In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received

isertrecvdone() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without ever looking at wc->bytelen, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS (ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsoldatalen / immdatalen) - out of the fixed-size descriptor:

iserthandleiscsidataout(): sgcopyfrombuffer(sgstart, sgnents, isertgetdata(rxdesc), unsoldatalen); iserthandlescsicmd(): sgcopyfrombuffer(cmd->secmd.tdatasg, sgnents, isertgetdata(rxdesc), immdatalen);

Because the declared length is never checked against wc->bytelen, an initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of the receive buffer.

Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:

- iscsitcheckdataouthdr() bounds the inbound payload against connops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter, used here for the inbound check. - iscsisetconnectionparameters() sets ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength; and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in iscsicheckacceptorstate(), so the value the initiator declares is adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively raises its own ceiling. - isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive descriptor (ISERRXSIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and the descriptor size are unrelated.

The immdatalen == datalen path is more than an over-read: it aliases the receive descriptor via sgsetbuf() and passes it to the backend as the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was demonstrated.

Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment length exceeds what was received. With KASAN:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sgcopybuffer+0x150/0x1c0 Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25 Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ibcqpollwork Call Trace: sgcopybuffer+0x150/0x1c0 isertrecvdone+0xba6/0x2390 ibprocesscq+0xe1/0x390 ibcqpollwork+0x46/0x150

isertrecvdone+0xba6 resolves to iserthandleiscsidataout() (ibisert.c:1160), inlined through isertrxopcode().

Validate wc->bytelen against the framing in isertrecvdone() before the PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short. Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs shorter than ISERHEADERSLEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISERHEADERSLEN")) but does not bound the declared length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no length check at all.

isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isertgetdata() returns the iSER header plus ISERHEADERSLEN and makes no adjustment for an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly [ISERHEADERSLEN, ISERHEADERSLEN + dlength), and comparing that sum against wc->bytelen bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth ---truncated---

IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received