The olmsessiondescribe function in Matrix libolm before 3.2.7 is vulnerable to a buffer overflow. The Olm session object represents a cryptographic channel between two parties. Therefore, its state is partially controllable by the remote party of the channel. Attackers can construct a crafted sequence of messages to manipulate the state of the receiver's session in such a way that, for some buffer sizes, a buffer overflow happens on a call to olmsessiondescribe. Furthermore, safe buffer sizes were undocumented. The overflow content is partially controllable by the attacker and limited to ASCII spaces and digits. The known affected products are Element Web And SchildiChat Web.

Impact

A logic error in the room key sharing functionality of matrix-js-sdk before 12.4.1 allows a malicious Matrix homeserver† participating in an encrypted room to steal room encryption keys from affected Matrix clients participating in that room. This allows the homeserver to decrypt end-to-end encrypted messages sent by affected clients.

† Or anyone with access to the account of the original recipient of an encrypted message.

Known clients affected (via their use of vulnerable versions of matrix-js-sdk):

- Element Web (1.8.2 and earlier) - Element Desktop (1.8.2 and earlier) - SchildiChat Web (1.7.32-sc1 and earlier) - SchildiChat Desktop (1.7.32-sc1 and earlier) - Cinny (1.2.0 and earlier)

Patch

This was fixed in https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/commit/894c24880da0e1cc81818f51c0db80e3c9fb2be9.

Workarounds To prevent a homeserver from being able to steal the room keys, vulnerable clients can be taken offline or signed out. If signing out, care should be taken to either set up Secure Backup or export E2E room keys in order to preserve access to past messages.

matrix-js-sdk is the Matrix Client-Server SDK for JavaScript and TypeScript. An attacker present in a room where an MSC3401 group call is taking place can eavesdrop on the video and audio of participants using matrix-js-sdk, without their knowledge. To affected matrix-js-sdk users, the attacker will not appear to be participating in the call. This attack is possible because matrix-js-sdk's group call implementation accepts incoming direct calls from other users, even if they have not yet declared intent to participate in the group call, as a means of resolving a race condition in call setup. Affected versions do not restrict access to the user's outbound media in this case. Legacy 1:1 calls are unaffected. This is fixed in matrix-js-sdk 24.1.0. As a workaround, users may hold group calls in private rooms where only the exact users who are expected to participate in the call are present.

Impact A malicious homeserver can craft a room or room structure such that the predecessors form a cycle. The matrix-js-sdk's getRoomUpgradeHistory function will infinitely recurse in this case, causing the code to hang. This method is public but also called by the 'leaveRoomChain()' method, so leaving a room will also trigger the bug.

Even if the CVSS score would be 4.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L) we classify this as High severity issue.

Patches This was patched in matrix-js-sdk 34.3.1.

Workarounds Sanity check rooms before passing them to the matrix-js-sdk or avoid calling either getRoomUpgradeHistory or leaveRoomChain.

References N/A.