Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

A vulnerability exists in Nokia’s ASIK AirScale system module (versions 474021A.101 and 474021A.102) that could allow an attacker to place a script on the file system accessible from Linux. A script placed in the appropriate place could allow for arbitrary code execution in the bootloader.

Remedy

Nokia has released technical support notes containing mitigation instructions for impacted Nokia users. Users should contact Nokia https://customer.nokia.com/support/s/  to receive further information.
First published (updated )
Severity
8.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

The bootloader in the Nokia ASIK AirScale system module (versions 474021A.101 and 474021A.102) loads public keys for firmware verification signature. If an attacker modifies the flash contents to corrupt the keys, secure boot could be permanently disabled on a given device.

Remedy

Nokia has released technical support notes containing mitigation instructions for impacted Nokia users. Users should contact Nokia https://customer.nokia.com/support/s/  to receive further information.
First published (updated )
Severity
8.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The signature check in the Nokia ASIK AirScale system module version 474021A.101 can be bypassed allowing an attacker to run modified firmware. This could result in the execution of a malicious kernel, arbitrary programs, or modified Nokia programs.

Remedy

Nokia has released technical support notes containing mitigation instructions for impacted Nokia users. Users should contact Nokia https://customer.nokia.com/support/s/  to receive further information.
First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. A mobile network solution internal fault was found in Nokia Single RAN software releases. Certain software processes in the BTS internal software design have unnecessarily high privileges to BTS embedded operating system (OS) resources.

First published (updated )
Severity
7
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. If/when CSP (as a BTS administrator) removes security hardenings from the Nokia Single RAN BTS baseband unit, the BTS baseband unit diagnostic tool AaShell (which is by default disabled) allows unauthenticated access from the mobile network solution internal BTS management network to the BTS embedded Linux operating-system level.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.1
Path Traversal
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. If/when CSP (as a BTS administrator) removes security hardenings from a Nokia Single RAN BTS baseband unit, a directory path traversal in the Nokia BTS baseband unit diagnostic tool AaShell (which is by default disabled) provides access to the BTS baseband unit internal filesystem from the mobile network solution internal BTS management network.

First published (updated )

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