by the build or modify the build to interact with a malicious archive. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed.

Gradle uses Tar archives for its Build Cache. These archives are safe when created by Gradle. But if an attacker had control of a remote build cache server, they could inject malicious build cache entries that leverage this vulnerability. This attack vector could also be exploited if a man-in-the-middle can be performed between the remote cache and the build.

Patches

A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Starting from these versions, Gradle will refuse to handle Tar archives which contain path traversal elements in a Tar entry name.

It is recommended that users upgrade to a patched version.

Workarounds

There is no workaround.

If your build deals with Tar archives that you do not fully trust, you need to inspect them to confirm they do not attempt to leverage this vulnerability. If you use the Gradle remote build cache, make sure only trusted parties have write access to it and that connections to the remote cache are properly secured.

References

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Gradle Build Cache ZipSlip

Gradle is a build automation tool, and its native-platform tool provides Java bindings for native APIs. When resolving dependencies in versions before 9.3.0, some exceptions were not treated as fatal errors and would not cause a repository to be disabled. If a build encountered one of these exceptions, Gradle would continue to the next repository in the list and potentially resolve dependencies from a different repository. If a Gradle build used an unresolvable host name, Gradle would continue to work as long as all dependencies could be resolved from another repository. An unresolvable host name could be caused by allowing a repository's domain name registration to lapse or typo-ing the real domain name. This behavior could allow an attacker to register a service under the host name used by the build and serve malicious artifacts. The attack requires the repository to be listed before others in the build configuration. Gradle has introduced a change in behavior in Gradle 9.3.0 to stop searching other repositories when encountering these errors.

Gradle is a build automation tool, and its native-platform tool provides Java bindings for native APIs. When resolving dependencies in versions before 9.3.0, some exceptions were not treated as fatal errors and would not cause a repository to be disabled. If a build encountered one of these exceptions, Gradle would continue to the next repository in the list and potentially resolve dependencies from a different repository. An exception like NoHttpResponseException can indicate transient errors. If the errors persist after a maximum number of retries, Gradle would continue to the next repository. This behavior could allow an attacker to disrupt the service of a repository and leverage another repository to serve malicious artifacts. This attack requires the attacker to have control over a repository after the disrupted repository. Gradle has introduced a change in behavior in Gradle 9.3.0 to stop searching other repositories when encountering these errors.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. This is a collision attack on long IDs (64bits) for PGP keys. Users of dependency verification in Gradle are vulnerable if they use long IDs for PGP keys in a trusted-key or pgp element in their dependency verification metadata file. The fix is to fail dependency verification if anything but a fingerprint is used in a trust element in dependency verification metadata. The problem is fixed in Gradle 8.0 and above. The problem is also patched in Gradle 6.9.4 and 7.6.1. As a workaround, use only full fingerprint IDs for trusted-key or pgp element in the metadata is a protection against this issue.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation. In versions prior to 7.2, start scripts generated by the application plugin and the gradlew script are both vulnerable to arbitrary code execution when an attacker is able to change environment variables for the user running the script. This may impact those who use gradlew on Unix-like systems or use the scripts generated by Gradle in thieir application on Unix-like systems. For this vulnerability to be exploitable, an attacker needs to be able to set the value of particular environment variables and have those environment variables be seen by the vulnerable scripts. This issue has been patched in Gradle 7.2 by removing the use of eval and requiring the use of the bash shell. There are a few workarounds available. For CI/CD systems using the Gradle build tool, one may ensure that untrusted users are unable to change environment variables for the user that executes gradlew. If one is unable to upgrade to Gradle 7.2, one may generate a new gradlew script with Gradle 7.2 and use it for older versions of Gradle. Fpplications using start scripts generated by Gradle, one may ensure that untrusted users are unable to change environment variables for the user that executes the start script. A vulnerable start script could be manually patched to remove the use of eval or the use of environment variables that affect the application's command-line. If the application is simple enough, one may be able to avoid the use of the start scripts by running the application directly with Java command.

Apache Ant could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions, caused by an insecure temporary file flaw. By sending a specially-crafted request, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to inject modified source files into the build process.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. When copying or archiving symlinked files, Gradle resolves them but applies the permissions of the symlink itself instead of the permissions of the linked file to the resulting file. This leads to files having too much permissions given that symlinks usually are world readable and writeable. While it is unlikely this results in a direct vulnerability for the impacted build, it may open up attack vectors depending on where build artifacts end up being copied to or un-archived. In versions 7.6.3, 8.4 and above, Gradle will now properly use the permissions of the file pointed at by the symlink to set permissions of the copied or archived file.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. When Gradle writes a dependency into its dependency cache, it uses the dependency's coordinates to compute a file location. With specially crafted dependency coordinates, Gradle can be made to write files into an unintended location. The file may be written outside the dependency cache or over another file in the dependency cache. This vulnerability could be used to poison the dependency cache or overwrite important files elsewhere on the filesystem where the Gradle process has write permissions. Exploiting this vulnerability requires an attacker to have control over a dependency repository used by the Gradle build or have the ability to modify the build's configuration. It is unlikely that this would go unnoticed. A fix has been released in Gradle 7.6.2 and 8.2 to protect against this vulnerability. Gradle will refuse to cache dependencies that have path traversal elements in their dependency coordinates. It is recommended that users upgrade to a patched version. If you are unable to upgrade to Gradle 7.6.2 or 8.2, dependency verification will make this vulnerability more difficult to exploit.

