Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called ApprovalInbox (lib/approval-inbox.ts). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which ApprovalGate uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: on every route, including the state-changing POST /approvals/:id/approve and /deny. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. ApprovalInbox now accepts a secret option. When set, the mutating endpoints POST /:id/approve and POST /:id/deny require an Authorization: Bearer <secret> header, validated in constant time with crypto.timingSafeEqual. startServer() already binds to 127.0.0.1 by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.