Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.4
OS Command Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool builds a psql \copy (...) command line by interpolating a user-supplied SQL query into a Jinja template and passing the rendered line to psql via --command. To stop an attacker from breaking out of the (...) wrapper, createimportexportjob() (route POST /importexport/job/<sid>, gated only by the ordinary, commonly-granted toolsimportexportdata permission) validated the query with a hand-written parenthesis-balance checker, isqueryparensbalanced(). That checker always treated a backslash before a single quote (\') as escaping the quote, i.e. as if standardconformingstrings were off. PostgreSQL has defaulted standardconformingstrings to on since 9.1 (2010), the default on every PostgreSQL version pgAdmin 4 currently supports (13-18); under that default psql's own \copy tokenizer treats \ as an ordinary character, so a single quote immediately after it closes the string literal. A query such as SELECT 'a\') TO PROGRAM 'echo pwned' x' was therefore accepted as "balanced" by pgAdmin's checker (which believed the ) was still inside the string), while psql, run through the actual rendered command line, closes the string at that point and treats the following ) as the end of the wrapping \copy (...) subquery, exposing an attacker-chosen TO PROGRAM '<command>' clause that psql executes via popen() -- independent of a subsequent syntax error later on the same line. This is the same class of bug as CVE-2025-12762/CVE-2025-13780 (RCE via psql meta-command/COPY injection during PLAIN-format dump restore), reached through an independently written defense in a different module (Import/Export Data rather than Restore) that had its own, different logic bug (inverted backslash-escape semantics rather than a BOM-defeated regex anchor).

The fix rejects any backslash inside a single-quoted string in the query outright, rather than picking one of the two possible psql interpretations. This is intentionally conservative: because the correct interpretation of \ depends on the target server's standardconformingstrings setting, which the checker cannot reliably know at validation time, refusing the query is safer than guessing.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of isqueryparensbalanced() before 9.18.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

pgAdmin <= 9.1 is affected by a security vulnerability with Cross-Site Scripting(XSS). If attackers execute any arbitrary HTML/JavaScript in a user's browser through query result rendering, then HTML/JavaScript runs on the browser.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Open redirect vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 versions prior to v6.14 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to redirect a user to an arbitrary web site and conduct a phishing attack by having a user to access a specially crafted URL.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
Path Traversal
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

pgAdmin 4 versions prior to v6.19 contains a directory traversal vulnerability. A user of the product may change another user's settings or alter the database.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
OS Command Injection
AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in pgAdmin. This issue occurs when the pgAdmin server HTTP API validates the path a user selects to external PostgreSQL utilities such as pgdump and pgrestore. Versions of pgAdmin prior to 7.6 failed to properly control the server code executed on this API, allowing an authenticated user to run arbitrary commands on the server.

1 / 3
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
Path Traversal, Malicious File Upload, CSRF
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

A malicious, but authorised and authenticated user can construct an HTTP request using their existing CSRF token and session cookie to manually upload files to any location that the operating system user account under which pgAdmin is running has permission to write.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )

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