Improper neutralization of delimiters in connection-URL construction allows connection-option injection in the MongoDB C# Driver. When an application passes untrusted text into the driver's connection-URL builder and round-trips the builder back into a client configuration, the untrusted text is serialized without neutralizing the URL/option delimiters and is then re-parsed as authoritative connection options. A low-privileged user of such an application can thereby introduce or suppress security-relevant connection settings.

A MongoDB C# driver document-replacement code path omits the element-name/shape validation that the equivalent write paths apply, so a value supplied as a replacement is forwarded to the server without neutralization of query-language special elements. An application that passes untrusted, loosely-typed input as a replacement value therefore allows that input to be interpreted by the database as update logic rather than as data, executing under the application's own database credentials. Applications using strongly-typed document mappings are not affected.

A NoSQL/expression injection weakness exists in the LINQ-to-aggregation query translation layer of the MongoDB C# Driver, in both aggregation expression and query filter translation. When application-supplied values are embedded in certain query constructs, special elements contained within those values are not properly escaped before the resulting query is transmitted to the database, so portions of the value may be interpreted by the database as query logic rather than as data. A user able to supply values that an application incorporates into an affected query may thereby cause unintended data to be returned or query results to be altered.