Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain a broken access control vulnerability in AssetModelPolicy where the files() method cascades from assets.files permission, allowing authenticated users to upload and delete file attachments on Asset Model records without the required models.files permission. Attackers with only assets.files permission can mutate shared model file attachments across company boundaries and bypass the dedicated models.files permission intended to restrict file management on the shared Asset Model catalog.

Snipe-IT through version 8.6.3 fails to perform object-level authorization in the updateLicense, updateConsumable, updateAccessory, and updateModel endpoints and in the storeModel endpoint for Predefined Kits. The existing check authorizes only the parent Predefined Kit (update on PredefinedKit) and not the child object being attached. As a result, an authenticated user holding only the kits.edit permission can attach a License, Consumable, Accessory, or Asset Model that they are otherwise denied (HTTP 403) from reading directly to a Predefined Kit, and the kit relation index then discloses the attached object's name back to that low-privilege user. This is the update-path and storeModel counterpart to CVE-2026-55478, which fixed only the storeLicense, storeConsumable, and storeAccessory methods in 8.6.2. Note that updateModel was code-vulnerable in 8.6.3 but not reachable in practice because a route-name typo bound the route to a nonexistent controller method, causing HTTP 500 responses. The issue is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in DepartmentPresenter::formattedNameLink() where department names are rendered unescaped in the fallback branch for users without departments.view permission. Users with departments.edit permission can inject malicious scripts into department names that execute in the browsers of all department members when they load their My Assets page.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to HTML-escape the employeenum field in the acceptance PDF generator, allowing attackers with users.edit permission to inject img tags into TCPDF's writeHTML() function. Attackers can craft a malicious employeenum value containing an img tag with an arbitrary HTTP(S) URL to trigger server-side requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or external targets when a victim signs an asset acceptance.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to validate username case sensitivity during SAML authentication, allowing attackers to authenticate as different users by registering IdP accounts with accent or case variants of victim usernames. Attackers can exploit the default utf8mb4unicodeci database collation to bypass username matching and achieve account takeover through federated login paths including SAML, LDAP, and OAuth.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain an improper ownership management vulnerability in the consumables checkout API endpoint that records the checkout target user's id in the createdby column instead of the authenticated caller's id. Authenticated attackers with consumables.checkout permission can perform checkouts that result in misattributed audit trail entries in the consumablesusers pivot table, obscuring which operator performed the action.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to validate soft-deleted state in API checkout endpoints, allowing authenticated users with checkout permissions to bind live inventory to trashed targets. Attackers can submit POST requests to hardware, component, or consumable checkout endpoints with soft-deleted user, asset, or location IDs to create orphaned references that corrupt the asset ledger and audit trails.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to apply company scope filtering to the GET /hardware/requested endpoint when Full Multiple Company Support is enabled, allowing authenticated users with assets.view permission to read pending asset requests from all companies. Attackers can retrieve cross-tenant data including requested asset names, requester display names and profile links, locations, and expected check-in dates without parameter manipulation.

Snipe-IT versions up to and including 8.6.3 contain a race condition (TOCTOU) in the consumable checkout API endpoint (POST /api/v1/consumables/{consumableid}/checkout). The requested quantity is validated against the number of remaining units before the database transaction begins, and the transaction then creates the checkout records without locking the consumable row or re-checking availability. An authenticated user with permission to check out consumables can submit concurrent checkout requests for the same consumable so that both requests pass the availability check and succeed, over-allocating stock and driving the remaining inventory negative (e.g., a consumable with 1 remaining unit ends at -1 after two concurrent 1-unit checkouts). The issue is fixed in 8.7.0, which re-fetches the parent row under lockForUpdate inside the transaction and re-validates availability.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce checkout authorization when assignment fields are submitted to the asset update endpoint. Authenticated users with edit permission but explicitly denied checkout permission can reassign assets, bypass check-in procedures, and alter custody records by submitting assigneduser, assignedasset, or assignedlocation parameters to PATCH /api/v1/hardware/{id}.

Snipe-IT through 8.6.4 (fixed in 8.7.0) does not enforce the components.view permission on the authenticated endpoint GET /api/v1/hardware/<asset-id>/assigned/components. The endpoint authorizes only assets.view on the parent asset before returning linked component details; the components.view check is applied only to the response's availableactions.view flag and not to the returned data. As a result, an authenticated user holding only assets.view can enumerate component IDs, names, assigned quantities, and notes that are otherwise protected — the direct GET /api/v1/components/<id> endpoint correctly returns 403 Forbidden for such users.

