The rancher-extension-stackstate extension in SUSE Observability exposes service tokens in plain configuration or insecure locations rather than managing them securely. An attacker with minimal access could obtain the token to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges within the observability environment.

A flaw was found in Rancher Manager. When a non-administrative caller supplied a label selector naming a different user, the ext.cattle.io/v1 Token store dropped its internal owner filter instead of returning an empty result. Any authenticated user could therefore list and watch every other user's tokens, disclosing token metadata and the stored salted hash of the bearer token.

This issue affects Rancher: before 2.15.1.

A flaw was found in Rancher Manager. The SAML assertion replay protection introduced by the fix for CVE-2026-44946 recorded consumed assertion IDs in a per-process cache, so each replica only detected replays that reached the same pod. In a high-availability deployment, an attacker holding a captured assertion could replay it once against every other replica to obtain additional authenticated sessions as the victim.

This issue affects Rancher: before 2.15.1.

A flaw was found in Rancher Manager. Project Secrets were propagated into a namespace based only on its field.cattle.io/projectId annotation, without verifying that the referenced project belonged to the same downstream cluster. A user able to create namespaces on one cluster could set the annotation to a project ID from another cluster and have that project's secrets copied into a namespace under their control.

This issue affects Rancher: before 2.15.1.

A flaw was found in Rancher Manager. The GlobalRole controller derived the target ClusterRole name from the user-settable authz.management.cattle.io/cr-name annotation and overwrote that object's rules without verifying ownership. A user with delegated GlobalRole create or update permission could point the annotation at any existing ClusterRole, such as cluster-admin, and revoke the permissions of every principal bound to it. The change persists after the malicious GlobalRole is deleted.

This issue affects Rancher: before 2.15.1.

A flaw was found in Rancher Manager. The /v3/users update path did not enforce immutability of a User resource's username and principalIds fields. A user holding the update verb on users.management.cattle.io could inject a foreign identity provider principal into any account, so that the next login by the owner of that principal was bound to the victim's account and inherited its role bindings.

This issue affects Rancher: before 2.15.1.

A information disclosure when DEBUG loglevel is set in SUSE Rancher AI Agent 1.0 before 1.0.2 could leak API keys or LLM response text with potential sensitive data into logfiles, allowing local attackers to misuse respective gained data or credentials.

Impact A vulnerability in Fleet for Rancher Manager affects multi-tenancy environments where different tenants share the same downstream clusters (e.g., different privileged or untrusted teams inside the same organization).

On unpatched versions, tenants could bypass restrictions to access any config map or secret across all namespaces on the downstream cluster. They can create cluster-wide resources using HelmOp or Bundle without authorization. Specifically, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability in the following ways: 1. Use valuesFrom in fleet.yaml(through a GitRepo resource) or a HelmOp resource to read the contents of any secret an on the downstream cluster, provided they know or can guess the name, namespace, and key. 2. Deploy HelmOp and Bundle resources without being restricted to a specific service account for the Fleet agent.

If you use Fleet in a multi-tenant environment, it's recommended that you: - Review your cluster and Fleet deployments logs for indicators of unauthorized access across tenant namespaces. - Rotate any service accounts and credentials that might have been exposed.

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Unsecured Credentials for further information about this category of attack.

Patches To resolve this vulnerability, upgrade to a patched version of Fleet. The new Policy resource allows you to: - Configure GitRepos, HelmOps, and Bundles to require a specific service account for the Fleet agent on downstream clusters used for deployment. The agent uses these designated service accounts for operations, blocking access to unauthorized resources. - Restrict HelmOp repository and chart URLs by using a regular expression. The regular expression is automatically anchored with ^ and $, meaning it must match the entire URL string.

Like GitRepoRestriction, a Policy resource must be created in the specific namespace you want to restrict, and it only applies to that namespace.

Note: Before applying a policy, ensure that the required service account is available on the downstream clusters and is configured with least-privilege permissions.

Patched versions of Fleet include releases v0.15.2, v0.14.6, 0.13.11, and v0.12.15.

Workarounds If you can't upgrade to a fixed version, please make sure that tenants do not have shared access to the same downstream clusters.

