A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0.0 through 4.20.0.0 where a malicious Domain Admin user in the ROOT domain can get the API key and secret key of user-accounts of Admin role type in the same domain. This operation is not appropriately restricted and allows the attacker to assume control over higher-privileged user-accounts. A malicious Domain Admin attacker can impersonate an Admin user-account and gain access to sensitive APIs and resources that could result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of infrastructure managed by CloudStack.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.19.3.0 or 4.20.1.0, which fixes the issue with the following:
Strict validation on Role Type hierarchy: the caller's role must be equal to or higher than the target user's role. API privilege comparison: the caller must possess all privileges of the user they are operating on. Two new domain-level settings (restricted to the default admin): - role.types.allowed.for.operations.on.accounts.of.same.role.type: Defines which role types are allowed to act on users of the same role type. Default: "Admin, DomainAdmin, ResourceAdmin". - allow.operations.on.users.in.same.account: Allows/disallows user operations within the same account. Default: true.
A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0.0 through 4.20.0.0 where a malicious Domain Admin user in the ROOT domain can reset the password of user-accounts of Admin role type. This operation is not appropriately restricted and allows the attacker to assume control over higher-privileged user-accounts. A malicious Domain Admin attacker can impersonate an Admin user-account and gain access to sensitive APIs and resources that could result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of infrastructure managed by CloudStack.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.19.3.0 or 4.20.1.0, which fixes the issue with the following: Strict validation on Role Type hierarchy: the caller's user-account role must be equal to or higher than the target user-account's role. API privilege comparison: the caller must possess all privileges of the user they are operating on. Two new domain-level settings (restricted to the default Admin): - role.types.allowed.for.operations.on.accounts.of.same.role.type: Defines which role types are allowed to act on users of the same role type. Default: "Admin, DomainAdmin, ResourceAdmin". - allow.operations.on.users.in.same.account: Allows/disallows user operations within the same account. Default: true.
CloudStack account-users by default use username and password based authentication for API and UI access. Account-users can generate and register randomised API and secret keys and use them for the purpose of API-based automation and integrations. Due to an access permission validation issue that affects Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0 up to 4.19.1.0, domain admin accounts were found to be able to query all registered account-users API and secret keys in an environment, including that of a root admin. An attacker who has domain admin access can exploit this to gain root admin and other-account privileges and perform malicious operations that can result in compromise of resources integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service and availability of CloudStack managed infrastructure.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.18.2.3 or 4.19.1.1, or later, which addresses this issue. Additionally, all account-user API and secret keys should be regenerated.