Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks used to break Wi-Fi handshakes that negotiate session keys was discovered. These attacks target the Wi-Fi/WPA2 standard. An adversary can trick a client or Access Point (AP) into reinstalling an already-in use group key in 4-way handshake. While reinstalling the already in-use key, the associated packet number (sometimes also called nonce) and receive replay counter is reset. This causes nonce reuse, voiding any security the underlying encryption protocol is supposed to provide. For example, it allows decryption or injection of frames, and enables an attacker to replay frames.
A new exploitation technique called key reinstallation attacks used to break Wi-Fi handshakes that negotiate session keys was discovered. These attacks target the Wi-Fi/WPA2 standard. An adversary can trick a client or Access Point (AP) into reinstalling an already-in use group key in the group key handshake. While reinstalling the already in-use key, the associated packet number (sometimes also called nonce) and receive replay counter is reset. This causes nonce reuse, voiding any security the underlying encryption protocol is supposed to provide. For example, it allows decryption or injection of frames, and enables an attacker to replay frames.
ntpd in NTP 4.x before 4.2.8p8, when autokey is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (peer-variable clearing and association outage) by sending (1) a spoofed crypto-NAK packet or (2) a packet with an incorrect MAC value at a certain time.
ntpd in NTP 4.x before 4.2.8p8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (interleaved-mode transition and time change) via a spoofed broadcast packet. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-1548.
A buffer overflow flaw was fixed in IBM JDK 6 SR16-FP25, 7 SR9-FP40, 7R1 SR3-FP40, and 8 SR3:
CVEID: CVE-2016-0264 DESCRIPTION: A buffer overflow vulnerability in the IBM JVM facilitates arbitrary code execution under certain limited circumstances. CVSS Base Score: 5.6 CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)
http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21980826
External Reference:
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/java/jdk/alerts/#IBMSecurityUpdateApril2016