Credits

This security issue was reported by the following collaborators according to our responsible disclosure policy:

- Radisauskas Arnoldas from NATO and the NATO Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).

References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Fleet when the helmRepoURLRegex field isn't set on a GitRepo resource. Fleet's bundle reader forwards Helm authentication credentials (BasicAuth) to any URL specified in the helm.repo field of a fleet.yaml file.

An attacker with git push access to a Fleet-monitored repository can exploit this behavior by specifying a malicious URL in helm.repo. This causes the Fleet controller to send the configured Helm repository credentials to the attacker’s server.

As a result, the attacker can capture the username and password that an administrator configured to access a private Helm chart repository. However, the response body from the attacker's server isn't included in the error message (this behavior was fixed in Fleet v0.13.3 and later), which prevents additional internal data from leaking through the status condition.

The final severity of this vulnerability depends on the specific permissions of the leaked credentials.

Fleet recommends you to: 1. Review your system for potentially leaked credentials. 2. Replace any credentials that might be compromised.

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Stored Data Manipulation and MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Steal Application Access Token for further information about this category of attack.

Patches To resolve this vulnerability, upgrade to a patched version of Fleet. The patched version of Fleet now requires you to set the helmRepoURLRegex field on the GitRepo. If the helmRepoURLRegex is empty or missing, Fleet won’t send credentials, regardless of the URL specified in fleet.yaml. When you upgrade, a Helm pre-upgrade job automatically migrates existing GitRepo resources that have helmSecretName or helmSecretNameForPaths configured but lack a helmRepoURLRegex. The migration job performs the following actions:

The job extracts the scheme and host from the Helm repository URLs already stored in the resource's Bundles. For example, a GitRepo with Bundles referencing https://charts.example.com/stable receives helmRepoURLRegex: "^https://charts\.example\.com/". This limits credential forwarding to the origins already in use before the upgrade. Migrated resources are annotated with fleet.cattle.io/helm-regex-auto-migrated: "true" so you can easily audit them.

If no Bundles with Helm repository URLs exist during the migration (for example, if the GitRepo has never successfully synced), helmRepoURLRegex remains empty and credentials aren't forwarded. You must set this field manually before Fleet will send credentials.

The migration job runs only once per installation and records its status in a ConfigMap named fleet-helm-url-regex-migrated in the Fleet system namespace. Any GitRepo resources you create after the upgrade require an explicit helmRepoURLRegex to forward credentials.

Patched versions of Fleet include releases v0.15.2, v0.14.6, 0.13.11, and v0.12.15.

Workarounds If you cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version, use the following methods to mitigate the risk and audit your environment. Set helmRepoURLRegex on all GitRepo resources that use helmSecretName. Ensure the regular expression matches only your legitimate Helm repository URL.

Example configuration: yaml apiVersion: fleet.cattle.io/v1alpha1 kind: GitRepo metadata: name: my-app namespace: fleet-local spec: repo: https://git.example.com/org/my-app.git helmSecretName: helm-creds helmRepoURLRegex: "^https://charts\\.example\\.com/."

After upgrading to a patched version, review all auto-migrated GitRepo resources by running the following command:

kubectl get gitrepo -A -o json | \ jq -r '.items[] | select(.metadata.annotations["fleet.cattle.io/helm-regex-auto-migrated"] == "true") | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name): \(.spec.helmRepoURLRegex)"'

Verify that the auto-derived regular expression matches only your intended Helm repository origins. If a regular expression is broader than necessary, replace it with a more specific pattern.

Credits

This security issue was reported by the following collaborators according to our responsible disclosure policy:

- Radisauskas Arnoldas from NATO and the NATO Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). - FluentLogic's security team.

References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Fleet when the webhook endpoint is configured without a secret; an attacker can forge webhook requests. The attacker doesn't need to know the specific repository or path configured in the GitRepo resource to make Fleet process these requests.

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to cause the following impacts: 1. Trigger continuous repository re-cloning, which increases network traffic and can deplete resources on the management cluster. 2. Downgrade running services to any historical revision available in the remote Git repository. This risk applies if the attacker has read access to the target Git repository and knows its configured path.

