Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in Undertow. When Undertow receives an HTTP request where the first header line starts with one or more spaces, it incorrectly processes the request by stripping these leading spaces. This behavior, which violates HTTP standards, can be exploited by a remote attacker to perform request smuggling. Request smuggling allows an attacker to bypass security mechanisms, access restricted information, or manipulate web caches, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or data exposure.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in Undertow. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to construct specially crafted requests where header names are parsed differently by Undertow compared to upstream proxies. This discrepancy in header interpretation can be exploited to launch request smuggling attacks, potentially bypassing security controls and accessing unauthorized resources.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in Undertow. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending \r\r\r as a header block terminator. This can be used for request smuggling with certain proxy servers, such as older versions of Apache Traffic Server and Google Cloud Classic Application Load Balancer, potentially leading to unauthorized access or manipulation of web requests.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Input Validation, SSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

A flaw was found in the Undertow HTTP server core, which is used in WildFly, JBoss EAP, and other Java applications. The Undertow library fails to properly validate the Host header in incoming HTTP requests. As a result, requests containing malformed or malicious Host headers are processed without rejection, enabling attackers to poison caches, perform internal network scans, or hijack user sessions.

1 / 4
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

AssertionConsumerServiceURL is a Java implementation for SAML Service Providers (org.keycloak.protocol.saml). Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS).

AssertionConsumerServiceURL allows XSS when sending a crafted SAML XML request.

1 / 2
First published (updated )
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Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found when an OpenSSL security provider is used with Wildfly, the 'enabled-protocols' value in the Wildfly configuration isn't honored. An attacker could target the traffic sent from Wildfly and downgrade the connection to a weaker version of TLS, potentially breaking the encryption. This could lead to a leak of the data being passed over the network.

1 / 3

Remedy

Avoid using an OpenSSL security provider and instead use the default configuration or regular JSSE provider with 'TLS'.
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind, where it would permit polymorphic deserialization of malicious objects using the ehcache and logback JNDI gadgets when used in conjunction with polymorphic type handling methods such as enableDefaultTyping() or when @JsonTypeInfo is using Id.CLASS or Id.MINIMALCLASS or in any other way which ObjectMapper.readValue might instantiate objects from unsafe sources. An attacker could use this flaw to execute arbitrary code.

1 / 5
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in the Undertow DEBUG log for io.undertow.request.security. If enabled, an attacker could abuse this flaw to obtain the user’s credentials from the log files.

1 / 3

Remedy

Use Elytron instead of legacy Security subsystem.
First published (updated )

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