Snipe-IT versions >= 7.0.12 and <= 8.6.3 contain an authorization bypass in the Livewire importer component (App\Livewire\Importer, mounted at the imports.index route). The component only checked the broad 'import' ability at mount time, while its files() and activeFile() computed properties queried the imports table with no owner or company scope. As a result, any authenticated non-superuser holding the import permission could view every Import record on the instance (original filename, filepath, filesize, importtype and creation timestamp) and could invoke the selectFile($id) Livewire action with any auto-incrementing Import ID to load another user's record, exposing its stored preview data (headerrow column headers and firstrow, the first data row of the CSV). Because import CSVs commonly contain personal data, asset serial numbers and license keys, this discloses sensitive information; in Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS) deployments the disclosure also crosses company/tenant boundaries. Impact is limited to preview data rather than the full CSV file, and superusers were unaffected. Fixed in version 8.7.0, which scopes non-superuser reads to imports owned by the caller.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in location print endpoints that fails to enforce per-model authorization checks. Authenticated attackers with location view permission can access printassigned and printallassigned endpoints to retrieve related users, assets, accessories, consumables, and components regardless of their individual model permissions.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 does not apply the CheckUserIsActivated middleware to the api middleware group in app/Http/Kernel.php, and deactivating a user does not revoke that user's Passport personal access tokens. As a result, although a deactivated account is correctly refused at web login, its existing API token continues to authenticate and to grant read and write access to the REST API (assets, users, licenses, etc.) at the account's prior permission level until the token expires. A deactivated account that retains user-management permissions can re-activate itself through the API, permanently defeating the deactivation control.

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to authorize the POST /hardware/history endpoint, allowing any authenticated user to reassign arbitrary assets and modify audit logs. Attackers can submit a CSV file to reassign assets across companies and inject fraudulent audit trail entries, compromising inventory integrity and accountability.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly enforce the viewKeys authorization gate in CSV export and API index endpoints, allowing authenticated users with only licenses.view permission to access product keys. Attackers can download all license keys in bulk via CSV export or validate candidate keys through API response discrepancies without needing the viewKeys permission.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly gate access to encrypted custom-field values in asset form templates for listbox, textarea, markdown-textarea, and date/datetime picker elements. Authenticated users with assets.edit, assets.checkin, assets.checkout, or assets.audit permissions can read plaintext encrypted custom field values by opening asset forms, bypassing the assets.view.encryptedcustomfields permission check.

Snipe-IT 8.5.0 through 8.6.3 contains an open redirect vulnerability in its SAML assertion-consumer endpoint (SamlController::acs, POST /saml/acs). The endpoint wrote the RelayState POST parameter directly into Laravel's url.intended session key with only CR/LF characters stripped, and LoginController later issued redirect()->intended(), which passes an absolute URL through to the Location header unchanged. An unauthenticated attacker who induces a user of a SAML-SSO-enabled instance to visit a crafted IdP-initiated SSO link can therefore cause the victim's browser to be redirected to an arbitrary absolute external URL immediately after a successful authentication, which the advisory notes facilitates credential-harvesting phishing. No account on the target instance and no compromise of the identity provider are required. Only deployments with SAML SSO enabled are affected. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit d30b73d, PR #19386), which validates RelayState via a new Helper::sameOriginUrl check before storing it.

Snipe-IT versions 4.2.0 through 8.6.3 expose Laravel Passport's auto-registered personal-access-token routes (GET, POST, DELETE /oauth/personal-access-tokens) with only 'web' and 'auth:web' middleware, without the self.api permission gate that Snipe-IT enforces on its own token endpoints (/account/api and /api/v1/account/personal-access-tokens). Any user with a valid web session and the corresponding CSRF token can POST to /oauth/personal-access-tokens and mint a long-lived bearer token for their own account, even when an administrator has denied the self.api permission. The issued token is still subject to existing per-endpoint authorization policies, so this is not a privilege escalation; it defeats the administrative control intended to block API/scripted access at the user's own permission level. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit 3f74b8c), which registers overriding routes wrapped in the can:self.api middleware.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly gate Laravel Passport's OAuth client management routes, allowing any authenticated user to register OAuth clients with attacker-controlled redirect URIs. Attackers can trick administrators into approving consent screens, then exchange authorization codes for bearer tokens inheriting full admin API permissions lasting up to 40 years.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to validate the requestable flag for asset models in the POST /account/request/assetmodel/{modelId} endpoint. Authenticated users can bypass administrative restrictions and create checkout requests for non-requestable asset models by submitting requests directly to the endpoint.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly sanitize markdown image syntax in note fields, allowing authenticated users to read arbitrary server files and issue server-side HTTP requests. Attackers can submit markdown image syntax in checkout acceptance notes that survive HTML escaping, are expanded by CommonMark parser, and resolved by laravel-mail-auto-embed via filegetcontents or curl, exfiltrating sensitive files like .env containing APPKEY.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce per-instance FMCS scoping in asset audit endpoints, relying solely on query-layer filtering instead of policy-layer authorization checks. Attackers with valid sessions and assets.audit permissions could write audit log entries against cross-company assets if the query-layer scope were bypassed or refactored.