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - T1499.004: Endpoint Denial of Service for further information about this category of attack.

Patches To resolve this vulnerability, upgrade Fleet to a patched version. This upgrade version escapes the URL and path to the remote repository received from webhooks, which prevents regular expressions from being used as a replacement for the URL and path.

Patched versions of Fleet include releases v0.15.2, v0.14.6, 0.13.11, and v0.12.15.

Workarounds If you can't upgrade to a fixed version, please make sure to only enable webhooks with a shared secret.

Credits

This security issue was reported by the following collaborators according to our responsible disclosure policy:

- Radisauskas Arnoldas from NATO and the NATO Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).

References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

A SAML authentication replay vulnerability in Rancher's Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) handler did not enforce one-time use of SAML assertion, potentially allowing person in the middle attacks against Rancher, affecting Rancher 2.14.0 before 2.14.3,

Impact A vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager in the GitHub App authentication provider. When evaluating permissions, the provider incorrectly expands user team memberships to include all teams within the associated GitHub organization, rather than restricting access to the specific teams to which the user actually belongs.

Specifically, when a user authenticates via the GitHub App provider, Rancher's team membership evaluation logic incorrectly handles cached data. Instead of checking the user-specific list, the evaluation logic iterates over all teams defined within the entire GitHub organization. The authentication provider should consult the correctly cached, per-user membership list to assign the user's specific group permissions. Consequently, any authenticated user who belongs to at least one team in a GitHub organization is mistakenly granted group principals for every team within that entire organization during authentication and authorization checks.

This issue allows a malicious user who is a member of a low-privilege team within a GitHub organization to gain unauthorized access to or permissions for any other team in that organization. If those other teams are bound to Rancher login allowlists or RBAC roles (cluster-level, project-level, or global), the attacker can pass access checks that should otherwise fail, inheriting permissions they were never granted.

Exploitation of this vulnerability requires the following conditions to be met: - The GitHub App authentication provider must be enabled and configured for the target GitHub organization. - The attacker must possess a valid GitHub account with membership in at least one team within that target organization. - A separate team within the same GitHub organization must be explicitly mapped to Rancher RBAC roles or specified within Rancher's login allowlist (allowedPrincipalIds).

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Valid Accounts for further information about this category of attack.

Patches This fix corrects the team listing logic to iterate only the teams stored in the per-user membership cache and includes a one-time startup migration that marks all affected User resources for refresh, forcing Rancher to rebuild group principals using the now-corrected logic.

Patched versions of Rancher include releases v2.14.2 and v2.13.6.

Workarounds If upgrading to a patched version immediately is not feasible, users are encouraged to consider these temporary mitigations: - Disable GitHub App authentication provider and switch to an alternative authentication provider (GitHub OAuth). - Remove or restrict team-based group principals from allowed principalIds. - Audit and temporarily remove RBAC bindings (GlobalRoleBindings, ClusterRoleTemplateBindings, ProjectRoleTemplateBindings) that reference GitHub App team principals until the patch is applied. - Disable provider refresh and clean up inflated group membership for users (manually or by writing a script).

These workarounds reduce the attack surface but do not eliminate the vulnerability. Existing user sessions and cached principals remain inflated until a provider refresh occurs. Upgrading to a patched version is strongly recommended.

References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Impact

A vulnerability has been identified in Rancher Manager that allows users assigned the Project Owner role to modify Pod Security Admission (PSA) labels on namespaces within their projects. Under the default role configuration, an attacker with the following access pattern can exploit this issue: 1. Cluster Access: The user is granted Cluster Member access. 2. Project Ownership: The user creates or is assigned ownership of a project. 3. Namespace Creation: The user creates a namespace within that project. 4. PSA Modification: The user modifies the namespace PSA configuration to use the privileged profile. 5. Privilege Escalation: The user deploys privileged workloads within the namespace.

As outlined in the Kubernetes Pod Security Standards documentation, privileged containers disable core Kubernetes security protections, allowing workloads to bypass standard container isolation boundaries. This can result in privilege escalation within the cluster environment.

