src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSHMSGKEXDHGEXGROUP (31) and SSHMSGKEXDHGEXREPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSHMSGKEXDHGEXINIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSHNODHGEXSHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSHNODH or NOSHA256, are unaffected.

Unsigned integer underflow in wstrncat() in src/port.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH from v1.4.11 through v1.5.0 on non-Windows platforms allows an authenticated remote attacker to write one out-of-bounds null byte past the end of a stack buffer by sending a crafted SFTP path. wolfSSHRealPath() in src/ssh.c appends each path component with a remaining-size bound (outSz - curSz) rather than the full destination size, so once the accumulated path reaches half the output buffer the sizet computation n - strlen(s1) - 1 wraps to near SIZEMAX. The strncat() call is then effectively unbounded and copies the whole component; when that component exactly fills the remainder of the buffer, its terminating null is written one byte past the end. The caller's own length check keeps the copied data inside the buffer, so the overflow is limited to that single null byte, which may corrupt an adjacent stack value and crash the process. Applications that call the public wolfSSHRealPath() with an output buffer smaller than the input path are additionally exposed to an unbounded copy, because the word32 expression outSz - segSz in that length check also wraps.

In wolfSSH through 1.5.0 built with --enable-fwd, DoChannelOpen() in src/internal.c gates only direct-tcpip channel opens with the forwarding policy callback. forwarded-tcpip opens are admitted without an authorization check and are not capped in number, allowing a malicious SSH peer to make an endpoint allocate unbounded per-channel buffers for forwarding channels the application never authorized. A client also does not check a forwarded-tcpip open against the forwards it registered with a tcpip-forward request, as RFC 4254 section 7.2 requires, so a malicious server can open forwarding channels for addresses and ports the client never asked it to forward.

wolfSSH does not validate that the ECDSA curve identifier in a KEXDHREPLY host key blob matches the algorithm negotiated during key exchange. In ParseECCPubKey() (src/internal.c), the blob's algorithm string is used to derive the curve via NameToId/wcPrimeForId without checking against the negotiated ssh->handshake->pubKeyId, and the RFC 5656 curve identifier string is discarded via GetSkip() rather than compared. An active network man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute a host key blob containing a different ECDSA curve, causing the client to import the key on the wrong curve. Because the attacker controls the private key for the substituted curve, signature verification passes. Exploitation requires an active MitM position and a lax public key check callback (e.g., TOFU, algorithm-name-only check, or fingerprint match against the parsed key).

A heap buffer over-read vulnerability exists in the wolfSSHCleanPath() function in wolfSSH. An authenticated remote attacker can trigger the issue via crafted SCP path input containing '/./' sequences, resulting in a heap over read by 1 byte.

wolfSSH’s key exchange state machine can be manipulated to leak the client’s password in the clear, trick the client to send a bogus signature, or trick the client into skipping user authentication. This affects client applications with wolfSSH version 1.4.21 and earlier. Users of wolfSSH must update or apply the fix patch and it’s recommended to update credentials used. This fix is also recommended for wolfSSH server applications. While there aren’t any specific attacks on server applications, the same defect is present. Thanks to Aina Toky Rasoamanana of Valeo and Olivier Levillain of Telecom SudParis for the report.

Improper host authentication vulnerability in wolfSSH version 1.4.20 and earlier clients that allows authentication bypass and leaking of clients credentials.