Summary The POST /login endpoint has no rate limiting, account lockout, or delay on failed attempts. An attacker can submit unlimited password guesses at full network speed.

Details

python lightrag/api/lightragserver.py:2161 @app.post("/login") async def login(formdata: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends()): if not authhandler.verifypassword(username, formdata.password): raise HTTPException(statuscode=401, detail="Incorrect credentials") # No: rate limit / lockout / backoff / CAPTCHA / attempt counter

A search for slowapi, ratelimit, lockout, or throttle in lightrag/api/ returns zero results.

PoC

bash Brute-force /login with a wordlist, no throttling while IFS= read -r pass; do code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{httpcode}" \ -X POST http://<TARGET>:9621/login \ -d "username=admin&password=${pass}") [ "$code" = "200" ] && echo "[FOUND] $pass" && break done < /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Impact Improper restriction of authentication attempts. Any network-reachable attacker can brute-force user passwords without restriction. Once credentials are recovered, the attacker gains full authenticated access to all documents, knowledge graph, and administrative operations.

Summary

The LightRAG API server passes raw Python exception messages directly into HTTP error responses across 30+ error handlers in every router. When combined with the default unauthenticated configuration (see companion report on CWE-306), any network-reachable client can trigger exceptions whose raw text discloses internal infrastructure — server filesystem paths, database host/port/user, LLM provider error details, and Python library internals. No global exception handler sanitizes error messages before they reach the client.

Details

Throughout the API route handlers, exceptions are caught and their string representation is returned verbatim via detail=str(e) / detail=str(exc) (and f-string variants such as detail=f"...: {str(e)}"). This occurs in every router file. Location breakdown on the current main branch:

HTTP 500 — raw exception passthrough (except Exception as e): - documentroutes.py — 13 - graphroutes.py — 12 (mix of detail=f"...{str(e)}" and detail=errormsg) - queryroutes.py — 3 - ollamaapi.py — 2 - lightragserver.py — 1 (health endpoint)

HTTP 422 — raw exception passthrough (except ValueError as exc): - documentroutes.py — 2 (chunking-config validation)

Total: ~33 raw-exception-to-HTTP-response locations. The only pre-existing custom exception handler in lightragserver.py is specific to RequestValidationError for /query/data; it does not cover the generic Exception handlers in route code.

Example pattern (documentroutes.py, upload handler):

python except Exception as e: logger.error(f"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {str(e)}") raise HTTPException(statuscode=500, detail=str(e))

Categories of sensitive information that can leak through these responses:

1. Server filesystem paths. File-I/O errors from the default JSON storage backend expose the server's directory layout (e.g. [Errno 13] Permission denied: '/app/data/ragstorage/default/kvstorefulldocs.json'), aiding path-traversal or targeted attacks. (Verified — see PoC Step 1.)

2. Database host / port / user / database name. Connection errors from the PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, or Neo4j backends surface the target the driver was trying to reach — e.g. asyncpg raises password authentication failed for user "lightrag" (username) or a socket error naming the unreachable host and port. Note on credentials: the PostgreSQL backend uses asyncpg, which is built from keyword parameters and does not echo the password in its exception strings — so a raw asyncpg error leaks host/port/user/db, not the password. URI-configured backends behave differently: the MongoDB backend is built with AsyncMongoClient(MONGOURI, ...), and a malformed-URI / configuration error from pymongo can surface the connection string itself, which may embed credentials (mongodb://user:password@host:port/). The leak surface is therefore backend- and error-type-dependent.

3. LLM provider error details. Errors from OpenAI / Gemini / Bedrock and other providers may include model names, organization ids, or partial API error context that reveal the deployment.

4. Python library internals. Unexpected exceptions expose class names, library-internal messages, and stack fragments that fingerprint the server stack and version.

5. Configuration details. Errors during configuration/parsing may reveal storage backend types and other configuration values.

The risk is amplified by the default unauthenticated configuration (CWE-306, companion report), which lets any network client trigger and read these errors without credentials.

PoC

Tested on a clean checkout with the [api] extras installed and the server run via lightrag-server.

Step 1 — Filesystem path disclosure (default JSON storage)

With the default storage backend, a file-permission error is returned verbatim:

bash Make a storage file unreadable to force an I/O error. chmod 000 ./ragstorage/default/kvstorefulldocs.json curl -s http://localhost:9621/documents | python3 -m json.tool

Vulnerable response — the full server-side path is disclosed:

json { "detail": "[Errno 13] Permission denied: '/app/data/ragstorage/default/kvstorefulldocs.json'" }

Step 2 — Database infrastructure disclosure (PostgreSQL backend)

Configure a PostgreSQL KV backend pointed at an unreachable / misconfigured host:

LIGHTRAGKVSTORAGE=PGKVStorage POSTGRESHOST=nonexistent-host-12345.example.com POSTGRESPORT=5432 POSTGRESUSER=lightrag POSTGRESDATABASE=lightrag

A request that touches storage returns the raw connection error, disclosing the host / port / user the server is configured to reach (the asyncpg password is not echoed — see the credentials note above):

json { "detail": "[Errno -2] Name or service not known" }

For a URI-configured backend such as MongoDB (MONGOURI=mongodb://user:pass@host:port/db), a malformed-URI / configuration error can instead surface the connection string itself, including any embedded credentials.

Impact

Error-message information exposure. A client able to reach the LightRAG server can extract:

- Confidentiality (C:L): server filesystem paths, database host/port/user/db, LLM provider configuration hints, and Python stack internals from raw exception messages; for URI-configured backends, potentially the connection string (with embedded credentials). - Escalation risk: leaked hosts/paths aid follow-on attacks; a leaked connection URI could enable direct database access if the database is network-reachable.

When combined with the default unauthenticated configuration, any network client can trigger and read these responses without authentication, which is why this is scored PR:N.

Suggested remediation

1. Replace every detail=str(e) / detail=str(exc) pattern with a generic client message. Log the full exception server-side (message + traceback) and return only a generic message plus a correlation id:

python except Exception as e: logger.error(f"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {e!r}") raise HTTPException(statuscode=500, detail="Internal server error")

2. Register a last-resort global handler as defense-in-depth so any exception that escapes a route is sanitized identically:

python @app.exceptionhandler(Exception) async def unhandledexceptionhandler(request, exc): logger.error(f"Unhandled exception: {exc!r}", excinfo=True) return JSONResponse(statuscode=500, content={"detail": "Internal server error"})

3. Preserve genuine client-input validation feedback. The two HTTP 422 chunking-config validators emit controlled, non-sensitive messages; keep them as 422 feedback rather than genericizing to 500 — but wrap the raw exception so it is never a bare passthrough.

Fix status: implemented in HKUDS/LightRAG#3422 — a shared internalservererror() helper routes all 500 handlers through a generic body carrying a correlation id (full detail logged server-side), a global @app.exceptionhandler(Exception) is registered in createapp, and the two 422 validators are wrapped.

Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D) - Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)