UltraVNC viewer through 1.8.2.2 contains an integer overflow leading to a heap buffer overflow in the RFB protocol failure-response parsing path. In vncviewer/ClientConnection.cpp, the 4-byte network-supplied reasonLen field (type CARD32) is passed as reasonLen+1 to CheckBufferSize(). Because both operands are unsigned 32-bit, a reasonLen of 0xFFFFFFFF overflows to 0, causing CheckBufferSize to allocate only 256 bytes. The subsequent ReadString(mnetbuf, reasonLen) call then performs ReadExact for the original 4 GiB length into that 256-byte heap buffer. This overflow is reachable via rfbConnFailed (auth-scheme negotiation) and rfbVncAuthFailed (post-handshake) message types without successful authentication. A malicious VNC server, or any man-in-the-middle on the RFB stream, can trigger this condition when the victim viewer connects, potentially resulting in remote code execution as the user running the viewer. The crash was confirmed with AddressSanitizer on a portable reproduction harness (heap-buffer-overflow WRITE at offset 256).

UltraVNC Viewer 1.2.2.4 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to crash the application by supplying an oversized string to the VNC Server input field. Attackers can paste a malicious string containing 256 repeated characters into the VNC Server field and click Connect to trigger a buffer overflow that crashes the viewer.

UltraVNC Viewer 1.2.4.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to crash the application by manipulating VNC Server input. Attackers can generate a malformed 256-byte payload and paste it into the VNC Server connection dialog to trigger an application crash.