Summary The "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable to the same issue as CVE-2025-62172. <img width="431" height="334" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84e0dfad-b986-4e84-ad0e-674c5da88582" /> This also indicates that any sensor showing their name in the history-graph, is likely to be vulnerable to this issue.
Details
Another entity was found which displays the same behavior as in this issue: CVE-2025-62172
The History-graph card will sometimes display the name of the entity it is displaying, when the graph is shown as a line with values on the x and y axis. This appears to be vulnerable to Cross-Site scripting (XSS) as it does not have any output escaping or sanitization.
The PoC in this instance only shows HTML-injection in the form of the <s> -tag being rendered as strike through, but the vulnerability also allows for injecting arbitrary tags which execute JavaScript, like the example given in the PoC description below.
PoC 1. Register a new sensor (or device) or change the name of an existing one, which provides a location 2. Change the name to something malicious, for example test <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) /> For a new entity, it should work when setting the name. For old entities, go here: <img width="1300" height="411" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dbd9afa-2f4b-4d03-9384-d57c53eaff5c" /> <img width="1383" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c4cfba2e-e2d8-4817-92fe-f17ba7877e27" /> <img width="387" height="436" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c40e986d-20ca-416e-bcdb-ca1d3afa77a4" /> <br> <img width="392" height="515" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/623fcf8c-eef1-4b17-853d-0ff5440aecaa" />
PS: the example pictures show changing the name of the device-tracker entity, which is wrong. Just change the name of the remaining charge time-sensor in order to validate this finding
3. Add a history graph card with the malicious sensor <img width="696" height="474" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3cda78e6-3db5-4075-8924-ab9fc5759082" />
5. Hover the graph for payload execution <img width="343" height="196" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/99e56169-b06a-4c60-9343-510e5d74af12" />
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability is that a user can target other users of the system and perform account takeover through client side exploitation of XSS.
In the context of this system, I believe the vulnerability to be less impactful than the CVSS metric describes. It is not displayed anywhere by default, it is not natural to display this history graph, and it also has no potential for being imported through seemingly innocent integrations. It also appears to rely on having used/using Android Auto. Other devices which has the same sensor can trigger the same vulnerability, and I expect there to exists cloud-based devices that would enable a threat actor to deliver the payload remotely.
Credit: Robin Lunde - https://robinlunde.com
Summary An authenticated party can add a malicious name to their device entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see a dashboard with a Map-card which includes that entity. It requires that the victim hovers over an information point (The lines or the dots representing that device's movement, as shown in the screenshot below, with the example showing a html-injection using <s> to strikethrough the text) <img width="348" height="355" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1af3ef33-3a72-4816-8ade-e6405aace176" />
This allows an authenticated user to execute JavaScript in the context of any other users accessing a dashboard.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the map-card by adding a malicious entity and having the property hourstoshow set. See example below, with the malicious entity being Pixel 9 <s> Fold Robin {{77}}: Map card with malicious device entity: <img width="338" height="332" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/15229cc3-1b69-438c-9ee5-cbfa9483aec9" />
YAML-view of same card: <img width="338" height="198" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd579266-75c3-4cdf-9d08-1544a6887feb" />
This issue largely resembles the issue documented in: CVE-2025-62172, but with an entity which can be displayed in a Map, instead of in an energy-dashboard.
PoC 1. Register a new sensor (or device) or change the name of an existing one, which provides a location 2. Change the name to something malicious, for example test <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) /> For a new entity, it should work when setting the name. For old entities, go here: <img width="1300" height="411" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d240549e-f26c-4617-89d7-5480451ae5a3" /> <img width="1383" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94db6186-ad54-476c-92a3-9f6870b0c862" /> <img width="387" height="436" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f4c4b9f6-b1e7-4b50-9012-3be31c617be4" /> <br> <img width="392" height="515" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a0f24d2f-cc18-4ef7-9071-40376dbb38c1" />
3. Add the entity to a map card, which has the "hours to show"-attribute set, to display movement history <img width="296" height="383" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2db55b6-3d4b-4ab0-91fe-fc26813ad5ff" /> <img width="692" height="410" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/aec15e07-12c0-4abf-ba73-979736131c7c" />
<img width="694" height="302" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e4bb7cac-fe85-41eb-963c-1743e78d937c" />
(The left arrow showing the custom setting, and the right arrow showing a data point which needs to be hovered)
4. The payload executes when hovering a data-point (here shown with an "alert(document.domain"-payload) <img width="504" height="118" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9f24e1fe-949f-4fa5-9e4f-781828a1343b" />
Impact The impact of this vulnerability is that a user can target other users of the system and perform account takeover through client side exploitation of XSS.
In the context of this system, I believe the vulnerability to be less impactful than the CVSS metric describes, as it requires a specific setup (map-card with attribute hourstoshow set, as this brings up the trail). It is interesting to note that any user who sets this attribute, will be highly likely to trigger the vulnerability through normal use. It also has no potential for being imported through seemingly innocent integrations and can only be set explicitly by another invited user, a device name, a cloud service or through social engineering. Other devices which has the same sensor can trigger the same vulnerability, and I expect there to exists cloud-based devices that would enable a threat actor to deliver the payload remotely.
Suggested criticality: Medium
Credit: Robin Lunde - https://robinlunde.com
Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.5.3, the LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission. Any installed app, with zero runtime permissions, can broadcast a forged Google Play Services LocationResult directly to it; the receiver trusts the extra and forwards it to the user's Home Assistant server as the device's real location. This bypasses Android's developer-mode "Mock Location" gate and allows a local malicious app to drive zone-based automations (unlock door / disarm alarm / open garage) by faking the user's GPS position. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.5.3.