Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

rConfig Core 8.2.3 before 8.2.13 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated users to retrieve cleartext SSH, Telnet, and enable passwords for managed devices through the device-credentials API due to automatic decryption on read and missing authorization checks. Attackers can request GET /api/device-credentials, GET /api/device-credentials/{id}, or the external GET /api/v1/device-credentials endpoint, which authenticates any valid token as the seeded administrator account, to statelessly exfiltrate all stored plaintext device credentials. rConfig Pro is not affected.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.1
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority as it's a duplicate of CVE-2026-64826.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.3
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

rConfig Core 8.0.0 before 8.2.19 and rConfig Pro before 8.4.1 contain a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability that allows unauthenticated network attackers to execute arbitrary code by pushing a crafted serialized job onto the Redis-backed Laravel Horizon queue, which runs without authentication in affected deployments. Laravel's CallQueuedHandler unserializes the job without class restrictions, allowing attackers to instantiate the existing App\\Jobs\\TaskDownloadRun class and invoke an attacker-controlled Artisan command. Attackers can leverage the bundled laravel/tinker package to execute arbitrary PHP and operating system commands as the queue worker's user, write a persistent web shell into the web-served storage/app/public directory, and read database credentials, stored device credentials, and API tokens. Where Redis is not directly reachable, authenticated attackers can deliver the payload through the application by configuring a device target that points at the rConfig server's loopback address.

First published (updated )

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