The vulnerability is that the Messaging ("com.android.mms") app patched by LG forwards attacker-controlled intents back to the attacker in the exported "com.android.mms.ui.QClipIntentReceiverActivity" activity. The attacker can abuse this functionality by launching this activity and then sending a broadcast with the "com.lge.message.action.QCLIP" action. The attacker can send, e.g., their own data/clipdata and set Intent.FLAGGRANT flags. After the attacker received that intent in the "onActivityResult()" method, they would have access to arbitrary content providers that have the android:grantUriPermissions="true" flag set.
he vulnerability is to delete arbitrary files in LGInstallService ("com.lge.lginstallservies") app. The app contains the exported "com.lge.lginstallservies.InstallService" service that exposes an AIDL interface. All its "installPackage" methods are finally calling the "installPackageVerify()" method that performs signature validation after the delete file method. An attacker can control conditions so this security check is never performed and an attacker-controlled file is deleted.
he vulnerability is that the Call management ("com.android.server.telecom") app patched by LG launches implicit intents that disclose sensitive data to all third-party apps installed on the same device. Those intents include data such as contact details and phone numbers.
The vulnerability is that the Call management ("com.android.server.telecom") app patched by LG sends a lot of LG-owned implicit broadcasts that disclose sensitive data to all third-party apps installed on the same device. Those intents include data such as call states, durations, called numbers, contacts info, etc.
The vulnerability is the use of implicit PendingIntents without the PendingIntent.FLAGIMMUTABLE set that leads to theft and/or (over-)write of arbitrary files with system privilege in the Personalized service ("com.lge.abba") app. The attacker's app, if it had access to app notifications, could intercept them and redirect them to its activity, before making it grant access permissions to content providers with the android:grantUriPermissions="true" flag.
The vulnerability is to theft of arbitrary files with system privilege in the Screen recording ("com.lge.gametools.gamerecorder") app in the "com/lge/gametools/gamerecorder/settings/ProfilePreferenceFragment.java" file. The main problem is that the app launches implicit intents that can be intercepted by third-party apps installed on the same device. They also can return arbitrary data that will be passed to the "onActivityResult()" method. The Screen recording app saves contents of arbitrary URIs to SD card which is a world-readable storage.
The vulnerability is the use of implicit PendingIntents with the PendingIntent.FLAGMUTABLE set that leads to theft and/or (over-)write of arbitrary files with system privilege in the Bluetooth ("com.lge.bluetoothsetting") app. The attacker's app, if it had access to app notifications, could intercept them and redirect them to its activity, before making it grant access permissions to content providers with the android:grantUriPermissions="true" flag.
The vulnerability is to theft of arbitrary files with system privilege in the LockScreenSettings ("com.lge.lockscreensettings") app in the "com/lge/lockscreensettings/dynamicwallpaper/MyCategoryGuideActivity.java" file. The main problem is that the app launches implicit intents that can be intercepted by third-party apps installed on the same device. They also can return arbitrary data that will be passed to the "onActivityResult()" method. The LockScreenSettings app copies the received file to the "/data/shared/dw/mycategory/wallpaper01.png" path and then changes the file access mode to world-readable and world-writable.
The vulnerability is an intent redirection in LG ThinQ Service ("com.lge.lms2") in the "com/lge/lms/things/ui/notification/NotificationManager.java" file. This vulnerability could be exploited by a third-party app installed on an LG device by sending a broadcast with the action "com.lge.lms.things.notification.ACTION". Additionally, this vulnerability is very dangerous because LG ThinQ Service is a system app (having android:sharedUserId="android.uid.system" setting). Intent redirection in this app leads to accessing arbitrary not exported activities of absolutely all apps.