Roo Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Roo Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(maliciouscommand)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions 3.26.6 and below, a Github workflow used unsanitized pull request metadata in a privileged context, allowing an attacker to craft malicious input and achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Actions runner. The workflow runs with broad permissions and access to repository secrets. It is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the runner, push or modify code in the repository, access secrets, and create malicious releases or packages, resulting in a complete compromise of the repository and its associated services. This is fixed in version 3.26.7.