In Gradle before version 7.0, files created with open permissions in the system temporary directory can allow an attacker to access information downloaded by Gradle. Some builds could be vulnerable to a local information disclosure. Remote files accessed through TextResourceFactory are downloaded into the system temporary directory first. Sensitive information contained in these files can be exposed to other local users on the same system. If you do not use the TextResourceFactory API, you are not vulnerable. As of Gradle 7.0, uses of the system temporary directory have been moved to the Gradle User Home directory. By default, this directory is restricted to the user running the build. As a workaround, set a more restrictive umask that removes read access to other users. When files are created in the system temporary directory, they will not be accessible to other users. If you are unable to change your system's umask, you can move the Java temporary directory by setting the System Property java.io.tmpdir. The new path needs to limit permissions to the build user only.

In Gradle before version 7.0, on Unix-like systems, the system temporary directory can be created with open permissions that allow multiple users to create and delete files within it. Gradle builds could be vulnerable to a local privilege escalation from an attacker quickly deleting and recreating files in the system temporary directory. This vulnerability impacted builds using precompiled script plugins written in Kotlin DSL and tests for Gradle plugins written using ProjectBuilder or TestKit. If you are on Windows or modern versions of macOS, you are not vulnerable. If you are on a Unix-like operating system with the "sticky" bit set on your system temporary directory, you are not vulnerable. The problem has been patched and released with Gradle 7.0. As a workaround, on Unix-like operating systems, ensure that the "sticky" bit is set. This only allows the original user (or root) to delete a file. If you are unable to change the permissions of the system temporary directory, you can move the Java temporary directory by setting the System Property java.io.tmpdir. The new path needs to limit permissions to the build user only. For additional details refer to the referenced GitHub Security Advisory.

Gradle is a build automation tool, and its native-platform tool provides Java bindings for native APIs. On Unix-like systems, the system temporary directory can be created with open permissions that allow multiple users to create and delete files within it. This library initialization could be vulnerable to a local privilege escalation from an attacker quickly deleting and recreating files in the system temporary directory. Gradle builds that rely on versions of net.rubygrapefruit:native-platform prior to 0.22-milestone-28 could be vulnerable to a local privilege escalation from an attacker quickly deleting and recreating files in the system temporary directory.

In net.rubygrapefruit:native-platform prior to version 0.22-milestone-28, if the Native.get(Class<>) method was called, without calling Native.init(File) first, with a non-null argument used as working file path, then the library would initialize itself using the system temporary directory and NativeLibraryLocator.java lines 68 through 78. Version 0.22-milestone-28 has been released with changes that fix the problem. Initialization is now mandatory and no longer uses the system temporary directory, unless such a path is passed for initialization. The only workaround for affected versions is to make sure to do a proper initialization, using a location that is safe.

Gradle 8.12, only that exact version, had codepaths where the initialization of the underlying native integration library took a default path, relying on copying the binaries to the system temporary directory. Any execution of Gradle exposed this exploit. Users of Windows or modern versions of macOS are not vulnerable, nor are users of a Unix-like operating system with the "sticky" bit set or noexec on their system temporary directory vulnerable. This problem was fixed in Gradle 8.12.1. Gradle 8.13 release also upgrades to a version of the native library that no longer has that bug. Some workarounds are available. On Unix-like operating systems, ensure that the "sticky" bit is set. This only allows the original user (or root) to delete a file. Mounting /tmp as noexec will prevent Gradle 8.12 from starting. Those who are are unable to change the permissions of the system temporary directory can move the Java temporary directory by setting the System Property java.io.tmpdir. The new path needs to limit permissions to the build user only.

An access-control vulnerability in Gradle Enterprise 2022.4 through 2022.3.1 allows remote attackers to prevent backups from occurring, and send emails with arbitrary text content to the configured installation-administrator contact address, via HTTP access to an accidentally exposed internal endpoint. This is fixed in 2022.3.2.

A credential-exposure vulnerability in the support-bundle mechanism in Gradle Enterprise 2022.3 through 2022.3.3 allows remote attackers to access a subset of application data (e.g., cleartext credentials). This is fixed in 2022.3.3.

In Gradle Enterprise before 2021.1.3, a crafted request can trigger deserialization of arbitrary unsafe Java objects. The attacker must have the encryption and signing keys.