Snipe-IT versions <= 8.6.3 (fixed in 8.7.0) do not validate company assignment authorization before persisting user records via the REST API. In Api\UsersController::store() and ::update(), the user record is filled from the request and saved before the requested companyid / companyids[] values are filtered against the actor's permitted companies (Company::getIdsForCurrentUser()). On installs using Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS), a non-superuser holding users.create (or users.edit on a target user) can submit company identifiers for companies outside their scope — including a mix of permitted and foreign ids — causing the account row to be committed to the database before authorization is checked. Where nullcompanyisfloater=1 is set, the post-hoc filter leaves an empty company pivot and the account is persisted as a "floater" with cross-company visibility, allowing creation or relocation of user accounts across tenant boundaries.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 wipe the database before validating the uploaded backup archive in the restore endpoint. Superusers uploading corrupted or invalid zip files trigger permanent data loss with no recovery path or rollback mechanism.

Snipe-IT versions <= 8.6.3 (fixed in 8.7.0) do not check the return value of storage write operations in ImageUploadRequest::handleImages(). Because Laravel's default disk mode does not throw on failure, a silently failed Storage::disk('public')->put(...) call still caused the application to delete the previous image via deleteExistingImage() and to reassign and persist the model's image reference to the new filename, destroying the existing image and leaving the database row pointing at a file that was never written. A mirror problem existed in deleteExistingImage(), where a failed Storage::delete() still nulled the model's image field, orphaning the file on disk. The condition is not directly attacker-controlled: it is triggered when any legitimate authenticated user submits an image upload while the storage backend transiently fails (for example an S3 network error, a local filesystem permission problem, or quota exhaustion). The result is unrecoverable loss of the prior image and a durable inconsistency between the database and disk that requires manual reconciliation. All models whose controllers route through ImageUploadRequest::handleImages (assets, asset models, users, companies, manufacturers, locations, categories, suppliers, departments, and other image-carrying models) are affected.

Snipe-IT is an open source IT asset management system. In versions up to and including 8.6.3, the report acceptance endpoints POST /reports/unacceptedassets/sentreminder (ReportsController::sentAssetAcceptanceReminder) and DELETE /reports/unacceptedassets/{acceptanceId}/delete (ReportsController::deleteAssetAcceptance) are not correctly scoped when Full Multiple Company Support (FMCS) is enabled. In 8.6.3 the guard ReportsController::currentUserCanAccessAcceptance() early-exits with 'return true' when '! $user->companyid' is truthy, which is the case for every pivot-only user (a user associated with companies through the companyuser pivot table whose scalar users.companyid column is NULL); versions prior to 8.6.3 lacked the guard altogether. As a result, an authenticated user holding the reports.view permission can send acceptance-reminder emails for, and permanently delete, any pending acceptance record in the install regardless of which company owns the underlying checkoutable. Deletion is destructive and forfeits the acceptance audit trail for the affected item, and the reminder email exposes limited cross-company acceptance context (item name and assignment metadata) to the recipient. Acceptance IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in Livewire components that enforce authorization only at the route level, not within component lifecycle methods. Attackers with a valid authenticated session can replay signed component snapshots via POST /livewire/update to invoke protected methods and escalate privileges, including creating OAuth clients, minting personal access tokens, and accessing sensitive admin data.

Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier (and develop pre-release commits prior to the fix) contain a race condition in the asset checkout paths. Api\AssetsController::checkout() and Assets\AssetCheckoutController::store() call Asset::availableForCheckout() outside the mutation path and then invoke Asset::checkOut() without taking a row lock or re-checking availability, so two concurrent checkout requests for the same available asset can both observe it as available and both commit. This produces duplicate checkout-history rows, a doubled checkoutcounter, and two CheckoutableCheckedOut events for a single-assignment asset, corrupting the audit trail and utilization/reconciliation reporting; the asset's final assignedto remains singular, so the visible assignment stays intact. Exploitation requires an authenticated session holding the assets.checkout permission (or superuser) and precise concurrent timing. Fixed in 8.7.0.