A flaw was found in the OpenShift console. An authenticated console user can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability by providing a specially crafted Helm chart URL without proper validation. This allows the user to make the console pod fetch arbitrary URLs, potentially leading to the disclosure of sensitive information through error messages or enabling blind port scanning within the cluster.

The CatalogdHandler() in the OpenShift console is registered without authHandler (pkg/server/server.go:340). Furthermore, the CatalogdProxyConfig is the only proxy config that omits HeaderBlacklist: srv.ProxyHeaderDenyList (cmd/bridge/main.go:429-432), so the user's openshift-session-token cookie is forwarded verbatim to the catalogd service.

Any unauthenticated network actor can GET /api/catalogd/<arbitrary-path> and the console pod will issue a TLS request to catalogd-service.openshift-catalogd.svc:443/<arbitrary-path>. This discloses the full operator-catalog index (intended to be cluster-internal) and provides a relay primitive into the openshift-catalogd namespace.

Tested and reproduced on OCP 5.0 nightly cluster.

Upstream: https://github.com/openshift/console File: pkg/server/server.go:340, pkg/server/server.go:859-868, cmd/bridge/main.go:429-432