In Gradle Enterprise before 2021.1.3, an attacker with the ability to perform SSRF attacks can potentially reset the system user password.

Gradle Enterprise before 2021.1.3 can allow unauthorized viewing of a response (information disclosure of possibly sensitive build/configuration details) via a crafted HTTP request with the X-Gradle-Enterprise-Ajax-Request header.

In Gradle Enterprise before 2021.1.3, an attacker with the ability to perform SSRF attacks can potentially discover credentials for other resources.

All versions of com.gradle.plugin-publish before 0.11.0 are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File. When a plugin author publishes a Gradle plugin while running Gradle with the --info log level flag, the Gradle Logger logs an AWS pre-signed URL. If this build log is publicly visible (as it is in many popular public CI systems like TravisCI) this AWS pre-signed URL would allow a malicious actor to replace a recently uploaded plugin with their own.

ObjectSocketWrapper.java in Gradle 2.12 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted serialized object.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. In some cases, when Gradle parses XML files, resolving XML external entities is not disabled. Combined with an Out Of Band XXE attack (OOB-XXE), just parsing XML can lead to exfiltration of local text files to a remote server. Gradle parses XML files for several purposes. Most of the time, Gradle parses XML files it generated or were already present locally. Only Ivy XML descriptors and Maven POM files can be fetched from remote repositories and parsed by Gradle. In Gradle 7.6.3 and 8.4, resolving XML external entities has been disabled for all use cases to protect against this vulnerability. Gradle will now refuse to parse XML files that have XML external entities.

gradle-completion provides Bash and Zsh completion support for Gradle. A command injection vulnerability was found in gradle-completion up to and including 9.3.0 that allows arbitrary code execution when a user triggers Bash tab completion in a project containing a malicious Gradle build file. The gradle-completion script for Bash fails to adequately sanitize Gradle task names and task descriptions, allowing command injection via a malicious Gradle build file when the user completes a command in Bash (without them explicitly running any task in the build). For example, given a task description that includes a string between backticks, then that string would be evaluated as a command when presenting the task description in the completion list. While task execution is the core feature of Gradle, this inherent execution may lead to unexpected outcomes. The vulnerability does not affect zsh completion. The first patched version is 9.3.1. As a workaround, it is possible and effective to temporarily disable bash completion for Gradle by removing gradle-completion from .bashrc or .bashprofile.

Latest version: 9.9.1

In Gradle Enterprise before 2023.1, a remote attacker may be able to gain access to a new installation (in certain installation scenarios) because of a non-unique initial system user password. Although this password must be changed upon the first login, it is possible that an attacker logs in before the legitimate administrator logs in.

Gradle is a build tool with a focus on build automation and support for multi-language development. In some cases, Gradle may skip that verification and accept a dependency that would otherwise fail the build as an untrusted external artifact. This occurs when dependency verification is disabled on one or more configurations and those configurations have common dependencies with other configurations that have dependency verification enabled. If the configuration that has dependency verification disabled is resolved first, Gradle does not verify the common dependencies for the configuration that has dependency verification enabled. Gradle 7.4 fixes that issue by validating artifacts at least once if they are present in a resolved configuration that has dependency verification active. For users who cannot update either do not use ResolutionStrategy.disableDependencyVerification() and do not use plugins that use that method to disable dependency verification for a single configuration or make sure resolution of configuration that disable that feature do not happen in builds that resolve configuration where the feature is enabled.

Gradle is a build tool. Dependency verification is a security feature in Gradle Build Tool that was introduced to allow validation of external dependencies either through their checksum or cryptographic signatures. In versions 6.2 through 7.4.2, there are some cases in which Gradle may skip that verification and accept a dependency that would otherwise fail the build as an untrusted external artifact. This can occur in two ways. When signature verification is disabled but the verification metadata contains entries for dependencies that only have a gpg element but no checksum element. When signature verification is enabled, the verification metadata contains entries for dependencies with a gpg element but there is no signature file on the remote repository. In both cases, the verification will accept the dependency, skipping signature verification and not complaining that the dependency has no checksum entry. For builds that are vulnerable, there are two risks. Gradle could download a malicious binary from a repository outside your organization due to name squatting. For those still using HTTP only and not HTTPS for downloading dependencies, the build could download a malicious library instead of the expected one. Gradle 7.5 patches this issue by making sure to run checksum verification if signature verification cannot be completed, whatever the reason. Two workarounds are available: Remove all gpg elements from dependency verification metadata if you disable signature validation and/or avoid adding gpg entries for dependencies that do not have signature files.

Develocity (formerly Gradle Enterprise) before 2024.3.1 allows an attacker who has network access to a Develocity server to obtain the hashed password of the system user. The hash algorithm used by Develocity was chosen according to best practices for password storage and provides some protection against brute-force attempts. The applicable severity of this vulnerability depends on whether a Develocity server is accessible by external or unauthorized users, and the complexity of the System User password.