Potential impacts include: - Deployment of privileged containers - Access to host-level resources - Container breakout - Cluster privilege escalation - Compromise of workloads running on affected nodes

Please refer to the associated MITRE ATT&CK techniques for further information about this category of attack: - Deploy Container - Escape to Host - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Reference: Kubernetes Pod Security Standards — Privileged Profile

Patches This vulnerability is resolved by modifying the project-owner role to explicitly define the allowed verbs for projects resources instead of using the wildcard () permission.

The updated role configuration removes access to the updatepsa verb. This prevents project owners from modifying PSA settings in a manner that could enable privilege escalation.

Patched versions of Rancher include releases v2.12.10, v2.13.6, and v2.14.2.

Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should create a custom project role based on the existing Project Owner role, while removing unrestricted wildcard permissions for project resources.

The allowed verbs for projects should be restricted to: “get, update, delete, patch, create, list, watch, deletecollection” instead of “”.

This prevents access to the updatepsa capability that enables the privilege escalation path.

References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Passing of unsanitized strings from DHCP replies into the wicked dhcp client before wicked 0.6.79 could be used by attackers operating a malicious DHCP server to execute code on the local machine.

Impact

A malicious user with permission to edit the local-path-config ConfigMap in the local-path-storage namespace can manipulate the helperPod.yaml template used by rancher/local-path-provisioner.

The helperPod.yaml template is loaded by the provisioner and used to create HelperPods during PVC provisioning and cleanup operations. However, the template is not sufficiently validated before use. Security-sensitive fields such as securityContext.privileged, hostPath volumes, and Linux capabilities can be injected into the template.

Example malicious HelperPod template:

~~~yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: helper-pod spec: containers: - name: helper-pod image: docker.io/kindest/local-path-helper:v20230510-486859a6 imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent securityContext: privileged: true volumeMounts: - name: host-root mountPath: /host volumes: - name: host-root hostPath: path: / type: Directory ~~~

When a PVC operation triggers HelperPod creation, the provisioner creates the HelperPod using the attacker-controlled template. This can result in a privileged pod running on the target node with the host root filesystem mounted.

This may allow the attacker to access sensitive host files, read ServiceAccount tokens from other pods on the same node, access other tenants' local-path volume data, or modify files on the host node.

Expected Behavior:

- The HelperPod template should not allow privileged containers. - The HelperPod template should not allow arbitrary hostPath mounts. - Security-sensitive fields in helperPod.yaml should be validated or rejected before the provisioner creates HelperPods.

Patches

This vulnerability is addressed by validating the HelperPod template loaded from the local-path-config ConfigMap before it is used to create HelperPods.

The fix ensures that unsafe fields such as privileged security contexts, hostPath volumes, and other dangerous pod security settings are rejected. This prevents an attacker with ConfigMap edit permission from injecting a malicious HelperPod template that grants access to the host node.

Previously, a malicious user could modify helperPod.yaml to cause the provisioner to create a privileged HelperPod with the host root filesystem mounted, potentially leading to node-level compromise and ServiceAccount token theft.

With this fix, HelperPod templates containing unsafe security-sensitive fields are denied, and only safe HelperPod configurations are accepted.

Patched versions of local-path-provisioner include releases v0.0.34 and later.

No patches are provided for earlier releases, as they do not include the necessary HelperPod template validation logic.

Workarounds

Users should upgrade to a patched version of local-path-provisioner to fully mitigate this vulnerability.

As a temporary mitigation, users can restrict write access to the local-path-config ConfigMap in the local-path-storage namespace. Only trusted administrators should be allowed to update this ConfigMap.

Users may also mark the ConfigMap as immutable after deployment:

~~~bash kubectl -n local-path-storage patch configmap local-path-config \ --type merge -p '{"immutable": true}' ~~~

