Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0.

The camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed.

Notes:

The JIRA ticket:  https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281  refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.

The fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available.

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 through 4.18.2, from 4.19.0 through 4.20.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.18.3, 4.21.0, which fixes the issue.

Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel in Camel-Undertow component under particular conditions.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 before 4.10.3, from 4.8.0 before 4.8.6.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.3 for 4.10.x LTS and 4.8.6 for 4.8.x LTS.

Camel undertow component is vulnerable to Camel message header injection, in particular the custom header filter strategy used by the component only filter the "out" direction, while it doesn't filter the "in" direction.

This allows an attacker to include Camel specific headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviour such as the camel-bean component, or the camel-exec component.

Affected Component: Apache Camel Framework (specifically versions 3.x through 4.10.1)

Vuln Type: Bypass/Injection

The vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with "Camel", "camel", or Attackers can bypass this filter by altering the casing of any letter other than the first one (e.g., "GAme\" or "GAW"). This allows attackers to inject headers like GAmelMeth0dßeanName, which can be exploited to invoke arbitrary methods from the Bean registry@04 and also supports using Simple Expression Language (or OGNL in some cases) as part of the method parameters passed to the bean (see attached examples). There are quite a large number of other "Camel" headers that, if manipulated, could allow an attacker to do some pretty dangerous things (think CamelSqlQuery).

Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 before 4.10.2, from 4.8.0 before 4.8.5, from 3.10.0 before 3.22.4.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases.

This vulnerability is present in Camel's default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, or the camel-exec component.

If you have Camel applications that are directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include parameters in the HTTP requests that are sent to the Camel application that get translated into headers.

The headers could be both provided as request parameters for an HTTP methods invocation or as part of the payload of the HTTP methods invocation.

All the known Camel HTTP component such as camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http, and camel-netty-http would be vulnerable out of the box.

This CVE is related to the CVE-2025-27636: while they have the same root cause and are fixed with the same fix, CVE-2025-27636 was assumed to only be exploitable if an attacker could add malicious HTTP headers, while we have now determined that it is also exploitable via HTTP parameters. Like in CVE-2025-27636, exploitation is only possible if the Camel route uses particular vulnerable components.