Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in Netty before version 4.1.44, where it accepted multiple Content-Length headers and also accepted both Transfer-Encoding, as well as Content-Length headers where it should reject the message under such circumstances. In circumstances where Netty is used in the context of a server, it could result in a viable HTTP smuggling vulnerability.

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Remedy

* Use HTTP/2 instead (clear boundaries between requests) * Disable reuse of backend connections eg. ```http-reuse never``` in HAProxy or whatever equivalent LB settings
First published (updated )

Contact

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