Additionally, enabling Kubernetes Pod Security Admission for the local-path-storage namespace can provide defense in depth. For example, enforcing the baseline policy can prevent privileged HelperPods from being created even if the template is modified:

~~~bash kubectl label namespace local-path-storage \ pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline \ pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted ~~~

These mitigations reduce the risk of exploitation, but upgrading to a patched release is required to fully address the issue.

References

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

- Contact the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository.

This new Linux kernel bug called Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) is kinda terrifying because it’s not complicated at all. A normal user can run a tiny 732-byte script and get root, no race conditions or luck required, and it works across major distros like Ubuntu, RHEL, and SUSE. The exploit quietly modifies the page cache instead of the file on disk, so integrity checks don’t catch it, but the kernel still executes the tampered version in memory.

Even worse, since the page cache is shared, it can potentially cross container boundaries too. Patch ASAP if your distro hasn’t already, because this one feels way too reliable…

crypto: algifaead - Revert to operating out-of-place

On Sun, 8 Mar 2026 03:57:45 +0100, Solar Designer wrote: others have. It may well be that allowing those other env vars by and maybe allowing LANG and LC is desirable for current use cases. LANG and LC were cargo-culted in as they are honoured by OpenSSHd. Separately note that I didn't check the BSDs telnet client (which I think is still present in all BSDs) for being (hopefully not) willing And you could want to check the telnet client in InetUtils, now that we know this package missed telnet[d] security fixes in general. This was CVE-2005-0488 (and CVE-2005-1205 on Windows).

"Certain BSD-based Telnet clients, including those used on Solaris and SuSE Linux, allow remote malicious Telnet servers to read sensitive command."

The daemon now clears the inherited environment (preserving PATH and TERM, respectively, if present) before calling telnetdsetup(). LDPRELOAD=/lib64/libhardenedmalloc.so (although /etc/ld.so.preload is a more reliable way to do this when practical to do it globally).

exorciseenv() and leave the inetd/tcpd supplied environment intact for telnetd (or some site-specific wrapper) to inherit. +++ b/telnetd/state.c @@ -1495,10 +1495,18 @@ suboption (void) case NEWENVVAR: case ENVUSERVAR: ... } / end of case TELOPTNEWENVIRON /

Some code duplication here. Not new with these changes, but could be worth moving to a new function e.g. setenvvarifallowed(). Agreed. I'll implement setenvvarifallowed() instead. +/ A default whitelist for environment variables. / +static const char allowedenvvars[] = { + "USER", + "LOGNAME", + "TERM", + "LANG", + "LC", + NULL +};

Can make not only the strings but also the pointers const:

static const char const allowedenvvars[] = {

so that both may end up in a read-only section. OK, .rodata it is. +int +isenvvarallowed (const char var, const char val) +{ + const char p; + int allowed = 0; + + for (p = allowedenvvars; p; p++) + { + if (fnmatch (p, var, FNMNOESCAPE) == 0) + { + allowed = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!allowed) + return 0;

You didn't strictly need the "allowed" variable, you could check p after the loop. But maybe it's more readable the way you wrote it. I'll keep "allowed" for the time being, but I don't mind changing it if there's a clearer way to express this logic. My review above isn't in full context - I only looked at the patches.

A Improper Access Control vulnerability in the kernel of SUSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP5 breaks nftables, causing firewall rules applied via nftables to not be effective.This issue affects SUSE Linux Enterprise Server: from 9e6d9d4601768c75fdb0bad3fbbe636e748939c2 before 9c294edb7085fb91650bc12233495a8974c5ff2d.

Impact A vulnerability has been identified within the Rancher Backup Operator, resulting in the leakage of S3 tokens (both accessKey and secretKey) into the rancher-backup-operator pod's logs.

Specifically, the S3 accessKey and secretKey are exposed in the pod's logs under the following logging level conditions:

| Variable Exposed | Logging Level Condition | ------------------ | ------------------------- | | accessKey | trace: false (default), and debug: false (default) | | secretKey | trace: true or debug: true|

Note: The S3 accessKey is exposed in the logs without requiring any supplementary configuration.

For further information on this attack category, please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Log Enumeration.

Patches This vulnerability is addressed by applying redaction to sensitive information that was leaking.

Patched versions of Rancher Backup Operator include: 108.0.1+up9.0.1, 107.1.2+up8.1.2, 106.0.6+up7.0.5, and 105.0.6+up6.0.3.

Workarounds Users are advised to rotate both S3 accessKey and secretKey once they have upgraded to a fixed version, especially if logs are exported.

