Last updated 24 July 2024
A flaw was found in the way the Linux kernel's floppy driver handled user space provided data in certain error code paths while processing FDRAWCMD IOCTL commands. A local user with write access to /dev/fdX could use this flaw to free (using the kfree() function) arbitrary kernel memory. (CVE-2014-1737, Important) It was found that the Linux kernel's floppy driver leaked internal kernel memory addresses to user space during the processing of the FDRAWCMD IOCTL command. A local user with write access to /dev/fdX could use this flaw to obtain information about the kernel heap arrangement. (CVE-2014-1738, Low) Note: A local user with write access to /dev/fdX could use these two flaws (CVE-2014-1737 in combination with CVE-2014-1738) to escalate their privileges on the system.
Last updated 24 July 2024
Last updated 24 July 2024
Last updated 24 July 2024
An information leak vulnerability in rtnetlink subsystem in Linux kernel was found in "net/core/rtnetlink.c". The stack object "map" has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4 bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are not initialized and sent out via nlaput().
Public via:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=146230821206492&w=2
http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=146230822606494&w=2
CVE-ID request and assignment:
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q2/234
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q2/237
Upstream patch:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6
Description of problem: This problem was originally tracked down by Brad Spengler.
When calling wireless ioctls, if a driver does not correctly validate/shrink iwp->length, the resulting copytouser can leak up to 64K of kernel heap contents.
It seems that this is triggerable[1] in 2.6.32 at least on ath5k, but I was not able to track down how. The twisty maze of ioctl handlers stumped me. :) Other drivers I checked did not appear to have any problems, but the potential remains. I'm not sure if this patch is the right approach; it was fixed differently[2] in grsecurity.
[1] http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2290&start=0 [2] http://grsecurity.net/~spender/wireless-infoleak-fix2.patch
Discussion: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/27/413
Description of problem: The SNDRVHDSPIOCTLGETCONFIGINFO ioctl in hdsp.c allows unprivileged users to read uninitialized kernel stack memory, because several fields of the hdspmconfiginfo structs declared on the stack are not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/06/6 http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/25/41
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The FBIOGETVBLANK device ioctl in sismain.c allows unprivileged users to read 16 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the 'reserved' member of the fbvblank struct declared on the stack is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/06/6 http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail//linux/kernel/1009.1/03385.html
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The compat ipc functions allow unprivileged users to read uninitialized stack memory, because some of the structures used and declared on the stack are not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/07/1 http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/10/6/492
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The "mem" array used as scratch space for socket filters is not initialized, allowing unprivileged users to leak kernel stack bytes.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg146361.html http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2010-November/077321.html
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The semctl syscall has several code paths that lead to the leakage of uninitialized kernel stack memory (namely the IPCINFO, SEMINFO, IPCSTAT, and SEMSTAT commands) during the use of the older, obsolete version of the semidds struct. The copysemidtouser() function declares a semidds struct on the stack and copies it back to the user without initializing or zeroing the 'sembase', 'sempending', 'sempendinglast', and 'undo' pointers, allowing the leakage of 16 bytes of kernel stack memory. The code is still reachable on 32-bit systems - when calling semctl() newer glibc's automatically OR the IPC command with the IPC64 flag, but invoking the syscall directly allows users to use the older versions of the struct.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/06/6 http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg80234.html
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The old shm interface allows unprivileged users to read uninitialized stack memory, because shmidds structure declared on the stack is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/07/1 http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/10/6/454
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Vasiliy Kulikov of Openwall and Kees Cook for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The SNDRVHDSPIOCTLGETCONFIGINFO ioctl in hdspm.c allows unprivileged users to read uninitialized kernel stack memory, because several fields of the hdspmconfiginfo structs declared on the stack are not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/06/6 http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/25/41
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: The VIAFBGETINFO device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 1968 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "reserved" member of the viafbioctlinfo struct declared on the stack is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/10/06/6 http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail//linux/kernel/1009.1/03392.html
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: packetgetnamespkt() doesn't initialize all members of sadata field of sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to fully fill sadata with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packetgetname(): it doesn't initialize sllpkttype field of sockaddrll. Set it to zero.
Reference: http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128854507220908&w=2 http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2010/q4/94
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Vasiliy Kulikov of Openwall for reporting this issue.
Last updated 24 July 2024
Description of problem: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/11/168 The EQLGETMASTRCFG device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 16 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "mastername" member of the masterconfigt struct declared on the stack in eqlgmastercfg() is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/11/170 The CHELSIOGETQSETNUM device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 4 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "addr" member of the chreg struct declared on the stack in cxgbextensionioctl() is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/11/167
The TIOCGICOUNT device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 9 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "reserved" member of the serialicounterstruct struct declared on the stack in hsogetcount() is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user. This patch takes care of it.
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.
Description of problem: Calling ETHTOOLGRXCLSRLALL with a large rulecnt will allocate kernel heap without clearing it. For the one driver (niu) that implements it, it will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and copy the full contents back to userspace.
This is different from CVE-2010-2478, but was introduced at the same time (0853ad66, 2.6.27-rc1).
Upstream commit: http://git.kernel.org/linus/ae6df5f96a51818d6376da5307d773baeece4014
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Kees Cook for reporting this issue.
The docoredump function in fs/exec.c in Linux kernel 2.4.x and 2.6.x up to 2.6.24-rc3, and possibly other versions, does not change the UID of a core dump file if it exists before a root process creates a core dump in the same location, which might allow local users to obtain sensitive information.