Icinga Web 2 is an open source monitoring web interface, framework and command-line interface. A vulnerability in versions prior to 2.11.5 and 2.12.13 vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a URL that, once visited by an authenticated user (or one that is able to authenticate), allows to manipulate the backend to redirect the user to any location. This issue has been resolved in versions 2.11.5 and 2.12.3 of Icinga Web 2. No known workarounds are available.

Icinga Web 2 is an open source monitoring web interface, framework and command-line interface. A vulnerability in versions prior to 2.11.5 and 2.12.13 allows an attacker to craft a request that, once transmitted to a victim's Icinga Web, allows to embed arbitrary Javascript into it and to act on behalf of that user. This issue has been resolved in versions 2.11.5 and 2.12.3 of Icinga Web 2. As a workaround, those who have Icinga Web 2.12.2 may enable a content security policy in the application settings. Any modern browser with a working CORS implementation also sufficiently guards against the vulnerability.

Icinga Web 2 is an open source monitoring web interface, framework and command-line interface. A vulnerability in versions prior to 2.11.5 and 2.12.13 allows an attacker to craft a URL that, once visited by any user, allows to embed arbitrary Javascript into Icinga Web and to act on behalf of that user. This issue has been resolved in versions 2.11.5 and 2.12.3 of Icinga Web 2. As a workaround, those who have Icinga Web 2.12.2 may enable a content security policy in the application settings.

Icinga Web 2 is an open source monitoring web interface, framework and command-line interface. A vulnerability in versions prior to 2.11.5 and 2.12.13 allows an attacker to craft a URL that, once visited by any user, allows to embed arbitrary Javascript into Icinga Web and to act on behalf of that user. This issue has been resolved in versions 2.11.5 and 2.12.3 of Icinga Web 2. As a workaround, those who have Icinga Web 2.12.2 may enable a content security policy in the application settings.

Icinga is a monitoring system which checks the availability of network resources, notifies users of outages, and generates performance data for reporting. In versions prior to 2.11.10 and from version 2.12.0 through version 2.12.4, some of the Icinga 2 features that require credentials for external services expose those credentials through the API to authenticated API users with read permissions for the corresponding object types. IdoMysqlConnection and IdoPgsqlConnection (every released version) exposes the password of the user used to connect to the database. IcingaDB (added in 2.12.0) exposes the password used to connect to the Redis server. ElasticsearchWriter (added in 2.8.0)exposes the password used to connect to the Elasticsearch server. An attacker who obtains these credentials can impersonate Icinga to these services and add, modify and delete information there. If credentials with more permissions are in use, this increases the impact accordingly. Starting with the 2.11.10 and 2.12.5 releases, these passwords are no longer exposed via the API. As a workaround, API user permissions can be restricted to not allow querying of any affected objects, either by explicitly listing only the required object types for object query permissions, or by applying a filter rule.

Icinga is a monitoring system which checks the availability of network resources, notifies users of outages, and generates performance data for reporting. From version 2.4.0 through version 2.12.4, a vulnerability exists that may allow privilege escalation for authenticated API users. With a read-ony user's credentials, an attacker can view most attributes of all config objects including ticketsalt of ApiListener. This salt is enough to compute a ticket for every possible common name (CN). A ticket, the master node's certificate, and a self-signed certificate are enough to successfully request the desired certificate from Icinga. That certificate may in turn be used to steal an endpoint or API user's identity. Versions 2.12.5 and 2.11.10 both contain a fix the vulnerability. As a workaround, one may either specify queryable types explicitly or filter out ApiListener objects.

Icinga Web 2 is an open source monitoring web interface, framework, and command-line interface. A vulnerability in which custom variables are exposed to unauthorized users exists between versions 2.0.0 and 2.8.2. Custom variables are user-defined keys and values on configuration objects in Icinga 2. These are commonly used to reference secrets in other configurations such as check commands to be able to authenticate with a service being checked. Icinga Web 2 displays these custom variables to logged in users with access to said hosts or services. In order to protect the secrets from being visible to anyone, it's possible to setup protection rules and blacklists in a user's role. Protection rules result in being shown instead of the original value, the key will remain. Backlists will hide a custom variable entirely from the user. Besides using the UI, custom variables can also be accessed differently by using an undocumented URL parameter. By adding a parameter to the affected routes, Icinga Web 2 will show these columns additionally in the respective list. This parameter is also respected when exporting to JSON or CSV. Protection rules and blacklists however have no effect in this case. Custom variables are shown as-is in the result. The issue has been fixed in the 2.9.0, 2.8.3, and 2.7.5 releases. As a workaround, one may set up a restriction to hide hosts and services with the custom variable in question.

Icinga Web 2 is an open source monitoring web interface, framework and command-line interface. Between versions 2.3.0 and 2.8.2, the doc module of Icinga Web 2 allows to view documentation directly in the UI. It must be enabled manually by an administrator and users need explicit access permission to use it. Then, by visiting a certain route, it is possible to gain access to arbitrary files readable by the web-server user. The issue has been fixed in the 2.9.0, 2.8.3, and 2.7.5 releases. As a workaround, an administrator may disable the doc module or revoke permission to use it from all users.

Icinga 2 v2.8.0 through v2.11.7 and v2.12.2 has an issue where revoked certificates due for renewal will automatically be renewed, ignoring the CRL. This issue is fixed in Icinga 2 v2.11.8 and v2.12.3.

An issue was discovered in Icinga2 before v2.12.0-rc1. The prepare-dirs script (run as part of the icinga2 systemd service) executes chmod 2750 /run/icinga2/cmd. /run/icinga2 is under control of an unprivileged user by default. If /run/icinga2/cmd is a symlink, then it will by followed and arbitrary files can be changed to mode 2750 by the unprivileged icinga2 user.

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Classic-UI with the CSV export link and pagination feature in Icinga before 1.14 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the query string to cgi-bin/status.cgi.

It was reported [1] that Nagios Core's history.cgi is vulnerable to a buffer overflow because it used sprintf on user-supplied data that was not restricted in size.

Due to various protections of the operating system (history.cgi is compiled with SSP, FORTIFYSOURCE is enabled, etc.) this is not believed to be exploitable and would result in a denial of service to the user sending the input to history.cgi.

This has been fixed in svn (r2547)[2].

[1] http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2012-12/0108.html [2] http://nagios.svn.sourceforge.net/viewvc/nagios?view=revision&revision=2547

Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in config.c in config.cgi in Icinga before 1.4.1, when escapehtmltags is disabled, allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a JavaScript expression, as demonstrated by the onload attribute of a BODY element located after a check-host-alive! sequence, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-2179.

It was reported [1],[2] that an XSS vulnerability exists in Nagios when viewing the configuration and using command expansion, as there is no input validation for "expand" in config.c(gi):

View Config -> Command Expansion -> To expand -> <script>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</script> View Config -> Command Expansion -> To expand -> <body onload=alert(666)>

or

http://www.example.com/nagios/cgi-bin/config.cgi?type=command&expand=<script>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</script> [^] http://www.example.com/nagios/cgi-bin/config.cgi?type=command&expand=<body [^] onload=alert(666)>

[1] http://tracker.nagios.org/view.php?id=224 [2] http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2011/Jun/17