Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.4
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Improper OCSP response validation in the Snowflake Python, Go, JDBC, and Node.js drivers allowed a revoked TLS certificate to be accepted as valid, because OCSP responses were not reliably bound to the certificate being validated and definitive verification failures were treated as transient. A man-in-the-middle attacker holding a revoked certificate and its private key for a Snowflake or stage hostname could cause the driver to establish a TLS session to the attacker-controlled endpoint anyway, allowing the attacker to read and modify data transmitted within that connection. Successful exploitation requires that on-path position and the corresponding private key, and impact is limited to data carried within the intercepted connection. The fix is available in the patched versions listed above. Users must manually upgrade.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
Input Validation, SSRF
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Improper input validation of the auto-configuration account identifier in Snowflake JDBC Driver versions 4.2.0 through 4.3.3 allowed a credential-bearing login request to be redirected to an attacker-selected HTTPS endpoint. An attacker able to control the account value could cause the driver to transmit a reusable login credential to a host of their choosing and replay it to obtain the privileges granted to that credential. Successful exploitation requires an application using jdbc:snowflake:auto with a connections.toml section that omits an explicit host and a lower-trust principal able to set the account value; ordinary JDBC URLs are unaffected. The fix is available in Snowflake JDBC Driver version 4.3.4. Users must manually upgrade.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Insertion of sensitive information into log files in the Snowflake Python, Go, JDBC, Node.js, PHP PDO, and ODBC drivers allowed authentication tokens, query-result encryption keys, pre-signed cloud-storage URLs, and SAML assertions to be written to diagnostic logs in circumstances where the available log redaction did not cover all affected log paths and data types. An attacker with read access to the log destination, whether the local filesystem, a log aggregation service, or a CI/CD artifact store, could obtain credentials and decryption keys that, if still valid at the time of access, could be used to authenticate to the corresponding Snowflake account or cloud-storage object. Successful exploitation requires read access to the log destination, and impact is bounded by credential lifetime and object scope. The fix is available in the patched versions listed above. Users must manually upgrade and should securely delete previously generated diagnostic logs containing sensitive information where retention is not required.

First published (updated )

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