Users who cannot update Rancher are advised to refresh the Rancher app Repository, which should provide the ability to update just the Rancher Backup chart alone. This will patch the vulnerabilities without requiring Rancher to be updated. This will not work for Rancher clusters in an air-gap setup.

For air-gapped Rancher clusters, the Rancher version must be updated first, and then after you will find the patched version of the Rancher Backup chart to upgrade. You will also need to sync new images for the release to your image mirror.

Users who cannot update either Rancher or Rancher Backup should ensure that both debug and trace values are both false (default). Users should revert the values to the default until they can update to prevent potential leaks.

References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Impact A vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager, where using self-signed CA certificates and passing the -skip-verify flag to the Rancher CLI login command without also passing the –cacert flag results in the CLI attempting to fetch CA certificates stored in Rancher’s setting cacerts. This does not apply to any other commands and only applies to the login command if the –cacert flag was not provided.

An attacker with network-level access between the Rancher CLI and Rancher Manager could interfere with the TLS handshake to return a CA they control, despite the use of the --skip-verify flag. This may be abused to bypass TLS as a security control. Attackers can also see basic authentication headers in a Man-in-the-Middle due to the lack of TLS enforcement.

Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Man-in-the-Middle for further information about this category of attack.

Patches This vulnerability is addressed by removing the ability to fetch CA certificates stored in Rancher’s setting cacerts when using the login command. Whenever required, for example when using self-signed certificates, CA certificates have to be explicitly passed with the –cacert flag.

Patched versions of Rancher include releases v2.13.2, v2.12.6, v2.11.10, and v2.10.11.

Workarounds If a projecct can't upgrade to a fixed version, please make sure whenever required, for example when using self-signed certificates, to always explicitly pass CA certificates with the –cacert flag when using the login command.

References If there are any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with the support matrix and product support lifecycle.

Note: Rancher versions beyond 2.3.0-alpha5 are no longer supported at pkg.go.dev, follow Rancher installation instructions for newer versions.

A Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS) vulnerability allows attackers to run arbitrary javascript via a reflected XSS issue in the search fields.This issue affects Container suse/manager/5.0/x8664/server:latest: from ? before 5.0.28-150600.3.36.8; SUSE Manager Server LTS 4.3: from ? before 4.3.88-150400.3.113.5.

A Path Traversal vulnerability in the tftpsync/add and tftpsync/delete scripts allows a remote attacker on an adjacent network to write or delete files on the filesystem with the privileges of the unprivileged wwwrun user. Although the endpoint is unauthenticated, access is restricted to a list of allowed IP addresses.

A UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following vulnerability in logrotate config in the exim package allowed privilege escalation from mail user/group to root.This issue affects Tumbleweed: from ? before 4.98.2-lp156.248.1.

A Plaintext Storage of a Password vulnerability in SUSE exposes the credentials for the HTTP proxy in the log files. This issue affects Container suse/manager/4.3/proxy-httpd:4.3.16.9.67.1: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Container suse/manager/5.0/x8664/proxy-httpd:5.0.5.7.23.1: from ? before 5.0.14-150600.4.17.1; Container suse/manager/5.0/x8664/server:5.0.5.7.30.1: from ? before 5.0.14-150600.4.17.1; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS-Azure: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS-EC2: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS-GCE: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-Azure: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-EC2: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-GCE: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; SUSE Manager Proxy Module 4.3: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2; SUSE Manager Server Module 4.3: from ? before 4.3.33-150400.3.55.2.

A Missing Authorization vulnerability in SUSE Linux Manager allows anyone with the ability to connect to port 443 of SUSE Manager is able to run any command as root on any client. This issue affects Container suse/manager/5.0/x8664/server:5.0.5.7.30.1: from ? before 5.0.27-150600.3.33.1; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS: from ? before 4.3.87-150400.3.110.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-Azure: from ? before 4.3.87-150400.3.110.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-EC2: from ? before 4.3.87-150400.3.110.2; Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-GCE: from ? before 4.3.87-150400.3.110.2; SUSE Manager Server Module 4.3: from ? before 4.3.87-150400.3.110.2.