TrustedFirmware-M (aka Trusted Firmware for M profile Arm CPUs) before 2.1.3 and 2.2.x before 2.2.1 lacks length validation during a firmware upgrade. While processing a new image, the Firmware Upgrade (FWU) module does not validate the length field of the Type-Length-Value (TLV) structure for dependent components against the maximum allowed size. If the length specified in the TLV exceeds the size of the buffer allocated on the stack, the FWU module will overwrite the buffer (and potentially other stack data) with the TLV's value content. An attacker could exploit this by crafting a malicious TLV entry in the unprotected section of the MCUBoot upgrade image. By setting the length field to exceed the expected structure size, the attacker can manipulate the stack memory of the system during the upgrade process.

An issue was discovered in Trusted Firmware-M through 2.0.0. The lack of argument verification in the logging subsystem allows attackers to read sensitive data via the login function.

In Trusted Firmware-M through TF-Mv1.8.0, for platforms that integrate the CryptoCell accelerator, when the CryptoCell PSA Driver software Interface is selected, and the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data Chacha20-Poly1305 algorithm is used, with the single-part verification function (defined during the build-time configuration phase) implemented with a dedicated function (i.e., not relying on usage of multipart functions), the buffer comparison during the verification of the authentication tag does not happen on the full 16 bytes but just on the first 4 bytes, thus leading to the possibility that unauthenticated payloads might be identified as authentic. This affects TF-Mv1.6.0, TF-Mv1.6.1, TF-Mv1.7.0, and TF-Mv1.8.

Trusted Firmware M 1.4.x through 1.4.1 has a buffer overflow issue in the Firmware Update partition. In the IPC model, a psafwuwrite caller from SPE or NSPE can overwrite stack memory locations.

Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M) 1.4.0, when Profile Small is used, has incorrect access control. NSPE can access a secure key (held by the Crypto service) based solely on knowledge of its key ID. For example, there is no authorization check associated with the relationship between a caller and a key owner.

In Arm Trusted Firmware M through 1.2, the NS world may trigger a system halt, an overwrite of secure data, or the printing out of secure data when calling secure functions under the NSPE handler mode.

In Trusted Firmware-M through 1.3.0, cleaning up the memory allocated for a multi-part cryptographic operation (in the event of a failure) can prevent the abort() operation in the associated cryptographic library from freeing internal resources, causing a memory leak.