A vulnerability has been found in the way developers have implemented the archive extraction of files. An arbitrary file write vulnerability, that can be achieved using a specially crafted zip archive (affects other archives as well, bzip2, tar,xz, war, cpio, 7z), that holds path traversal filenames. So when the filename gets concatenated to the target extraction directory, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. Of course if an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily. This affects multiple libraries that lacks of a high level APIs that provide the archive extraction functionality.

References: https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability

Patch: https://github.com/apache/hadoop/commit/745f203e577bacb35b042206db94615141fa5e6f#diff-19cfa944d1bb9ce1daa46aa4223f3642

Vulnerability in Apache Hadoop 0.23.x, 2.x before 2.7.5, 2.8.x before 2.8.3, and 3.0.0-alpha through 3.0.0-beta1 allows a cluster user to expose private files owned by the user running the MapReduce job history server process. The malicious user can construct a configuration file containing XML directives that reference sensitive files on the MapReduce job history server host.

The YARN NodeManager daemon in Apache Hadoop 0.23.0 through 0.23.11 and 2.x before 2.5.2, when using Kerberos authentication, allows remote cluster users to change the permissions of certain files to world-readable via a symlink attack in a public tar archive, which is not properly handled during localization, related to distributed cache.